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This book explores the relations between the EU and the BRICS in the areas of politics, economic development, trade and security. The contributions cover topics such as the position of the EU and BRICS in the global order and the EU as a ""normative power,"" as well as the evolution, characteristics and institutionalization of BRICS and the roles of its member countries Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. The book will appeal to researchers and scholars interested in the rise of BRICS and the resulting challenges and opportunities for the European Union and Global Governance

This book explores the relations between the EU and the BRICS in the areas of politics, economic development, trade, and security. The contributions cover topics such as the position of the EU and BRICS in the global order and the EU as a "normative power," as well as the evolution, characteristics and institutionalization of BRICS and the roles of its member countries Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. The book will appeal to researchers and scholars interested in the rise of BRICS and the resulting challenges and opportunities for the European Union and Global Governance.

The purpose of this article is to take a closer look at the European Union's (EU) external policy and its diplomatic apparatus, i.e. the European External Action Service (EEAS). as a post-Westphalian political innovation specific only to the EU. The article assumes that the EU's post-Westphalian external policy is based on multilateralism, hybridism and normative plasticity. All the features of the EU's external policy became apparent in the EEAS, which, originally constructed as a 'service', gradually turned into an 'interstitial organisation'. Trying to find its place between standardisation and adaptation to the structures and practices typical of classical Westphalian diplomacy, and the emergence of transformative structures and new diplomatic practice, it has become a source of innovation related to the changing dynamics in diplomacy.

Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest empiryczna analiza znaczenia problematyki cyfryzacji w agendzie Grupy Dwudziestu (G20). Punktem wyjścia jest oparta na ilościowej i jakościowej analizie treści dokumentów i rozmowach z ekspertami obserwacja, zgodnie z którą problematyka ta – początkowo towarzysząca zagadnieniom gospodarczym i traktowana marginalnie przez G20 – zyskała na znaczeniu podczas prezydencji w Grupie sprawowanej przez Chiny (2016) i Niemcy (2017). Emancypując się spod kurateli ekonomii cyfryzacja stała się w latach 2016–2019 priorytetem w międzypaństwowej przestrzeni deliberacyjnej i podstawą promowanej przez G20 wizji "świata połączonego", opartego na przyjęciu szerokiego podejścia do przeobrażeń w cyberprzestrzeni i pozwalającego na powiązanie zagadnień ekonomicznych i finansowych z polityką rozwojową, bezpieczeństwem oraz ochroną praw obywatelskich.

This article looks at the European Union's external policy as a late-Westphalian political innovation. The article assumes that the external activity of the European Union goes beyond the classical framework of foreign policy, which is usually considered an attribute of the state, and the EU itself, as a hybrid entity, formulates and implements external policy. The latter has a normative and functional character, which means that the basis of the EU's presence in the world is a set of specific rules, tools and organizational structures allowing for actions that not only complement the foreign policy of the member states but also go beyond its framework. European Union's late-Westphalian external policy is based on three pillars – multilateralism, normative plasticity, and hybridism, which when considered collectively create an image of the EU's activity beyond the model of classical diplomacy and interstate cooperation.

AbstractThis article addresses challenges to the established international order. Its critique becomes particularly discernible at the domestic level, where political and economic frameworks are contested by electorates and anti-establishment movements in Western countries, engulfed by anti-globalisation sentiments and disillusioned with the asymmetric formula of globalisation. Populism implies that the 'social revolt' facing the West today, regardless of whether it takes place in France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, the UK or the USA, is not a legitimate response to deep-seated problems but rather is the problem itself. The main aims of this article are to investigate what has caused this surge of support for populism in the West; what the role of the default system of economic governance is in inspiring populist resentment; and, finally, what the identity crisis, stemming from 'hyperglobalisation', and wrecking the social order in Western societies has to do with fear, (un)fairness and the redistributive effects of economic globalisation.

This article addresses challenges to the established international order. Its critique becomes particularly discernible at the domestic level, where political and economic frameworks are contested by electorates and anti-establishment movements in Western countries, engulfed by anti-globalisation sentiments and disillusioned with the asymmetric formula of globalisation. Populism implies that the 'social revolt' facing the West today, regardless of whether it takes place in France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, the UK or the USA, is not a legitimate response to deep-seated problems but rather is the problem itself. The main aims of this article are to investigate what has caused this surge of support for populism in the West; what the role of the default system of economic governance is in inspiring populist resentment; and, finally, what the identity crisis, stemming from 'hyperglobalisation', and wrecking the social order in Western societies has to do with fear, (un)fairness and the redistributive effects of economic globalisation.

Abstract
The author of the article focuses on investigating the relationship between the outbreak of irregular migration to Europe and the increasing importance of transnational criminal networks. The starting point is the assumption that the transnational economy of crimigration (TEC) is driven by the illicit activity of private actors (the supply side) and potential migrants who create the demand for this kind of services, often not realizing the full extent of the consequences of entering into contractual relationships with groups of smugglers (the demand side). It is also assumed that the dynamics of the transnational economy of crimigration is one of the main causes of the rising wave of irregular migration and the migration crisis in the European Union.

The considerations presented in the paper demonstrate that the situation of women in the European labor market has considerably improved over the last decade. This is facilitated, among other things, by the extensive legal instruments stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in so-called 'equality directives'. Yet, despite this extensive and moderately coherent system of legal protection of women in the labor market, they continue to have a weaker position than men. Gender segregation in the European Union is a considerable problem; it is exemplified by women's limited access to attractive positions and a gender pay gap, i.e. obtaining lower remuneration than men employed in comparable positions. There are also other factors that influence limited women's activity in professional life. For a long time women have been second to men in terms of education, but the differences in this area have been gradually decreasing in recent times. What continues to be a factor to curb the participation of women in the European labor market is insufficient childcare provisions. It should be pointed out that confronting demography with employment, and requesting that women choose between home and family or work falsifies the problem. This has clearly been noted in the Europe 2020 strategy, which creates a feedback between women's employment and their traditional role of guardians of home and hearth. This is facilitated by flexible instruments in the labor market, such as contracts typical for a flexecurity model, e.g. non-standard contracts and flexible hour contracts. Their implementation can contribute to maintaining a positive trend that has recently been manifested in an increasing rate of employed women.

One of the results of the accelerated economic and social development over the last thirty years involves the emergence of social movements that are opposed to globalization. The objective of this paper is to present the main demands of the opponents of globalization, in particular in the context of the asymmetrical development of the parties in international relations. Anti-globalists and alter-globalists oppose the increasing importance of transnational corporations and the gradual shift of the point of gravity in the global economy from sovereign states to institutions of a regional, supraregional or global character. Anti-globalists note the progressing global crisis of legitimization of the democratic system of governance and the threat that it will be replaced by highly institutionalized technocratic structures (WTO, IMF, World Bank, European Commission). The role of anti-globalist and alter-globalist movements is of profound significance at present as they provide opposition to neoliberalism as the binding doctrine in global economy. Calling for the establishment of mechanisms that would provide for fair distribution of goods between the 'North' and the 'South' they contribute to the internationalization of the idea of collaboration between states thus ensuring that order be maintained in the global economy. Therefore, these movements support the 'weaker party' in international business relations – the developing countries. However, there is a negative aspect of their activity, namely they perceive globalization as a process of subordinating the weak by the strong, or – in other words – they refer to the idea of class struggle in the global economic system.

This article addresses selected issues enmeshed into global economic governance debate. It focuss on a role of international institutions in transforming world order, in particular the rise of emerging powers increasingly categorised or acronymised as BRICS, their resources, power and vested interests. The main narrative brings close the phenomenon of the new reshuffling in multilateral development banking (MDB). The New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as 'products' of the third wave of MDB emergence, fit well into the process coined as 'the recalibration of the world economy.' It is expressed by shift of the centre of global economic gravity towards non-western actors and can be explained by arguments derived from game theory. They elucidate exit – voice nexus, where the cost of exit for both organisation leaders (Western donors) and members (EMDCs, BRICS) is fragmented multilateralism and where thecost of voice is decreasing capacity to influence principles and procedures of multilateral development lending. The article in the first section starts with overview of three waves of multilateral development banking, where the most recent of them is partially explained using game theory argument. Second section starts from accentuating common characteristics of NDB and AIIB and then examines the differences between NDB and AIIB – entities which emerged during the third wave. The final section provides summaries and conclusions.

This article addresses selected issues enmeshed into global economic governance debate. It focus¬es on a role of international institutions in transforming world order, in particular the rise of emerging powers increasingly categorised or acronymised as BRICS, their resources, power and vested interests. The main narrative brings close the phenomenon of the new reshuffling in multilateral development banking (MDB). The New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as 'products' of the third wave of MDB emergence, fit well into the proc¬ess coined as 'the recalibration of the world economy.' It is expressed by shift of the centre of glo¬bal economic gravity towards non-western actors and can be explained by arguments derived from game theory. They elucidate exit - voice nexus, where the cost of exit for both organisation leaders (Western donors) and members (EMDCs, BRICS) is fragmented multilateralism and where the cost of voice is decreasing capacity to influence principles and procedures of multilateral develop¬ment lending. The article in the first section starts with overview of three waves of multilateral development banking, where the most recent of them is partially explained using game theory argument. Second section starts from accentuating common characteristics of NDB and AIIB and then examines the differences between NDB and AIIB - entities which emerged during the third wave. The final section provides summaries and conclusions. ; Artykuł porusza wybrane zagadnienia związane z debatą na temat globalnego zarządzania gospodarczego. Koncentruje się na roli instytucji międzynarodowych w przekształcaniu porządku światowego, w szczególności w odniesieniu do wzrostu znaczenia potęg wschodzących, coraz częściej kategoryzowanych lub akronimizowanych jako BRICS, ich zasobów, władzy i żywotnych interesów. Główna narracja przybliża zjawisko najnowszych tendencji rozwojowych w wielostronnej bankowości rozwojowej (MDB). Nowy Bank Rozwoju (NDB) i Azjatycki Bank Inwestycji Infrastrukturalnych (AIIB) jako "produkty" trzeciej fali pojawiania się MDB, dobrze wpisują się w proces określany jako "rekalibracja gospodarki światowej." Wyraża się on poprzez przesunięcie środka globalnej grawitacji ekonomicznej w stronę niezachodnich aktorów, co można to wytłumaczyć argumentami wywodzącymi się z teorii gier. Wyjaśniają one związek między wyjściem a głosami, w którym kosztem wyjścia zarówno dla liderów organizacji (dawców z Zachodu), jak i dla członków organizacji (EMDC, BRICS) jest rozdrobniony multilateralizm, a kosztem głosu jest zmniejszenie zdolności wpływania na zasady i procedury wielostronnych pożyczek rozwojowych. W pierwszej części artykułu dokonuje się przeglądu trzech fal wielostronnej bankowości rozwojowej, przy czym ostatnią z nich częściowo wyjaśniono za pomocą argumentów zaczerpniętych z teorii gier. Drugą część zaczęto od zaakcentowania wspólnych cech NDB i AIIB, po czym zbadano różnice pomiędzy NDB i AIIB - podmiotami, które pojawiły się podczas trzeciej fali. Ostatnia sekcja artykułu zawiera podsumowanie i wnioski.