Suchergebnisse

Deckblatt -- Titelseite -- Impressum -- Inhaltsverzeichnis -- Vorwort -- 1 Krieg und Kriegsführung -- 1.1 Kriegsursachentheorien -- 1.2 Kriegsformen -- 1.3 Moderne Kriegsführung -- 1.4 Kriegsfolgen -- 2 Der Erste Weltkrieg -- 2.1 Entwicklungen der Kriegsführung vor und zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges -- 2.2 Kriegsführung im Ersten Weltkrieg -- 2.3 Der Erste Weltkrieg: ein totaler Krieg? -- 3 Der Zweite Weltkrieg -- 3.1 Entwicklungen der Kriegsführung vor und zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges -- 3.2 Der Kriegsverlauf in Europa -- 3.3 Der Zweite Weltkrieg zu See: Die Atlantikschlacht -- 3.4 Der Luftkrieg -- 3.5 Irreguläre Kriegsführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg -- 4 Der Kalte Krieg -- 4.1 Was war der »Kalte Krieg«? -- 4.2 Nuklearstrategien im Kalten Krieg -- 4.3 Heißer Friede: Insurgency und Counterinsurgency im Kalten Krieg -- 5 Der Krieg nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges -- 5.1 Revolution in Military Affairs?: Der Erste Irakkrieg (1990-1991) -- 5.2 Die »Neuen Kriege« -- 6 Der Krieg im 21.Jahrhundert -- 6.1 Der Krieg gegen den Terrorismus -- 6.2 Hybride Kriege -- 6.3 Remote warfare: Kriegsführung aus sicherer Distanz -- 6.4 Der Cyber-Krieg - Kriegsführung im Informationszeitalter -- 7 Die Zukunft des Krieges: Ein Ausblick -- 7.1 Künstliche Intelligenz und autonome Waffensysteme -- 7.2 Urbane Kriegsführung: die Rückkehr der Stadt als Schlachtfeld -- 7.3 Neurologische Kriegsführung -- Literaturverzeichnis -- Abbildungsverzeichnis.

Critical approaches to IR have often been criticized for lacking methodological rigour. Especially, authors informed by the works of Michel Foucault have faced challenges to justify their methodology, given that Foucault did not provide scholars with a methodological blueprint. This article argues that Carol Bacchi's 'What's the problem represented to be?' (WPR) approach provides a robust critical methodology for policy analysis. WPR is a method that facilitates the critical examination of public policies to analyse 'how the "problem" is represented within them and to subject this problem representation to critical scrutiny' (Bacchi, 2012b). This way of questioning differs from other forms of policy analysis in that it shifts the focus of analysis from policy as a 'problem-solving' exercise towards seeing policy as an act which is constructive of 'problems'. Policies are therefore not analysed from a problem-solving perspective, but from a problem-questioning perspective. By making the 'problem' itself the focus of analysis, it becomes possible to uncover the political, epistemological and historical contexts which are constitutive of the problem representation. I demonstrate the value of this approach by subjecting the Cure Violence Global NGO to a WPR analysis.

AbstractIR scholarship has increasingly begun to scrutinize the ahistorical and ahistoricist assumptions pervading the discipline. Specifically, attention has been turned to those concepts, actors, and practices that appear to be without history and that therefore assumed the status of universals. This article contributes to this scholarship by critically investigating the seemingly transhistorical figure of the mercenary, whose history, it appears, is little less than the history of organized warfare itself. This article questions this assumption by investigating how the Renaissance Landsknechte, actors invoked to support the transhistorical mercenary claim, were problematized within their own historical specificity. Through this analysis, this article rejects the notion that the mercenary is a transhistorical phenomenon as the ideas and categories associated with this figure are tied to specific modern accounts of statist political community and individual identity, as well as a modern account of self-interest. It is argued that the mercenary is not a phenomenon that predates the emergence of the modern state and the system of states, but its own existence is grounded within them. This article, thus, reinstates the historicity of this figure and argues that the mercenary is not "as old as war itself" but a product of specific modern conditions.

Nach dem Angriffskrieg Russlands auf die Ukraine kündigte Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz eine Zeitenwende in der deutschen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik an. Ein epochaler Umbruch stellt Politik und Gesellschaft vor die Herausforderung, sich mit einer seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges größtenteils vernachlässigten Thematik auseinanderzusetzen: der nationalen Sicherheit und der Verteidigung Deutschlands mit militärischen Mitteln. Malte Riemann und Georg Löfflmann haben Beiträge verschiedener ExpertInnen versammelt. Die kompakte Einführung beleuchtet das Thema aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven der Friedens-, Konflikt- und Sicherheitsforschung. Dabei werden konzeptionelle Ansätze vorgestellt, um die strategischen Herausforderungen für Deutschland und seine Rolle in Europa und der Welt einzuordnen und sichtbar zu machen.

The chapter intervenes in current public debates about German security policy. Many observers in the media have argued that the Russian invasion has triggered a revolution in German military affairs, de facto putting an end to German pacifism. The chapter takes issue with this argument. It draws on public opinion polls and prior research of parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag to show that neither German foreign policy elites nor the German public could ever aptly be described as pacifist in a strict sense; neither elites nor the general public as a whole were ever fundamentally opposed to the military. And while German society could (mostly) be adequately described as antimilitarist (reluctant to get militarily involved abroad), since the 1990s there has been a significant shift among foreign policy elites towards increased support for military operations outside the NATO area. Even public opinion, commonly seen as sceptical of military involvement, is much more differentiated than commonly assumed, in particular among the media. Thus, while the German government has only haltingly and somewhat hesitantly expanded its military support for Ukraine, this is does not appear to be primarily a result of a lack of public support.