Suchergebnisse

Several Radical Right (RR) parties have called for referendums challenging European institutions, unpopular elites, and immigration, but do their voters support the use of referendums in general and do Radical Left (RL) voters also share preferences for these instruments? Combining data on twenty-six European countries from the 2012 ESS and the 2017 Polpart survey, we demonstrate that both RR and RL voters score higher on referendum support than moderate voters, with RR voters scoring the highest. However, the differences between voter groups are more characteristic of Western than Eastern European countries and the link between RR voting and referendum support is weaker in countries where these parties are more electorally successful. In a second analysis on five Western European countries from the 2017 Polpart Survey, we investigate individual-level explanations for the association between radical voting and referendum support, demonstrating that anti-elitism is the most important attitude linking RR voters to referendum support whereas income redistribution is the most important attitude linking RL voters to referendum support. Even when controlling for all possible explanations, we find that radical voters are still more favorable towards direct democracy than moderate voters.

AbstractThe authors examined double standards regarding divorce among parents with young children and regarding having children within nonmarital cohabitation across Europe. Whether people disapprove more of men or of women engaging in these behaviors is not a priori clear. The authors formulated arguments in both directions and expected double standards to vary cross‐nationally by the level of socioeconomic gender equality in a country. They conducted multilevel analyses on a sample of about 44,000 individuals nested in 25 countries, obtained from the European Social Survey (2006). Double standards were measured with a split‐ballot design. The findings indicated that men were generally more disapproved of than women when displaying the family behaviors under study. Overall, women endorsed both double standards, whereas men endorsed only the double standard regarding divorce. However, substantial cross‐national differences in the double standards exist. The higher the level of socioeconomic gender equality, the larger these double standards in favor of women.

This study examines whether partner relationship quality influences fertility, and if so, in which direction and which aspects of relationship quality are relevant. Competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis assumes that higher relationship quality leads to higher rates of childbearing, as a high-quality relationship offers the most favourable environment to raise children. An opposite hypothesis expects that lower relationship quality leads to higher rates of childbearing, as couples might have children in order to improve their relationship. Hazard analyses are performed using three waves of the Panel Study on Social Integration in the Netherlands. Findings indicate that positive as well as negative interaction between partners has a negative effect on first- and higher-order birth rates. This suggests that couples are most likely to have children if they do not have too much negative interaction, but neither interact in a very positive way. Value consensus negatively influences higher-order birth rates.

AbstractWe investigated whether income gaps in voting turnout vary with country-level economic inequality, and whether this pattern differs between wealthier and less-wealthy countries. Moreover, we investigated whether the prevalence of clientelism was the underlying mechanism that accounts for the presumed negative interaction between relative income and economic inequality at lower levels of national wealth per capita. The harmonised PolPart dataset, combining cross-national surveys from 66 countries and 292 country-years, including 510,184 individuals, was analysed using multilevel logistic regression models. We found that the positive effect of relative income on voting was weaker at higher levels of economic inequality, independent of the level of national wealth. Although clientelism partially explains why economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout, it does not do so in the way we expected. It seems to decrease turnout of higher income groups, rather than increase turnout of lower income groups. Importantly, that economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout does not imply that economic inequality is positive for democratic representation, since economic inequality was found to depress the likelihood of voting for all income groups.

We investigated whether income gaps in voting turnout vary with country-level economic inequality, and whether this pattern differs between wealthier and less-wealthy countries. Moreover, we investigated whether the prevalence of clientelism was the underlying mechanism that accounts for the presumed negative interaction between relative income and economic inequality at lower levels of national wealth per capita. The harmonised PolPart dataset, combining cross-national surveys from 66 countries and 292 country-years, including 510,184 individuals, was analysed using multilevel logistic regression models. We found that the positive effect of relative income on voting was weaker at higher levels of economic inequality, independent of the level of national wealth. Although clientelism partially explains why economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout, it does not do so in the way we expected. It seems to decrease turnout of higher income groups, rather than increase turnout of lower income groups. Importantly, that economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout does not imply that economic inequality is positive for democratic representation, since economic inequality was found to depress the likelihood of voting for all income groups.

Previous research on public support for participatory decision-making fails to distinguish between vote-centric (referendums and initiatives) and talk-centric (deliberative-style meetings) instruments, despite a deliberative turn in democratic theory suggesting that political discussion among ordinary citizens improves decision-making. In an online factorial survey experiment conducted among a sample of 960 Americans recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, we compared support for the use of referendums and public meetings, arguing that attitudes towards these instruments depend on whether they are used to inform legislators or take binding decisions. Public meetings were rated considerably lower than referendums and initiatives, especially when the outcomes were binding. Contrary to expectations, we did not find a preference for binding (over advisory) referendums and individuals from referendum and initiative states, where these instruments are legally binding, expressed less support for binding participatory reforms than individuals from non-direct democratic states. Despite the many critiques of direct democracy, public debate in the US has not considered whether advisory outcomes might appease some of these concerns. The results also demonstrated that individuals expressing concerns about the inability of ordinary citizens to understand politics and about the welfare of minority groups were not as negative about participatory decision-making when legislators had the final say.

Previous research on public support for participatory decision-making fails to distinguish between vote-centric (referendums and initiatives) and talk-centric (deliberative-style meetings) instruments, despite a deliberative turn in democratic theory suggesting that political discussion among ordinary citizens improves decision-making. In an online factorial survey experiment conducted among a sample of 960 Americans recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, we compared support for the use of referendums and public meetings, arguing that attitudes towards these instruments depend on whether they are used to inform legislators or take binding decisions. Public meetings were rated considerably lower than referendums and initiatives, especially when the outcomes were binding. Contrary to expectations, we did not find a preference for binding (over advisory) referendums and individuals from referendum and initiative states, where these instruments are legally binding, expressed less support for binding participatory reforms than individuals from non-direct democratic states. Despite the many critiques of direct democracy, public debate in the US has not considered whether advisory outcomes might appease some of these concerns. The results also demonstrated that individuals expressing concerns about the inability of ordinary citizens to understand politics and about the welfare of minority groups were not as negative about participatory decision-making when legislators had the final say.

Previous research on public support for participatory decision-making fails to distinguish between vote-centric (referendums and initiatives) and talk-centric (deliberative-style meetings) instruments, despite a deliberative turn in democratic theory suggesting that political discussion among ordinary citizens improves decision-making. In an online factorial survey experiment conducted among a sample of 960 Americans recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, we compared support for the use of referendums and public meetings, arguing that attitudes towards these instruments depend on whether they are used to inform legislators or take binding decisions. Public meetings were rated considerably lower than referendums and initiatives, especially when the outcomes were binding. Contrary to expectations, we did not find a preference for binding (over advisory) referendums and individuals from referendum and initiative states, where these instruments are legally binding, expressed less support for binding participatory reforms than individuals from non-direct democratic states. Despite the many critiques of direct democracy, public debate in the US has not considered whether advisory outcomes might appease some of these concerns. The results also demonstrated that individuals expressing concerns about the inability of ordinary citizens to understand politics and about the welfare of minority groups were not as negative about participatory decision-making when legislators had the final say.

Seeing the sociopolitical system as fair and legitimate is important for people's participation in civic duties, political action, and the functioning of society in general. However, little is known about when migrants, without life-long socialization in a certain system, justify the sociopolitical system of their host country and how system justification influences their political participation. We examined antecedents of system justification using a survey among Iranian migrants in eight European countries (N = 935). Subsequently, we examined the relationship between system justification and political participation intentions. We found that system justification beliefs are generally high in our sample, mainly stemming from an assessment of opportunity to achieve changes in intergroup relations. Stronger social identity threat, feeling disadvantaged, a longer residence in Europe, and perceived intergroup stability all relate to less system justification. Conversely, stronger efficacy beliefs bolster system justification. Furthermore, we found some support for a curvilinear relationship between system justification and political participation intentions, but the size of this effect is small. The results show that the high levels of system justification of Iranian migrants are at risk when discrimination and disadvantage are perceived to be stable facets of society. Surprisingly, political participation to better Iranian migrants' societal position is barely affected by system justification. We discuss implications and further research that can increase understanding of system justification among migrants. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Seeing the sociopolitical system as fair and legitimate is important for people's participation in civic duties, political action, and the functioning of society in general. However, little is known about when migrants, without life-long socialization in a certain system, justify the sociopolitical system of their host country and how system justification influences their political participation. We examined antecedents of system justification using a survey among Iranian migrants in eight European countries (N = 935). Subsequently, we examined the relationship between system justification and political participation intentions. We found that system justification beliefs are generally high in our sample, mainly stemming from an assessment of opportunity to achieve changes in intergroup relations. Stronger social identity threat, feeling disadvantaged, a longer residence in Europe, and perceived intergroup stability all relate to less system justification. Conversely, stronger efficacy beliefs bolster system justification. Furthermore, we found some support for a curvilinear relationship between system justification and political participation intentions, but the size of this effect is small. The results show that the high levels of system justification of Iranian migrants are at risk when discrimination and disadvantage are perceived to be stable facets of society. Surprisingly, political participation to better Iranian migrants' societal position is barely affected by system justification. We discuss implications and further research that can increase understanding of system justification among migrants.

Engaging in political action can ensure adequate political representation for citizens. Except for voting, however, only a nonrepresentative, small group of people regularly engages in political action. Social psychological theories provide individual, group, and system-level explanations for why people could remain inactive. However, they often focus only on personally held attitudes and do not fully consider the dynamics of attitude formation in interactions. Based on 26 focus group discussions conducted in Brazil, Hungary, and the Netherlands, we explored how citizens explain political inaction. We used latent thematic analysis, informed by social psychological theories, to understand how people form opinions about their own and others' political inaction. In all three countries, the prevalent norm in the focus group discussions was that political inaction should be reduced but a lack of political efficacy constituted a core theme in explaining why people remain politically inactive. Depending on the sociopolitical context and how people self-categorized within the discussions, people blamed unresponsive governments, or cited personal fears of repercussions and cultural differences within and between countries as reasons for inaction. The findings and interpretations are discussed within a framework that extends and integrates previous perspectives on why people remain politically inactive.