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The emerging literature on executive decree authority has generated important insights, but it has tended to select on the dependent variable (decrees), rather than view decrees as one of several possible ways that presidents can initiate policies. This article examines the conditions under which presidents resort to extraordinary rather than ordinary means of legislative initiative. Unilateral action theory claims that presidents will resort to decrees in unfavorable political environments, while delegation theory claims that decrees will flourish when the president is more politically secure. A study of four Brazilian presidents between 1988 and 1998 yields inconsistent support for both theories. Presidential popularity is only weakly related to the use of decree authority, but executive-legislative relations—especially coalition management via multiparty cabinets—is a more reliable predictor. Neither unilateral action theory nor delegation theory can fully account for the wide variation in the legislative strategies of presidents.

The relationship between elite behavior and mass preferences is in the essence of discussions about representative democracy. However, very little is known about who influences whom and how long it takes for such influence to be felt. This article presents results from a time-series dataset that allows us to verify the relationship between the mood of public opinion, presidents' choice of policy making instrument (extraordinary vs. ordinary legislation) and congressional support to presidents' policy initiatives in Brazil. We collected monthly observations of presidential popularity, patterns of roll-call voting in congress and presidents use of "medidas provisórias" as well as regular legislation. This dataset allows us to test, using time-series techniques, the impact of these variables on each other and the amount of lags it takes for these impacts to become significant.