Suchergebnisse

Contents: Introduction -- section I: The political economy of climate change and climate policy -- 1. Distributional issues in climate policy: Air quality co-benefits and carbon rent / James K. Boyce -- 2. Evaluating policies to implement the Paris Agreement: A toolkit with application to China / Ian Parry, Baoping Shang, Nate Vernon, Philippe Windeger and Tarun Narasimhan -- 3. Bargaining to lose: A permeability approach to post-transition resource extraction / Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal -- 4. Host-MNC relations in resource-rich countries / Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal and Geoffrey M. Heal -- 5. Bargaining to lose the global commons / Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal and Graciela Chichilnisky -- section II: Integrated assessment modelling -- 6. Integrated assessment models of climate change / Chris Hope -- 7. Climate change policy under spatial heat transport and polar amplification / William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas -- 8. Progressive adaptation strategies in European coastal cities: A response to flood-risk under uncertainty / Luis M. Abadie, Elisa Sainz de Murieta, Ibon Galarraga and Anil Markandya -- 9. Economic growth and the social cost of carbon: Additive versus multiplicative damages / Armon Rezai, Frederick van der Ploeg and Cees Withagen -- 10. Optimal global climate policy and regional carbon prices / Mark Budolfson and Francis Dennig -- 11. Tipping and reference points in climate change games / Alessandro Tavoni and Doruk Iris -- section III: Climate change and sustainability -- 12. Climate change, Malthus and collapse / Norman Schofield -- 13. Greenhouse gas and cyclical growth / Lance Taylor and Duncan Foley -- 14. Growth and sustainability / Robin Hahnel -- 15. Intergenerational altruism: A solution to the climate problem? / Frikk Nesje and Geir Asheim -- 16. On intertemporal equity and efficiency in a model of global warming / John Hartwick and Tapan Mitra -- 17. Transformational change: Parallels for addressing climate and development goals / Penny Mealy and Cameron Hepburn -- 18. Less precision, more truth: Uncertainty in climate economics and macroprudential policy / Cameron Hepburn and J. Doyne Farmer -- Index.

Contents -- 1 The Economics of the Global Environment-Catastrophic Risks in Theory and Practice -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Part I. Catastrophic Risk in Economic Theory -- 3 Part II. Ethical and Welfare Considerations -- 4 Part III. The Environment in a Global Context -- 5 Part IV. The Case of Climate Change -- 6 Part V. Economic Policy and Regulation -- 7 Part VI. Catastrophic Risk in Economic Practice -- References -- Part I Catastrophic Risk in Economic Theory -- Catastrophic Risk, Rare Events, and Black Swans: Could There Be a Countably Additive Synthesis? -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Countably Additive Subjective Probability -- 1.2 Monotonicity -- 1.3 Beyond Monotonicity -- 1.4 Outline of Paper -- 2 Catastrophic Risk -- 2.1 Etymology -- 2.2 Catastrophic Consequences -- 2.3 Assumptions -- 2.4 Money Metric Utility -- 2.5 A Critical Probability Level: Catastrophic Risk -- 2.6 Extreme Economic Catastrophes -- 3 Rare Events -- 3.1 Standard Decision Theory -- 3.2 Infinitesimal Probability -- 3.3 Rare Events and Infinitesimal Probabilities -- 3.4 A Metric Completion -- 3.5 Extended Probability Measures -- 3.6 Extended Subjective Expected Utility -- 3.7 Lexicographic Expected Utility -- 4 Black Swans -- 4.1 Background -- 4.2 Black Swan Events -- 4.3 An Initial Simple Tree -- 4.4 Initial Evaluation -- 4.5 Enriched Subtrees -- 4.6 Retrospective Evaluation in the Enlivened Tree -- 4.7 Cardinally Equivalent Evaluation Functions -- 4.8 Uncertain Retrospective Evaluation -- 4.9 State-Dependent Consequence Domains -- 4.10 Subjective Expected Evaluation -- 4.11 Hubris Versus Enlivenment -- 4.12 Could There Be a Metamodel? -- 4.13 Should We Look for a Meta Stochastic Process? -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Preference Representations for Catastrophic Risk Analysis -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Problem -- 1.2 Some Modeling Issues -- 1.3 What We Do

AbstractTrade changes incentives to protect an open-access natural resource independently of its effect on the resource price. General equilibrium linkages cause resource policy to affect the price of privately owned assets regardless of whether they are used in the resource sector. In the closed economy, the asset market in our overlapping generations setting creates incentives for currently living agents to protect the natural resource. The interplay of the asset market and general equilibrium effects causes trade to reverse these incentives. Trade liberalization and the establishment of formal property rights are policy complements: the former makes the latter more important.

Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability states that fixed
exchange rate regimes require a leader that will provide it with disproportionate
resources to ensure stability. Applying his theory to European monetary
cooperation, we argue that, like the tools of Goethe's "Sorcerer's Apprentice,"
European Monetary Union was constructed as a "self-regulating system," and
it threatens to run amok without a hegemonic leader. Germany has exercised
"soft hegemony" in Europe, providing the European Union with disproportionate
resources to stabilize the single market. It has the capability to be the
Eurozone's leader. But, by 2017, blinded by its ordoliberal ideology, i t refused
to do so, instead placing the burden of cooperation on the weak. If Germany
continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, European Monetary
Union faces collapse.

This volume brings together papers inspired by the work of Duncan Foley, an extraordinarily productive economist who has made seminal contributions to a wide variety of areas. Foley's work cannot be easily classified, but one thread that runs through it is a critical examination (along both ethical and analytical lines) of conventional neoclassical economic theory, particularly involving general equilibrium theories of value and money. Foley was a pioneer of complexity economics as well, which adopts approaches to these questions drawn from natural sciences, so the collection therefore has an interdisciplinary quality that will interest a wide variety of readers. Some of the chapters are intellectual biographies that contextualize and identify Foley's contributions to Keynesian macroeconomics, Marxian value theory, and complexity theory in economics. The topics covered include the economics of complexity; the ethics of general equilibrium theory; the economics of climate change; applications of Keynesian, Marxian and Ricardian political economy; and money and financial crises. The collection should be useful to scholars who work in various economic traditions critical of the currently dominant free-market approach, but it also speaks to scholars of critical theory in various disciplines beyond economics such as the mathematicians, physicists, and other natural scientists who are interested in understanding the complexity of social processes using their analytical frameworks. This book should also appeal to graduate students in economics who are working in these traditions, as well as scholars (including current graduate students in orthodox programs) who are dissatisfied with the current state of economic theory and would like to satisfy their intellectual curiosity by sampling the contributions of critical theorists.

The general equilibrium model developed by Golosov et al. (2014), GHKT for short, is modified to allow for additional negative impacts of global warming on utility and productivity growth, mean reversion in the ratio of climate damages to production, labour-augmenting technical progress, and population growth. We also replace the GHKT assumption of full depreciation of capital each decade by annual logarithmic depreciation. Furthermore, we allow the government to use a lower discount rate than the private sector. We derive a tractable rule for the optimal carbon price for each of these extensions. We then simplify the GHKT model by making temperature a linear function of cumulative emissions and making the proportion of output lost due to global warming a linear function of temperature. Finally, we consider how the rule for the optimal carbon price must be modified to allow for a temperature cap, and what this implies for stranded oil and gas reserves. We illustrate our analytical results with a range of optimal policy simulations.

The tractable general equilibrium model developed by Golosov et al. (2014), GHKT for short, is modified to allow for additional negative impacts of global warming on utility and productivity growth, mean reversion in the ratio of climate damages to production, labour-augmenting technical progress, and population growth. We also replace the GHKT assumption of full depreciation of capital each decade by annual logarithmic depreciation. Furthermore, we allow the government to use a lower discount rate than the private sector. We derive a tractable rule for the optimal carbon price for each of these extensions which contain the GHKT model as a special case. Finally, the GHKT model is simplified by modelling temperature as cumulative emissions and calibrated to Burke et al. (2015) damages. We illustrate our analytical rules with a range of optimal policy simulations.

A simple integrated assessment framework that gives rules for the optimal carbon price, transition to the carbon-free era and stranded carbon assets is presented, which highlights the ethical, economic, geophysical and political drivers of optimal climate policy. For the ethics we discuss the role of intergenerational inequality aversion and the discount rate, where we show the importance of lower discount rates for appraisal of longer run benefit and of policy makers using lower discount rates than private agents. The economics depends on the costs and rates of technical progress in production of fossil fuel, its substitute renewable energies and sequestration. The geophysics depends on the permanent and transient components of atmospheric carbon and the relatively fast temperature response, and we allow for positive feedbacks. The politics stems from international free-rider problems in absence of a global climate deal. We show how results change if different assumptions are made about each of the drivers of climate policy. Our main objective is to offer an easy back-on-the-envelope analysis, which can be used for teaching and communication with policy makers.

A simple integrated assessment framework that gives rules for the optimal carbon price, transition to the carbon-free era and stranded carbon assets is presented, which highlights the ethical, economic, geophysical and political drivers of optimal climate policy. For the ethics we discuss the role of intergenerational inequality aversion and the discount rate, where we show the importance of lower discount rates for appraisal of longer run benefit and of policy makers using lower discount rates than private agents. The economics depends on the costs and rates of technical progress in production of fossil fuel, its substitute renewable energies and sequestration. The geophysics depends on the permanent and transient components of atmospheric carbon and the relatively fast temperature response, and we allow for positive feedbacks. The politics stems from international free-rider problems in absence of a global climate deal. We show how results change if different assumptions are made about each of the drivers of climate policy. Our main objective is to offer an easy back-on-the-envelope analysis, which can be used for teaching and communication with policy makers.