Suchergebnisse

New investment techniques and new types of shareholder activists are shaking up the traditional ways of equity investment that inform current corporate law and governance. This book evaluates different risk-decoupling strategies and makes the case for regulatory intervention, developing a comprehensive proposal to address the regulatory problem

Dieser Band geht auf ein Symposium am Hamburger Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg zurück. Er bietet erstmals einen breiten Vergleich gesellschafts- und kapitalmarktrechtlicher Fragen in Deutschland und den nordischen Ländern. Erläutert werden die Besonderheiten des Gesellschaftsrechts in Skandinavien, das sich in einem Spannungsfeld aus Experimentierfreude und Innovation einerseits und Harmonisierung andererseits entwickelt. Dem werden die charakteristischen Merkmale und Eigenheiten des deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts gegenüber gestellt. Weitere Beiträge betreffen die neu geschaffene Unternehmergesellschaft in Deutschland und Dänemark sowie die Rolle der Anteilseigner und des Aufsichtsrats bzw. Verwaltungsrats in Publikumsgesellschaften. Außerdem finden sich eingehende Analysen der konzernrechtlichen Regelungen in Deutschland und den nordischen Staaten vor dem Hintergrund einer möglichen Harmonisierung in Europa. Abgerundet wird der Band durch Beiträge zum Kapitalmarkt- und Übernahmerechts. Erörtert werden insbesondere Fragen des Acting in Concert, der Beteiligungstransparenz und des Zusammenspiels zwischen Gesetzgeber und Takeover Panel in Schweden.InhaltsübersichtPart I – Overview of Company Law and Types in Germany and the Nordic Countries Holger Fleischer: A Guide to German Company Law for International Lawyers – Distinctive Features, Particularities, Idiosyncrasies – Jan Andersson: Company Law as a Product in Scandinavia versus EU – Experimentation and Innovation versus Harmonization Part II – The Law of Private Limited Companies Frauke Wedemann: Reforming the Law of Limited Liability Companies in Germany – Troels Michael Lilja: Entrepreneur Companies in Denmark and Germany – On the Danish IVS and the German UG (haftungsbeschränkt) Part III – The Role of Shareholders and Boards in Public Companies Jesper Lau Hansen: The Role of Shareholders in Public Companies in the Nordic Countries – Christian Kersting: The Role of Shareholder in Public Companies in Germany – Paul Krüger Andersen/Evelyne JB Sørensen: The Danish Supervisory Board – a German Model? Part IV – Groups of Companies Tobias Tröger: Corporate Groups – A German's European Perspective – Søren Friis Hansen: Introduction to Scandinavian Nordic Group Law Part V – Capital Markets in Perspective Dirk Verse: Acting in Concert in German Company and Takeover Law – Mårten Knuts: The Disclosure of Cash Settled Equity Derivatives – Will the Proposed Amendments Solve the Problems? – Göran Nyström/Erik Sjöman: The Regulation of Takeovers in Sweden – An Interplay Between the Rulemaker and the Takeover Panel

Abstract
The transition to a sustainable economy currently involves a fundamental transformation of markets and market actors. This paper makes the case for investor empowerment as the main tool towards achieving greater sustainability in capital markets. This trust in institutional investors is grounded in various recent developments both on the supply side and the demand side of financial markets, and also in the increasing tendency of institutional investors to engage in common ownership. The need to build coalitions among different types of asset managers or institutional investors, and to convince fellow investors of any given initiative, can then act as an in-built filter helping to overcome the pursuit of idiosyncratic motives and supporting only those campaigns that are seconded by a majority of investors. In particular, institutionalized investor platforms have emerged over recent years as a force for investor empowerment, serving to coordinate investor campaigns and to share the costs of engagement. ESG engagement has the potential to become a very powerful driver towards a more sustainability-oriented future. Any regulatory activity should then be limited to a facilitative and supportive role.

Corporate stewardship holds great promise for the improvement of shareholder engagement and the encouragement of more responsible and long-term oriented value creation. This is particularly true since the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries have long adopted a best practice code for the stewardship role of institutional investors and asset managers, but Germany has so far refused to follow that trend. This paper explores the reasons for this reluctance, as well as whether the adoption of a Stewardship Code would still make sense in the regulatory framework of Germany today. Despite the increased presence of shareholder engagement (and even activism), several reasons may be put forward for why lawmakers have refused to adopt a stewardship code. This paper argues that the main political reason for this reluctance lies in the limited geographical reach of such a code, which would primarily be restricted to the (limited) domestic fund industry and would thus be unable to prescribe any meaningful principles to foreign-based asset managers. Still, I argue that the adoption of a code in the German context may make sense, for example to define expectations and to clarify the obligations of investee companies. Most importantly, it would benefit domestic investors that are typically 'home biased' and thereby frequently disproportionately invested in domestic funds.

EU policymakers are currently implementing the capital markets union (CMU) agenda-a collection of individual steps that, taken together, should strengthen cross-border market integration in EU capital markets. However, the imminent departure of the United Kingdom from the EU reshuffles the cards in this project, since the absence of the United Kingdom as the continent's most developed capital market jeopardizes the objective of creating a truly Europe-wide deep and liquid market that merits its name. This paper argues that the purpose of the CMU project can and should be redefined. The initial thrust behind the project in 2014-2015 seems to have been to court the British public in a bid to influence the Brexit referendum. After the UK's vote to leave, that objective no longer provides the glue that holds the CMU agenda together. Instead, I show that CMU can helpfully be redefined and reexplained in an entirely new context. Specifically, the CMU agenda provides a sensible set of measures to strengthen the architecture of the Eurozone: cross-border integration of national financial markets holds the promise of promoting so-called 'private risk sharing' that can serve as an important boost to reinforce the fragile framework of the common currency. This paper makes two points. First, it explores the initial motivation behind launching the CMU agenda. The paper argues that the initial purpose was - among other things - a political bid to influence the growing anti-EU attitude and to win over the City of London. Since this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful - at least, it did not suffice to secure a majority voting for a UK-wide 'remain' vote - the entirety of the CMU project was put into question. In a second step, the paper shows that the CMU agenda currently on the table - if sufficiently reinforced and expanded - may find a new purpose in strengthening the Eurozone architecture. The latter point comes amid the ongoing policy debate on the future of the Euro.