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This article explores how emotions connected to the Government's handling of the Covid-19 outbreak in Sweden relates to behaviors to stop the spread of the virus, and which emotions functions as mediators in this relationship. The Swedish approach to handling the outbreak greatly differed from how many other Western European countries handled the situation and thus makes an important case to study. In a large representative survey (N = 2449), we found that satisfaction with how the Government handled the situation was related to more positive and less negative emotions. Anxiety, compassion and pride mediated the effect of satisfaction on compliance with the national recommendations such that anxiety and compassion increased compliance, while pride decreased it. Importantly though, satisfaction increased compassion and pride, but only compassion led to more compliant behaviors. In fact, satisfaction was indirectly related to less compliant behaviors via anxiety and pride. Shame mediated the effect on the tendency to wear face masks, a behavior that was explicitly not endorsed by the Swedish Public Health Agency. We speculate if the face mask, which was intensely debated, became a politicized symbol of dissatisfaction with the Swedish approach. In sum, it seems that individuals who were dissatisfied with how the government handled the Covid-19 outbreak were in fact engaging more in health-promotional behaviors to stop the spread of the virus.

The Covid‐19 pandemic has significantly changed the lives of most people. It has been described as the most severe global health disaster of modern times by the United Nations. No doubt such a major crisis influences what citizens think of different policies, and how they become politically active, not to mention, the forceful emotional experiences that the Covid‐19 pandemic brings. This study evaluates how emotions affect support for policies related to restricting the spread of the virus and economic assistance, and how emotions affect intentions to engage politically. In an experiment (N = 1,072), we manipulated emotional reactions to threat by highlighting different aspects of the pandemic. Our findings show that different experimental treatments elicit different emotions, and that fear, anxiety, and anger are all related to policy support and political action intentions, but in different ways. Fear and anger predict support for restrictive policies to limit the spread of the virus, while anxiety predicts support for economic policies. Anger and anxiety, but not fear, increase intentions to engage politically. Hence, we find support for a mechanism where different aspects of the Covid‐19 crisis evoke different emotional reactions, which in turn affects policy support and political actions differently.

Why do some individuals feel hostility and express bias against supporters of other political parties? Drawing on intergroup threat theory, we examine the role of emotions as a mechanism by which perceived threats against the ingroup are a source of increased affective polarization. In two survey experiments performed in the multiparty contexts of Sweden (N = 505) and Germany (N = 776), we manipulated intergroup threat using simulated online media, presenting participants with content related to immigration, and measured affective polarization using ratings of ingroup and outgroup supporter traits and feeling thermometers. Compared to a control condition, the threatening content evoked fear, anxiety, and anger among participants. However, only when individuals reacted to the threatening content with anger was increased affective polarization observed, in line with research showing that anger is a high‐arousal emotion related to an increased reliance on stereotypes. We conclude that individuals distance themselves from supporters of opposing political parties when they perceive a threat to their ingroup and subsequently react with anger. The findings contribute to the literature on affective polarization by stressing the role of emotional reactions to intergroup threat.

What makes people affectively polarized? Affective polarization is based on the idea that partisanship can be a social identity leading to polarization in the form of intergroup distancing between the own party and the other parties. In this study, we argue that perceived threats from an outgroup can spur affective polarization. To investigate this, we use the issue of immigration, often framed as a threat by right-wing groups, to examine whether individual-level differences influence how sensititivity to the perception of immigration as a threat. One such factor is the trait right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which is characterized by emphasis on submission to authority and upholding norms of social order. The emphasis among individuals with this trait on protecting the ingroup from threats means that negativity toward immigration is likely to extend toward political opponents, resulting in an increase in affective polarization. Thus, we hypothesize that the affective polarization is likely to increase when individuals interpret immigration as threatening, particularly for the individuals who are high in RWA aggression. We evaluate and find support for this claim using a large-scale survey performed in Sweden (N = 898). The results, showing a conditional effect of immigration attitudes on affective polarization, are consistent across three commonly used measures of affective polarization as follows: trait ratings, a social distance measure, and feeling thermometers. Overall, our results show that it is important to consider intergroup threats and intergroup differences in the context of sensitivity to such threats when explaining affective polarization.

The electoral success of radical right parties throughout Western Europe is the biggest change to these formerly stable party systems. Several studies have identified that mainstream parties can shape the trajectory of radical right parties. Our aim is to contribute to this literature, and to investigate if and how radical right parties gain from mainstream party recognition. Theoretically, we draw on the literature that has suggested that when aiming to explain the legitimization of radical right parties, we need to consider that many individuals in Western Europe are influenced by an anti-prejudice norm when forming preferences towards such parties. We hypothesize that when mainstream parties signal that it is acceptable to associate with radical right parties' they challenge the anti-prejudice norm that dissuade voters from such parties. In addition, individuals with lower internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP) are more susceptible to be affected by mainstream party recognition of radical right parties as those with high IMCP have a stronger internalized anti-prejudice norm. We evaluate the effects of changes in the normative context in a survey experiment (N = 1133) by manipulating mainstream party legitimization of a radical right party, the Sweden Democrats, before the Swedish parliamentary election in 2018. Our results suggest that when mainstream parties challenge the anti-prejudice norm, individuals are more likely to sympathize with radical right parties. Moreover, the effect of mainstream party recognition is moderated by IMCP – individuals with a low motivation to appear non-prejudiced are more influenced by mainstream party legitimization of a radical right party.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020, many governments tried to contain the spread of the virus by legally restricting social life and imposing national lockdowns. The Swedish government did not enforce a national lockdown, but instead appealed to the individual's self-responsibility to follow specific containment recommendations developed by the Swedish Public Health Agency. Sweden is thus an especially interesting case to study because of the potential influence of psychological and attitudinal individual-level factors that might contribute to compliance with containment recommendations. Drawing on previous literature on how individuals respond during health crises, we define and evaluate a mediation model that considers the role of personality traits and trust authorities to explain compliance. More specifically, we argue that we need to consider the role of trust in authorities to better understand the relationship between personality traits and compliance. In analyses based on a large-scale representative survey (N = 1,034), we find Conscientiousness to be directly linked to compliance, whereas Agreeableness, Neuroticism and Openness were indirectly related to compliance when trust in the Public Health Agency was taken into account.

What explains affective polarization among voters and societal groups? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that, while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings.

What explains affective polarization among voters and societal groups? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that, while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

What explains affective polarization among voters and societal groups? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that, while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings.

What explains conflict between various societal groups and polarization among voters? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings.

This article focuses on how party identity can shape policy support or opposition to the controversial issue of legalizing cannabis in Sweden, which is strongly opposed by the public. In a survey experiment (N = 3612), we manipulated if a message that supported or opposed a policy proposal to legalize cannabis was presented by a representative of the own party or an outgroup party. Results showed increased opposition to the proposal when the ingroup party opposed the policy and when the outgroup party endorsed the policy. When the ingroup party endorsed the policy and when the outgroup party opposed the policy, attitudes to the policy were not influenced. We argue that prior attitudes moderate how ingroup- and outgroup party messages are processed and that voters do not blindly follow the party line. Only when the own party presents a position that coincides with the individual's prior position, are attitudes strengthened and voters follow the party line. Attitudes are also strengthened as a way to increase distance to a disliked outgroup party. When the party cue contradicts prior beliefs (ingroup-endorse; outgroup-oppose), the information is ignored, which allows individuals to retain their view of the party, be it positive or negative.

Are people more likely to become more politically active through social media when they observe that their friends are active? Previous research has shown that an individual's likelihood of engaging politically is influenced by observations of how friends act through social media, but relatively little is known about how such social influence through social media interacts with personality features. We argue that individuals with high belongingness needs will engage in political activity if they believe that this is expected from the social groups they belong to. To evaluate this hypothesis, a survey experiment was designed (n = 289) in Qualtrics. We had two experimental conditions (friends or extended network) in which we informed participants that the most shared or "liked" online material among their friends or extended network on Facebook was a specific petition. In a control condition, they were informed that they were shown a random petition. To increase the credibility of the manipulation, we asked participants to log into a fictive app that supposedly downloaded their Facebook data. We show that individuals are more likely to engage politically if they observe that their friends have been politically active on Facebook, but only if they have high belongingness needs.

Social norms guide humans' everyday behavior, and previous research has shown that social norms consistently predict some forms of political participation. Failure to conform to norms may lead to deviation and possible rejection, which humans innately seek to avoid since it threatens their need for belongingness. Following an episode of rejection, individuals are therefore likely to become increasingly willing to conform to norms in order to re-establish a position in their social group. In an experiment, we show that 1) individuals conform to a perceived political engagement norm, and that 2) when rejection associations are made salient, they become increasingly willing to conform to a political engagement norm. We also show 3) that this effect is moderated by individual-level need for belongingness, such that rejection primed participants with a high need to belong, showed the highest levels of conformity to the perceived political engagement norm. The results imply that social pressure is a strong motivating factor in political engagement, which is an important result suggesting that basic social affiliation needs may in fact have an impact on politics and political outcomes. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Social norms guide humans' everyday behavior, and previous research has shown that social norms consistently predict some forms of political participation. Failure to conform to norms may lead to deviation and possible rejection, which humans innately seek to avoid since it threatens their need for belongingness. Following an episode of rejection, individuals are therefore likely to become increasingly willing to conform to norms in order to re-establish a position in their social group. In an experiment, we show that 1) individuals conform to a perceived political engagement norm, and that 2) when rejection associations are made salient, they become increasingly willing to conform to a political engagement norm. We also show 3) that this effect is moderated by individual-level need for belongingness, such that rejection primed participants with a high need to belong, showed the highest levels of conformity to the perceived political engagement norm. The results imply that social pressure is a strong motivating factor in political engagement, which is an important result suggesting that basic social affiliation needs may in fact have an impact on politics and political outcomes.