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OBSERVED CORRELATIONS AMONG INCOME, EDUCATION, AND ABILITY MEASURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH EDUCATION BEING USED TO SCREEN FOR EXOGENOUS ABILITY DIFFERENCES. THIS PAPER TESTS FOR SUCH AN INFORMATIONAL ROLE, ARGUING THAT SCREENING WILL BE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IN SOME OCCUPATIONS THAN IN OTHERS. SUBSAMPLES OF "SCREENED" AND "UNSCREENED" OCCUPATIONS ARE ISOLATED AND COMPARED.

Essential Microeconomics is designed to help students deepen their understanding of the core theory of microeconomics. Unlike other texts, this book focuses on the most important ideas and does not attempt to be encyclopedic. Two-thirds of the textbook focuses on price theory. As well as taking a new look at standard equilibrium theory, there is extensive examination of equilibrium under uncertainty, the capital asset pricing model, and arbitrage pricing theory. Choice over time is given extensive coverage and includes a basic introduction to control theory. The final third of the book, on game theory, provides a comprehensive introduction to models with asymmetric information. Topics such as auctions, signaling and mechanism design are made accessible to students who have a basic rather than a deep understanding of mathematics. Examples and diagrams are used to illustrate issues as well as formal derivations.

Economists have always recognised that human endeavours are constrained by our limited and uncertain knowledge, but only recently has an accepted theory of uncertainty and information evolved. This theory has turned out to have surprisingly practical applications: for example in analysing stock market returns, in evaluating accident prevention measures, and in assessing patent and copyright laws. This book presents these intellectual advances in readable form for the first time. It unifies many important but partial results into a satisfying single picture, making it clear how the economics of uncertainty and information generalises and extends standard economic analysis. Part One of the volume covers the economics of uncertainty: how each person adapts to a given fixed state of knowledge by making an optimal choice among the immediate 'terminal' actions available. These choices in turn determine the overall market equilibrium reflecting the social distribution of risk bearing. In Part Two, covering the economics of information, the state of knowledge is no longer held fixed. Instead, individuals can to a greater or lesser extent overcome their ignorance by 'informational' actions. The text also addresses at appropriate points many specific topics such as insurance, the Capital Asset Pricing model, auctions, deterrence of entry, and research and invention

Contrary to what is usually assumed, the expected revenue for lenders as a function of the loan rate cannot be globally hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model with a continuum of types. This has important implications. First, if there is credit rationing, there must be at least two equilibrium loan rates. Second, while at the low rate loans are rationed, all those applicants willing to pay the high rate are then served. Numerical analysis shows that unless the joint distribution of risk class and output is rather special, the two loan rate outcome with rationing is unlikely. (JEL D82, G21)

A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political influence and low lobbying and other influence‐seeking outlays relative to the value of politically allocated prizes.

There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games