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The article analyzes the populist attitudes in a society that has experienced full-scale external aggression under the conditions of populist rule and the "rally around the flag" effect. Typically, in countries where populists are in power, there is a decline in anti-elitist sentiment and a rise in support for anti-democratic orientations. However, after the landslide victory of populists in Ukraine in 2019 and even during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, citizens demonstrated an increased level of support for populist ideas. In particular, most Ukrainians agree with populist ideas of people-centrism. Public opinion is still dominated by anti-establishment and anti-elitist orientations, despite national unity during the war and support for the current government. On the other hand, while advocating the absolute primacy of popular sovereignty, citizens are divided on whether they want to be represented in politics by an ordinary citizen rather than an experienced politician. Moreover, most Ukrainians do not agree with the expediency of violating the law to achieve a political result. Support for populism in Ukraine is concentrated primarily among economically disadvantaged people living in small towns, less educated, older people, and those with financial problems. At the same time, the populist orientations of Ukrainians during the war were not determined by regional or ethnolinguistic distinctions.

Populist orientations refer to a set of political beliefs and values that emphasize the interests of «ordinary people» with a corresponding need to challenge the political establishment. In Ukraine, long social transformations in the post-communist period led to total mistrust and a negative attitude toward state institutions. The post-communist irremovability of the political establishment led to persistent anti-elitist attitudes. As a result of the inconsistency and contradictions of Ukraine's path to democracy, a basic «transitional type» of personality has emerged. It is characterized by psychological ambivalence, that is a double contradictory attitude to the prospects of society's development. The connection of ambivalent consciousness with populist orientations often arises because both phenomena are based on the absence of a stable ideological orientation or a clear political identity. The ambivalent consciousness and unbelief in the pluralist mechanisms of an imperfect democracy have fuelled the population's attachment authoritarian methods in politics, which is a reflection of the hopes for effective governance. However, the existence of polarization in Ukrainian society based on geopolitical orientations and social identities for a long time conditioned citizens to rely on traditional political forces in their electoral behavior. Only after the disappearance of this polarization did populist orientations materialize into the electoral phenomenon of 2019. In the course of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, a radical reassessment of the state and state institutions by the population took place, and therefore the antagonism between the population and the elite became temporarily irrelevant. However, post-war reconstruction carries with it the risks of a revival and growth of populist orientations, as economic difficulties will exacerbate intolerant of social injustice.

The phenomenon of growing support for populist parties and relevant orientations among the world's population is usually defined as a threat to democracy, social unity, and civic activism. The psychological appeal of populist ideas is based on the human need for collective identity, social cohesion, categorization of social life, predictability and sense of security as well as moral absolutism and support for conspiracy theories. This leads to the spread of confrontational discourse in the public sphere, support for authoritarianism and deepening social cleavages. However, empirical researches show the ambiguous focus of populist orientations in support of anti-democratic ideas. In fact, citizens with populist orientations should not be unambiguously identified with voters of populist parties. Because of its mobilizing potential, populism can make the democratic process more inclusive, as people with populist orientations support deliberative forms of democracy. In some cases, populist mobilization become useful in emergencies, such as the overthrow of an authoritarian regime or resistance to the enemy during war. However, populism can be an obstacle in trying to reform state institutions, as the absolutization of simplistic forms of government and the propensity for authoritarianism common among populists block civic initiative.

The article analyzes the determinants of citizens' assessment of the activity of the Presidents of Ukraine during 1994–2020. The institution of the Presidency in the mass consciousness of Ukrainians is a reflection of social stratification. Social groups, formed mainly by different identities, evaluate the President's activities through the prism of their own economic situation, ideological identification, ethno-cultural affiliations, ethno-political aspirations and geopolitical orientations. The attitudes of Ukrainians to the head of state are related to electoral cycles, when the most positive assessments of activity are observed in the first year after the election. Using the method of multiple linear regression, it was found that the socio-economic determinant of the financial situation of the family was less tied to the electoral cycles: regardless of the term of office of the President , wealthy citizens evaluate his activities more positively while the poor ones evaluate it more negatively. In the mid-1990s, the attitudes towards the President of Ukraine were also differentiated by a region of residence and a language of communication in the family. However, after 2004 the factor of language communication in the family has reduced its influence on the assessment of the President's actions in favor of the question of the expediency of the Russian language official status. The factor of regional polarization restored its influence during 2003–2013. At the same time, since the end of the 1990s, the factor of geopolitical orientations of citizens has been gaining influence and has become one of the key ones in the following years. The assessment of the activities of Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko is characterized by clear geopolitical orientations. Instead, the attitudes to the activities of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi in the second year of his term are characterized by a negative attitude of respondents with both left and right ideological views.

It has become an axiom in the scientific literature that any civic engagement contributes to democratic transit and the development of civil society. However, different types of this behavior may have different determinants. These may be actions motivated by civic norms and values, but may also be actions driven by financial encouragement or administrative pressure, especially in transitional democracies. The purpose of the study was to identify the impact of modernization values and orientations on different types of civic activism. The author created an indicator where among the options for the answers was offered a list of socio-political measures that were most relevant at the time of the survey. The substantive side of these activities combined the way and the object of communicating their public aspirations and interests. The most common are discussion forms of civil practices that are individualized. These practices do not require much organizational or collective effort and do not require direct interaction with political or governmental institutions. Practices that combine economic activities also have individualized traits, but they require financial costs or sample consumption, so they are less common. Socio-political practices, civic-local practices and protest-demonstration practices are even less common because they require organizational or collective efforts. Five types of civic practices of the Ukrainian population have been empirically identified and their relationship with democracy and liberal values tested. By means of multiple linear regression method, there was found that only civic practices that combine an ethical consumerism, financial donations and political discussions claim that their subjects could be considered as a social basis of Ukraine's democratic transit. The likelihood of such actions increases with the increase of education levels, decrease of age and living in large settlements. The paradox is that people who profess values of modernization are ready to fund activists, among whom these values are not traced.

It has become an axiom in the scientific literature that any civic engagement contributes to democratic transit and the development of civil society. However, different types of this behavior may have different determinants. These may be actions motivated by civic norms and values, but may also be actions driven by financial encouragement or administrative pressure, especially in transitional democracies. The purpose of the study was to identify the impact of modernization values and orientations on different types of civic activism. The author created an indicator where among the options for the answers was offered a list of socio-political measures that were most relevant at the time of the survey. The substantive side of these activities combined the way and the object of communicating their public aspirations and interests. The most common are discussion forms of civil practices that are individualized. These practices do not require much organizational or collective effort and do not require direct interaction with political or governmental institutions. Practices that combine economic activities also have individualized traits, but they require financial costs or sample consumption, so they are less common. Socio-political practices, civic-local practices and protest-demonstration practices are even less common because they require organizational or collective efforts. Five types of civic practices of the Ukrainian population have been empirically identified and their relationship with democracy and liberal values tested. By means of multiple linear regression method, there was found that only civic practices that combine an ethical consumerism, financial donations and political discussions claim that their subjects could be considered as a social basis of Ukraine's democratic transit. The likelihood of such actions increases with the increase of education levels, decrease of age and living in large settlements. The paradox is that people who profess values of modernization are ready to fund activists, among whom these values are not traced.

The article examines the determinants of social tension in Ukraine on the perception, intention and context levels. The comparative analysis was conducted out on the basis of a social survey carried out by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center in June 2017. The use of the regressive method has allowed common and distinct factors of certain manifestations of social tension. The expectations of mass protests are widespread among urbanized strata of poor young people who are living in the West-Central macroregion and pessimistic about the political situation. The personal readiness to engage in protests increases among young people who are living in the West-Central Macroregion, pessimistic about the political situation, consider the Ukrainian language native and have a pro-European orientation. The willingness to take part in long-term protests over most of the current problems has manifested itself among the inhabitants of the South-East Macroregion, who pessimistically assess the political situation, declared the Ukrainian language as a native and in certain cases self-identify themselves with the middle class. ; В статье рассматриваются детерминанты социальной напряженности в Украине на перцептивном, интенциональном и содержательном уровнях. Сравнительный анализ осуществляется на основе данных социологического опроса, проведенного Фондом «Демократические инициативы» имени Илька Кучерива и Центром Разумкова в июне 2017 года. Подчеркивается, что применение регрессионного метода позволило выявить общие и отличительные факторы отдельных проявлений социальной напряженности. Акцентируется внимание на том, что ожидания массовых протестов и личная готовность присоединиться к ним растут среди молодежи, особенно малообеспеченной, которая проживает в городах западно-центрального макрорегиона, пессимистично оценивает политическую ситуацию в стране, считает украинский язык родным и имеет проевропейскую ориентацию. Готовность принимать участие в длительных протестах по большинству актуальных проблем проявилась среди жителей юго-восточного макрорегиона, которые отличаются пессимистичными оценками политической ситуации в стране, считают украинский язык своим родным языком и в определенных случаях идентифицируют себя со средним классом ; У статті розглядаються детермінанти соціальної напруженості в Україні на перцептивному, інтенціональному та змістовному рівнях. Порівняльний аналіз здійснюється на основі даних соціологічного опитування, яке було проведено Фондом «Демократичні ініціативи» імені Ілька Кучеріва та Центром Разумкова у червні 2017 року. Зазначається, що застосування регресійного методу дало змогу виявити спільні та відмінні чинники окремих проявів соціальної напруженості. Підкреслюється, що очікування масових протестів та особиста готовність долучитися до них зростають серед молоді, перш за все незаможної, яка проживає у містах західно-центрального макрорегіону, песимістично оцінює політичну ситуацію в країні, вважає українську мову рідною та має проєвропейську орієнтацію. Акцентується на тому, що готовність брати участь у довготривалих протестах щодо більшості актуальних проблем проявилася серед мешканців південно-східного макрорегіону, які відрізняються песимістичними оцінками політичної ситуації в країні, визнають українську мову в якості рідної та у певних випадках ідентифікують себе з середнім класом.

The article examines the determinants for participation in two Ukrainian revolutions, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014. These revolutions were proof of the social movement that accompanies post-communist transition in an Eastern European country. This social movement, in a transitional society in the process of redefining traditional ethno-cultural identities, defined a value-rational understanding of democracy and market economy. A result of Ukrainian government action, these two revolts (which occurred less than ten years apart) have both similar and different features. The methods of binary logistic regression used in this research reveal that both protests are the result of macroregional division and the Ukrainian population's foreign policy priorities. However, in determining participation in the Orange Revolution, these factors also combined with principles of linguistic identity, age, and status differentiation. In contrast, participation in the Revolution of Dignity was shaped by support for democratic and market values.

The paper considers economic factors of marriage and cohabitation of men and women in European countries. The analysis showed that the impact of economic factors of marriage or cohabitation is more typical for developed countries of Western Europe. Moreover, the large proportion of variance of the influence of economic factors is observed more among women than among men.
Influence of comprehensive income on marriage and cohabitation are fixed among men, while influence of paid employment on marriage and cohabitation observed among women.

The paper deals with hypothesis for probable socio-economic, professional-educational, information-technological and personal-innovational preconditions of employee's autonomy in Ukraine under global informatization.
This hypothesis correctness is confirmed to a considerable extent by its empirical testing with the use of the model of multiple linear regression. It is established that socio-economic predetermining of employees' autonomy prevails in the contemporary Ukrainian society.

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the phenomenon of private property in the social theories of utopian socialism. Attention is paid to the justification of the provisions of the social dysfunction of private property.
The argumentation of the necessity of the abolition of private property has been studied.

Article is devoted to the empirical analysis of the socio-economic harassments of Ukrainian school graduates. Among the graduates of 2011/12 school year, the most popular are entrepreneurial, consumer and educational harassments.
The article compares types of harassments in terms of success in learning, in terms of religion, gender, and regional settlement structure.