Suchergebnisse

During the June 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada displayed its international leadership with the announcement of the Africa Action Plan. In this paper, we analyze Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program during the 1990s to evaluate several hypotheses about how ODA is disbursed. Some facts that are uncovered are that Commonwealth members receive more aid; media coverage & the content of media coverage of aid recipients affect aid levels; & surprisingly, contrary to its announced policy, Canada does not seem to favor democratic states that would be more likely to practice "good governance." These results lead us to speculate about the future of Canada's ODA program in light of the post 9-11 (2001) international transformations. We conclude with some general policy suggestions to improve Canada's ODA program. 3 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The analogy that states in the international system act as firms in a market has been used by scholars to explain the initiation of war and the formation of balances of power, among other things. Here, this analogy is explored further in an attempt to formalize and quantify the age‐old concept of diplomatic reputation. In this paper, I argue that states, like firms, invest in their reputation in order to secure future benefits, which might take the form of bargaining advantages. Investment in reputation is accomplished by escalating crises, in order to deter other states from initiating future crises. The resulting model of reputation‐building is tested empirically using International Crisis Behavior data on United States involvement in international crises for the years 1918–1988. The results support the model developed here; it appears that we can measure the concept of diplomatic reputation, and once a strong reputation is established, the United States does become involved in fewer crises. Furthermore, a hypothesis predicting more crisis activity during new presidential administrations is supported. Domestically, empirical evidence also is found linking diplomatic reputation with presidential approval levels.

It is traditionally assumed that the US long ago established a zone of influence in the Western hemisphere where its hegemony goes unchallenged. Thus, global organizations such as the UN & regional organization such as the Organization of American States (OAS) should be ineffective bodies in mediating conflicts in this US sphere of influence. In this study, however, we find that Latin American international crises since 1947 have been characterized by a greater incidence of global organization activity than one would expect, although UN intervention was not as important in abating conflict levels as the OAS & the US. How can one explain this important global organization activity in light of the alleged US hegemony over the area, & what factors influence the effectiveness of its mediation in Latin America? What lessons can be learned from these findings that can be applied to other conflict areas & for the future? These findings may serve as a lesson for other regional organizations. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.