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'Dual use' refers to those technologies that can, with some adaptation, have both military and civilian applications. It is a concept rooted in the dichotomies of the Cold War. Over the last 55 years it has served both to structure an export control regime aimed at limiting the diffusion of advanced technology to hostile states and to underpin a range of domestic defense acquisition policies aimed at increasing the utilization of civilian technologies by the military. With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the boundaries between civil and military technologies, U.S. policy to control the spread of military-related technology is in disarray. A more workable policy would replace open-ended support for new military technology with a realistic assessment of the security risks and needs, and limit export controls to a few, highly dangerous technologies.

'Dual use' refers to those technologies that can, with some adaptation, have both military & civilian applications. It is a concept rooted in the dichotomies of the Cold War. Over the last 55 years it has served both to structure an export control regime aimed at limiting the diffusion of advanced technology to hostile states & to underpin a range of domestic defense acquisition policies aimed at increasing the utilization of civilian technologies by the military. With the end of the Cold War & the erosion of the boundaries between civil & military technologies, U.S. policy to control the spread of military-related technology is in disarray. A more workable policy would replace open-ended support for new military technology with a realistic assessment of the security risks & needs, & limit export controls to a few, highly dangerous technologies. Adapted from the source document.

In An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations Barry Buzan presents an overview of the field of strategic studies organized around the concepts of anarchy in the international state system and the technological imperative. The rivalries of the international system are fed by the stream of new weapons, and attempts to reach a stable status quo, e.g., through a stable deterrence posture, are constantly confounded by technological change. Given the impossibility of stemming the flow of technology from the civil to the military sector, there is no way out of the security dilemma. It is argued here, however, that a more sophisticated understanding of the processes of technical innovation and diffusion leads to a different conclusion. New technology is the result of social and political choices, and as such is subject to political control. Other points discussed include Buzan's treatment of Soviet military doctrine and his analysis of alternative defense policies within the framework of strategic studies.

ABSTRACTMilitary R&D is an important element in our national security, although advanced technology by itself does not insure military superiority. There is a large well‐funded program for military R&D in the U.S. Two kinds of questions are raised in connection with this program: the problem of optimizing the military effectiveness of the program through the allocation of resources among R&D projects and between R&D and other elements in the defense budget; and the problem of the long‐range effects of new weapons technology on international stability.