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ABSTRACTWithin-semester shifts in course modality in response to pandemics, weather, or accommodation for travel and health are increasingly common and can interrupt student learning. We tracked temporary modality changes across 10 sections of "Introduction to American Government" to examine the extent to which instructors have tools to help students successfully navigate such changes and mitigate learning loss. We find that students rated instructors' handling of shifts well if they made course material engaging, communicated clearly, and effectively used technology. The analysis suggests that instructors can mitigate the impact of unplanned changes to modality on students' learning when there are three or fewer shifts during a semester.

Debate within judicial politics scholarship continues to focus on whether, and to what extent, the separation of powers system affects U.S. Supreme Court decision making. While both formal and empirical work points to such an effect, the literature has not addressed a fundamental part of this process—namely, how justices learn about the preferences or possible reactions of Congress to potential Court decisions. In this article, we provide an answer by demonstrating justices use their limited time during oral arguments to seek such information. Specifically, using data from all orally argued cases between 1979 and 2003, we show that justices raise questions about Congress more often as the level of external constraint increases.

Using data collected from a survey experiment, we examine whether information about the nature of the interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress influences respondents' assessments of the Court. We find that political sophistication is key to understanding how individuals incorporate the separation of powers context into their evaluations of the Court. Political sophisticates give the Court its highest assessments when told that the Court and Congress are often in disagreement, and that Congress is most responsible for this disagreement. Assessments of the Court are significantly lower, however, when sophisticates believe that high levels of disagreement between the Court and Congress are due to the Court's actions and when these respondents believe that the Court and Congress agree a high proportion of the time. These results suggest that for political sophisticates, the Court's institutional standing is related to the balance it strikes between deference to Congress and judicial independence. Adapted from the source document.

Previous findings on whether U.S. Supreme Court justices include strategic factors in their decisions to leave the Court have been mixed. We use ideological distance measures to capture the political landscape and retest the hypothesis that justices use strategic political considerations when making the decision to leave the Court. Using a Cox model of proportional hazards, we find that justices do take ideological distance from the Senate into account when making retirement decisions. Thus, the evidence indicates that justices engage in strategic behavior when contemplating retirement.

This week, the US Senate Judiciary Committee will begin hearings to confirm D.C. Circuit Court Judge Brett Kavanaugh for Justice Anthony Kennedy's seat on the Supreme Court. While there has been much median speculation as to how these hearings might play out, Logan Dancey, Kjersten Nelson and Eve M. Ringsmuth have analyzed Kavanaugh's previous confirmation hearings to provide their own insights. They find that Kavanaugh was asked almost 40 times the median number of questions asked of other nominees – questions that were often far more intensive and in-depth.

Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their 'advice and consent' privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors-such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election-are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their "advice and consent" privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors—such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election—are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees.