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The world needs a UN 3.0. The extent and severity of global crises are such that business as usual provides no solution. Roland Rich's Leviathan describes the necessary next version of the United Nations. It is a confident, competent, and independent organization that incorporates the world of business and global civil society as well as governments. It will certainly not have a monopoly on the use of force, but it will lead the international community through a mix of the principle of subsidiarity placing it at the apex, the application of the process of certification whereby thousands of entities are engaged in problem-solving, and the benefit of legitimacy earned through performance. The result will allow the UN to tackle the climate crisis, broaden the protection of democracy and human rights, govern globalization, and be better prepared for the next pandemic. Leviathan contains a vision but not a blueprint. Yet it does spell out how to achieve the first essential step – to clip the wings of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Democracy is in crisis. After the hope engendered by the Third Wave, democracies around the world are beleaguered with threats from multiple sources. What are these threats? Where did they come from? And how can the challenges to democratic governance best be overcome? Grappling with these questions, Roland Rich interprets the danger signs that abound in the United States and Europe, in Asia and the Arab World, in Africa and Latin America, and offers innovative strategies for turning the tide

Political parties are an essential ingredient in a modern democracy. They are also seen as the least trusted and most problematic institution in most democratic systems. While there have been attempts to strengthen parties through institutional design and capacity building, a new strategy has been to quarantine them from parts of parliament. Within the space of a few years the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia implemented designs for parliamentary representation that proscribed the established political parties from a parliamentary chamber or part thereof. Using these three countries as case

Political parties are an essential ingredient in a modern democracy. They are also seen as the least trusted and most problematic institution in most democratic systems. While there have been attempts to strengthen parties through institutional design and capacity building, a new strategy has been to quarantine them from parts of parliament. Within the space of a few years the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia implemented designs for parliamentary representation that proscribed the established political parties from a parliamentary chamber or part thereof. Using these three countries as case studies, this book traces the historical context for institutional designs, the intentions behind them and their implementation through at least one full parliamentary term. It investigates the conceptual architecture of the non-partisan designs, identifying corporatism as one (discredited) alternative and "championship" as another. While there is a yearning for exemplary people as representatives, the designers have struggled to find a successful means of having these champions elected to office. The book concludes that non-partisan chambers, based on the evidence to date, are not viable. Roland Rich is Executive Head of the United Nations Democracy Fund and Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University. Publsiher's note

This paper examines the design of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) that Indonesia set up in 2002. Why was it established with its current electoral system and responsibilities? The design of the DPD had to fit within a compromise made between the two then dominant parties and their leaders. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle wished to preserve the revered People's Consultative Assembly structure, but without losing the power it then wielded by virtue of being the biggest party in the parliament. The other major party, Golkar, obtained the provincial chamber it sought, but was denied control of it when membership was closed to political parties. The public's demand for greater electoral power was appeased through the method of election chosen for the DPD. Institutionally, the design has not made the workings of the legislature more complicated for the established political actors, because the new chamber has little influence.

This paper examines the design of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) that Indonesia set up in 2002. Why was it established with its current electoral system and responsibilities? The design of the DPD had to fit within a compromise made between the two then dominant parties and their leaders. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle wished to preserve the revered People's Consultative Assembly structure, but without losing the power it then wielded by virtue of being the biggest party in the parliament. The other major party, Golkar, obtained the provincial chamber it sought, but was denied control of it when membership was closed to political parties. The public's demand for greater electoral power was appeased through the method of election chosen for the DPD. Institutionally, the design has not made the workings of the legislature more complicated for the established political actors, because the new chamber has little influence.