Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article presents original research findings on the state of anti‐trafficking efforts in Mexico. Based on quantitative and qualitative interviews with stakeholders from government, civil society, and United Nations organizations, this article provides data on the challenges these actors face, especially regarding corruption and violence. It argues for eight actions to improve prevention, protection, and prosecution: 1. Collect more and better data; 2. Retain officials; 3. Support shelters; 4. Employ better evaluation measures and use multipliers; 5. Provide technical help to NGOs; 6. Design a coordination platform; 7. Increase the rule of law, and 8. Promote high‐level interest to push the topic of human trafficking on the political agenda in Mexico. In sum, these eight actions address the deficiencies this research found, and outlines concrete steps each actor can take to improve the current anti‐trafficking regime in Mexico.

Sind Abschiebungen rechtsstaatlich notwendige Instrumente oder Maßnahmen, die der Willkür Tür und Tor öffnen? Schickt Deutschland zu viele Menschen zurück oder zu wenige? Und wie funktioniert die Kooperation mit den Herkunftsländern? Die Debatte um Rückkehr und Reintegration erhitzt die Gemüter in Deutschland und Europa. Ein Versuch, Nüchternheit in die Diskussion zu bringen. Sieben Thesen auf dem Prüfstand.(IP)

Neue Schätzungen der Zahl nicht-autorisierter Migranten in Deutschland sorgen für Wirbel. So wird der Ausdruck "nicht-autorisiert" als irreführend kritisiert und befürchtet, dass die Zahlen durch die politische Rechte instrumentalisiert werden könnten. Eine nüchterne Betrachtung der Zahlen und Diskussion der Handlungsoptionen ist in dieser Situation wichtig.

Die große Mehrheit der Menschen in Deutschland unterstützt Abschiebungen. Dies geht aus einer Studie des Pew Research Centers hervor. Zudem sieht die deutsche Bevölkerung Abschiebungen positiver als die Menschen in vielen anderen Ländern. Dies steht im Widerspruch zur politischen und medialen Debatte, die bei diesem Thema tiefe gesellschaftliche Gräben suggeriert. Politiker sollten anerkennen, dass die Mehrheit der Öffentlichkeit Abschiebungen unterstützt, und versuchen, die Debatte zu versachlichen.

Die Kritik am UN-Migrationspakt, die seit Wochen durch Europa fegt, ist oft haltlos. Politiker und Experten sollten nicht versuchen, die gefühlten Ängste der Gegner mit Faktenchecks zu entkräften - denn das ausführliche Widerlegen von Gerüchten kann dazu beitragen, dass sich diese noch hartnäckiger festsetzen. Stattdessen sollten Experten den Skeptikern ein fundiertes Alternativ-Narrativ entgegensetzen, das Fakten besser vermittelt und den Nutzen des Paktes betont.

Migrants increasingly have a say in migration policies. Diaspora and migrant associations rightfully step into the spotlight to bring their much-needed perspectives to policy development. But the work of associations of returned migrants has stayed in the shadows despite their having firsthand experiences that can guide the design of reintegration policies.

Europeans are entering a decisive period for their relationship with African countries, on migration and beyond. Efforts to strengthen cooperation abound, but many migration initiatives are plagued by frustrations on both sides. So how to break through this vicious cycle and improve the unhealthy relationship? This paper analyzes trends in African migration policies and puts forward six recommendations for European policymakers and experts about how to prepare for their next encounter with their African counterparts - be it a friendly and informal chat or a negotiation.

Der neue amerikanische Präsident Joe Biden hat begonnen die US-Migrationspolitik umfassend neu zu ordnen. Das hat auch Auswirkungen auf Deutschland. Nach der rigorosen Abschottungspolitik der letzten vier Jahre will Biden die Rolle der USA als Einwanderungsland und tragende Säule des internationalen Flüchtlingsschutzes stärken. Deutschland sollte eine neue Schutzkoalition für Flüchtlinge mit den USA und anderen Demokratien begründen, um mehr legale Wege für Flüchtlinge zu schaffen – und um neue Wege außerhalb der blockierten europäischen Ebene zu gehen. Deutsche Politiker sollten aus den Fehlern der USA lernen. Trumps Bilanz zeigt: Wer Migration sinnvoll steuern will, kann nicht einseitig auf Abschottung setzen.

Effective migration partnerships with third countries are a declared goal of the European Union. But views diverge on what good migration cooperation looks like. Using carrots and sticks, also known as conditionality, is a controversial strategy to reach the EU's migration goals. Politicians and experts either frame it as necessary and legitimate, or as post-colonial and counterproductive. Whether one supports conditionality or not, positive and negative incentives have shaped the different types of migration agreements the EU and its Member States have struck in the last decade. Some are formal agreements binding under international law, but most are soft law or handshake deals. They may cover just one specific issue within migration policy, or tie migration to other policy areas. Some are public, others confidential. All these agreements reflect the interests and the leverage which the EU, Member States, and partner countries bring to the table. The three most discussed levers the EU uses to nudge partner countries toward joint migration management are visas, development aid, and trade - the holy trinity of migration conditionality. But the exclusive focus on these three levers is artificial. Europe also uses other levers, such as police or military cooperation and training, diplomatic attention and high level visits, legal migration opportunities, and others. When these levers are used, they generate three kinds of effects: the conclusion of an agreement, common document, or statement (paper), procedural or technical changes (process), and migratory movements (people). But they also bring unintended side effects, such as backlash from the citizens of third countries, or the phenomenon of reverse conditionality, when a third country reacts to threats by reducing border patrols or by supporting irregular onward migration. Lever use of one EU country can also worsen the migration relationship of its EU neighbors with that third country. Despite these high stakes, Europe uses conditionality remarkably inconsistently. Its strategy to create coordination mechanisms to make Member States' approaches more coherent is hobbled by entrenched realities: The cost of coordination is often disproportionate to its benefits, and turf demarcation hinders cooperation. Thus, the chase for coherent conditionality usage in the EU is at best an uphill battle and at worst a delusion. This report puts forward five recommendations to improve Europe's migration conditionality use and debate in the future. It draws on case studies that trace the EU's use of incentives and threats toward Bangladesh, The Gambia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria, and distills lessons from them. 1. Stop using conditionality as a rhetorical tool and start using it as a practical tool that has legitimate yet limited use. Politicians and experts alike should work to make the debate on conditionality less ideological and more pragmatic. Concretely, opponents of conditionality should acknowledge that applying carrots and sticks can indeed be effective and legitimate, while proponents of conditionality should acknowledge that it only works in specific cases, and that large-scale replicability of successful cases is unlikely. Rejecting or embracing conditionality categorically, as happens so often, prevents a meaningful and nuanced debate on incentives in migration cooperation. 2. If you use conditionality, use it smartly. Policymakers should go through a checklist to use conditionality more effectively and credibly in the future. They should avoid path dependency and use of a lever just because it is there or has worked elsewhere, and instead find the levers a country is most receptive to. They should also adapt the timing and sequencing of their demands to the electoral calendar of the country they are engaging: the case studies show that elections and governmental changes are central determinants of countries' behaviors, perhaps more so than the EU's lever use itself. European policy-makers should also be more consistent in their demands. They should use threats more credibly, and negative levers consciously, not accidentally - as has happened in the past. 3. Make the visa lever fairer and more daunting. The EU should try and make its visa lever fairer by adapting the indicators that measure readmission cooperation, and by monitoring the effects of visa restrictions more systematically. To date, restrictions under Article 25a are not used on the countries that cooperate the least, but on countries that depend most on the EU and do not have a strong veto player friend among Member States. At the same time, the EU should try and make its visa restrictions more daunting. The EU could consider increasing wait times by introducing delays longer than the maximum 45 days, and it could critically review the current visa fee increase structure. Alternatively, Member States should improve the speed and efficiency of their visa delivery to increase the impact of restrictions. The current visa process is so cumbersome that the added hassle brought by visa restrictions has little impact on applicants. A better baseline would make visa restrictions more potent. 4. Let realism reign about development, trade, and legal pathways levers. Policy-makers should come to a more realistic assessment of the potential of the development, trade, and legal pathways levers, as expectations of these levers' powers are overblown. Less for less aid conditionality is hotly debated in theory, but rare and easy to buffer in practice. The trade lever formalization is uncertain, and even if it is formalized, it is unlikely that it will be used. Legal pathways are now in the spotlight, but ways to use them as a positive incentive have either been discarded (resettlement) or are underdeveloped (skill-based schemes). 5. Create alternatives to decrease dependency on conditionality. Europe should also go beyond conditionality and work to solve migration challenges with other or fewer external partners. European countries could piggyback on other countries' established relations with third countries on readmissions, which would allow them to use a path already carved instead of having to carve new paths from scratch. Also, European countries could decrease the urgency to strike migration agreements through internal improvements, such as fixing dysfunctions in their national systems of migration, return, and visa processing, and decreasing their population of irregular migrants through alternative efforts like regularizations. They can also change their strategies at home to improve EU coordination, for instance when they sidestep the go-to solution of yet another coordination format, and instead bring in third-party moderators to create incentives for positive coordination. Migration conditionality, like it or not, is here to stay. The EU will keep expanding its conditionality toolbox. But if it wants this toolbox to be more effective, coherent, and credible, it needs to use it more smartly and selectively than in the past. The use of carrots and sticks will continue. But it will hopefully be driven by more facts and fewer delusions.

Die deutsche Rückkehrpolitik steckt tief in der Krise. Scheiternde Abschiebungen, überhöhte Erwartungen an die freiwillige Rückkehr, komplexe Strukturen und eine vergiftete und emotionale Diskussionskultur – all diese Probleme muss Deutschland angehen, um seine Rückkehrpolitik effektiver, menschlicher und ehrlicher zu machen.

Trotz aller Diskussionen um das Thema Migration im Wahlkampf wird der Ausgang der Europawahl die Migrationspolitik Europas nur wenig ändern. Das hat zwei Gründe: Zum einen ist die Macht des Europaparlaments im Bereich Migration und Asyl begrenzt, zum anderen zeigen die Mitgliedstaaten kaum Willen, die Reformen des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) anzugehen. Daher werden interne Blockaden, ad-hoc Aktionen und die Verlagerung von Problemen auf Pufferstaaten am Rande Europas weitergehen.

Tunisia is transforming into a small but important migration hub in North Africa. It grapples with a range of migration challenges that include growing mixed movements, irregular sea crossings, and brain drain. Europe has been nudging Tunisia to overhaul its migration governance system for years, but practical and political challenges stand in the way of reform for the young democracy. This report provides German and European politicians, policy experts, and practitioners with concrete and actionable ideas for how to aim for more informed migration discussions with their Tunisian counterparts in the future.