Suchergebnisse

Preface and Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Turning Lemons into Lemonade? Party Strategy as Compensation for External Stresses -- 1.1 Plan of the Book -- References -- Chapter 2: This Is Trump Country: Donald Trump's Base and Partisan Change in Unhyphenated America -- 2.1 The Ethnicity of Americans -- 2.2 The Demography, Geography, and Politics of the Unhyphenated -- 2.3 Unhyphenated Americans and Donald Trump -- 2.4 The 2016 General Election in Unhyphenated America -- 2.5 Unhyphenated America and the Challenge to the Parties -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3: Parties and Populism in 2016 -- 3.1 Populism and Parties in US History -- 3.2 Populism in 2016 -- 3.3 Sanders Takes on Establishment Democratic Party Politics -- 3.4 Trump Against the Establishment -- 3.5 Michigan 2016: A Case Study in Populist Messaging -- 3.6 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: From Consensus to Conflict: Political Polarization, the Culture War, and Gay Rights -- 4.1 The Study of Political Polarization and the Culture War: Myth or Reality? -- 4.2 Defining and Assessing Polarization: Averages, Density, and Consensus Versus Conflict -- 4.3 An Empirical Operationalization of Polarization: Consensus to Conflict -- 4.4 From Consensus to Polarization: Public Opinion on Gay Rights in America: 1970-2016 -- 4.4.1 In to the Headwind: The Anti-Gay Rights Consensus, 1970-1988 -- 4.4.2 Sowing the Wind: An Emergent Social Conflict on Gay Rights, 1988-1991 -- 4.4.3 Reaping the Whirlwind: The Culture War on Gay Rights, 1991-2016 -- 4.5 Data -- 4.6 Empirical Analysis of Trends in POCP for Gay Rights, 1971-2016 -- 4.6.1 Models and Methods -- 4.6.2 Analysis: Exploring the Path from Consensus to Conflict on Gay Rights -- 4.7 From Consensus to Conflict: The Collapse of Consensus and Rise of Polarization on Gay Rights

This book addresses the changing electoral and political circumstances in which American political parties found themselves during the 2016 election, and the strategic adaptations this new pressure may require. The respective establishments of both major political parties have found themselves facing serious challenges. Some observers wondered if realignment was in progress, and whether the parties could survive. Both grounded in research and accessible to more than just academics, this book provides important insights into how political parties can move forward from 2016.

Veto threats may offer presidents bargaining leverage, but such leverage will be diminished if they and those with whom they transact business view a veto as hurting the president's approval rating and his party's prospects in the next election. How concerned must presidents be about the audience costs associated with a veto? Political science research suggests that they should be in that the public does not like vetoes and punishes presidents when they exercise this authority. In this article, we test this argument with survey responses during times after presidents have issued a veto threat but before an actual veto. While, on average, respondents register opposition to a veto, this preference varies greatly with the specific policy in question and with respondents' party identification and presidential approval. The results suggest that opposition to a veto comes disproportionately, may be limited to politically distant respondents, and thus may not be as costly as the net negative numbers suggest.

Presidents' audiences have been shrinking over time. Prior research suggests that the rise of cable television is to blame. We investigate whether this shrinkage is occurring disproportionately among those the president most needs to persuade—disapprovers of his performance. Analyzing both A. C. Nielsen's audience ratings and self‐reports of speech watching from 32 postspeech surveys, we find that as the share of households subscribing to cable has grown, the statistical relationship between the president's approval rating and the percentage watching his televised speeches has strengthened commensurately for each group of party identifiers. Consequently, as presidential approval ratings have polarized during the past two decades, so too has the partisan composition of presidents' audiences, a phenomenon unknown during the broadcast era. Modern presidents thus find themselves increasingly preaching to their party choir and losing the capacity to influence public opinion more broadly.

Introduction: why young adult political expression deserves a fresh look -- Part I. Posting, protesting, and civic engagement: causes and movements that mobilized -- The MeToo movement: how an online social movement sparked civic engagement -- Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett: how controversial Supreme Court nominations provided opportunities to get involved -- School shootings: how gun violence encouraged civic involvement -- Immigration and family separation: when political expression fails to expand participation -- Black Lives Matter: how a surging movement engaged young people in -- Part II. Moving from the outside in: the link between posting and protesting and contacting elected officials -- Messages received? Examining the link between young adults posting political views online and sharing views with elected officials -- Discontent heard? Examining the link between young adults engaging in protests and sharing views with elected officials -- Conclusion: assessing young adult political power.

Web 2.0 and the Political Mobilization of College Students investigates young adults' political participation by looking at their online activities and the ways in which these forums help mobilize young adults to participate in their political system online and offline.

ObjectiveWe investigate whether the Iraq War might be a catalyzing event for this generation, like Vietnam was for baby boomers or World War II for the "greatest generation," through testing how opinions about the war influence patterns of political participation.MethodsUsing data from an Internet‐based survey of randomly sampled college students at a midwestern state university and the 2008 National Election Studies, we investigate the relationship between disapproval of Bush's handling of the Iraq War and a variety of forms of political participation, including two that are new in this generation: "friending" or joining an online political group or expressing one's political views online.ResultsWe discover that young voters who expressed opposition to Bush's handling of the war in Iraq are more likely to be civically engaged.ConclusionWhile it is too early to determine how long the effect will last or how it will change over the course of young voters' life cycles, at least in the short term, it appears opposition to the Iraq War has catalyzed greater levels of political participation.