Suchergebnisse

1. Existentialism and its heritage -- 2. Heidegger and the existential analytic -- 3. Condemned to freedom : Sartre's phenomenological ontology -- 4. Sartre : hell is other people -- 5. Merleau-Ponty and the body -- 6. De Beauvoir : feminism and existential ethics -- 7. The legacy of existentialism : deconstruction, responsibility and the time of the decision.

Intro -- CONTENTS -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part 1 -- 1 MERLEAU-PONTY, THE BODY-SUBJECT, AND THE DISCIPLINING OF REFLECTION -- 2 THE DECONSTRUCTION OF OPPOSITIONS -- 3 THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE -- 4 HABITUALITY AND UNDECIDABILITY -- Part 2 -- 5 SOLIPSISM AND THE MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC -- 6 MERLEAU-PONTY, LÉVINAS, AND THE ALTERITY OF THE OTHER -- 7 THE OTHER OF DERRIDEAN DECONSTRUCTION -- 8 POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE, SELF AND OTHER, AND THE REVERSIBILITY OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND DERRIDA -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

AbstractIn this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem" for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus' work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.

AbstractPhenomenology has been described as a "non-argumentocentric" way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the "usual suspects" or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and in terms of justification. This paper identifies two main steps to making this case. The first step takes seriously the consequences of the intrinsically dialectical aspect of phenomenology in intersection with other modes of philosophy, the natural attitude, and non-philosophy. The second step focuses on transcendental reflection and arguments about the conditions/structures they contain. Together, these two steps aim to rescue phenomenology from the objection that it has an "ostrich epistemology" with regard to the ostensible purity of description, the intuition of essences, or the "conditions" ascertained through transcendental reflection.

Abstract
In this paper, I consider a challenge that naturalism poses for embodied cognition and enactivism, as well as for work on phenomenology of the body that has an argumentative or explanatory dimension. It concerns the connection between embodiment and emergence. In the commitment to explanatory holism, and the irreducibility of embodiment to any mechanistic and/or neurocentric construal of the interactions of the component parts, I argue there is (often, if not always) an unavowed dependence on an epistemic and metaphysical role for emergence, especially concerning certain embodied capacities (motor-intentionality, know-how, skilful habits, affordances, etc.). While the problem of emergence is standardly dismissed as a problem for phenomenology, which brackets away the kind of materialist (and scientific) picture from which reflection on emergence derives, I argue that once a phenomenologist takes a fully-fledged embodied turn, they also have a genuine dilemma of emergence to confront, and I evaluate the relevant options.

Cover page -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- CONTENTS -- TABLES AND FIGURES -- Dedication -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- Chapter One THE RISE OF LABOUR AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM: THE GENERAL PROBLEM AND WEST YORKSHIRE -- Chapter Two THE ORIGINS OF SOCIALISM AND INDEPENDENT LABOUR -- Chapter Three TRADE UNIONS AND THE INDEPENDENT LABOUR PARTY: THE GENESIS OF THE ILP IN WEST YORKSHIRE -- Chapter Four LIBERAL RESPONSES AND LABOUR DIFFICULTIES IN THE 1890S -- Chapter Five LABOUR RESURGENCE 1900-6 -- Chapter Six LIBERAL DECLINE AND LABOUR GROWTH 1906-14 -- Chapter Seven THE FIRST WORLD WAR -- CONCLUSION -- EPILOGUE -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX