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Deference is Dead (Long Live Chevron)
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Working paper
The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy
In: Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law, Forthcoming
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Working paper
Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and Related Policy Risks for Consumer- Facing Regulation
In: University of Cincinnati Law Review, Band 86
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Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent 'Major Questions' Doctrine
In: Connecticut Law Review, Band 49, Heft 2
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The Elephant in the Room or the Elephant in the Mousehole? The Legal Risks (and Promise) of Climate Policy Under §115 of the Clean Air Act
In: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 16-41-REV
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Working paper
Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act
In: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 12-22
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International Greenhouse Gas Offsets Under the Clean Air Act
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Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does Chevron v. NRDC Set the EPA Free?
In: Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Forthcoming
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Cutting Carbon, Take Two: A Brief Guide to Federal Electricity‐Sector Climate Policy without Cap‐and‐Trade
In: Applied economic perspectives and policy, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 377-397
ISSN: 2040-5804
AbstractThis paper explores federal policies, other than a carbon price, for reducing emissions from the electric power sector. These policies fall into two major categories: policies that encourage the development of non‐ or low‐emitting energy sources, and regulatory policies under existing legal authority (primarily the Clean Air Act). The paper provides an overview of policy options and a few concrete proposals, along with a summary of insights from economists on their advantages and disadvantages. Economists generally disfavor investment subsidies, but comparing other policy options, including regulatory approaches, technology mandates, and production subsidies, is complex. Excluding existing clean generation from incentive policies is tempting but can lead to perverse outcomes.
Heterogeneity of State Shale Gas Regulations
In: Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, Band 4, Heft 1
Managing the Risks of Shale Gas Development Using Innovative Legal and Regulatory Approaches
In: RFF Discussion Paper 14-15
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Working paper
Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price
In: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 13-13
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Working paper
Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm Organization and Safety
Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices-often referred to as the safety culture-of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This Article defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or may not be adequate or effective from the public's perspective. Two potential justifications for policy intervention are that: (1) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and (2) there may be principal-agent problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The Article discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financial responsibility (a requirement that a firm's assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the latter three policies provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of small firms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The Article concludes with policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach would be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill and to require insurance up to the cap.
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