Environmental protection at the state level: politics and progress in controlling pollution
In: Bureaucracies, public administration, and public policy
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In: Bureaucracies, public administration, and public policy
In: Bureaucarcies, pulbic administration, and public policy
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 726-727
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 726-727
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Social science quarterly, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 297-323
ISSN: 1540-6237
Objective. Arthur Okun made plain the fundamental conflict between efficiency and equity that arises in the pursuit of policy goals (Okun, 1974). Although Okun was speaking about government tax and spending policy, the potential conflict between efficiency and equity is also manifest at the nexus of two of the most far‐reaching changes in the environmental policy arena: the adoption of market‐like tools for pollution control and the quest for environmental justice. The article assesses this potential tradeoff by determining whether the pursuit of efficiency through the Clean Air Act Amendment's (CAA) sulfur dioxide allowance trading program (ATP) inadvertently transfers pollution into poor and minority communities.Methods. I employ Probit, Tobit, and GLS models using data for all SO2 trading activity between January 1995 and March 2009 to estimate whether allowance trading concentrates SO2 emissions in poor communities and communities of color. When using these models, I control for sample selectivity and for possible bias stemming from the modifiable areal unit problem.Results. The ATP does not concentrate sulfur dioxide emissions in black or Hispanic communities. To the contrary, communities with high percentages of black and Hispanic residents experience fewer imports of sulfur dioxide. Allowance trading does transfer SO2 emissions into poorly educated communities.Conclusions. There is no inherent tradeoff between efficiency and equity when using market‐based instruments for pollution control. Policymakers, however, might make an effort to design and implement future emissions trading programs in a manner that reduces the monitoring costs of tracking emissions trading. By reducing monitoring costs, policymakers may prevent the concentration of emissions in poorly educated communities while preserving the efficiency benefits of these instruments.
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 753-757
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 753-758
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 223-248
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 852-853
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 852-853
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 117, Heft 3, S. 543-544
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 117, Heft 3, S. 543
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 4, S. 947-948
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 1148-1165
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, S. 1148-1165
ISSN: 0022-3816
Examines and compares penalties for violating environmental regulations in poor and minority areas with those of other areas; based on civil cases filed under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; US.