Suchergebnisse

In Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below, Norrin M. Ripsman explains how regional rivals make peace and how outside actors can encourage regional peacemaking. Through a qualitative empirical analysis of all the regional rivalries that terminated in peace treaties in the twentieth century—including detailed case studies of the Franco-German, Egyptian-Israeli, and Israeli-Jordanian peace settlements—Ripsman concludes that efforts to encourage peacemaking that focus on changing the attitudes of the rival societies or democratizing the rival polities to enable societal input into security policy are unlikely to achieve peace.Prior to a peace treaty, he finds, peacemaking is driven by states, often against intense societal opposition, for geostrategic reasons or to preserve domestic power. After a formal treaty has been concluded, the stability of peace depends on societal buy-in through mechanisms such as bilateral economic interdependence, democratization of former rivals, cooperative regional institutions, and transfers of population or territory. Society is largely irrelevant to the first stage but is critical to the second. He draws from this analysis a lesson for contemporary policy. Western governments and international organizations have invested heavily in efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian and Indo-Pakistani peace by promoting democratic values, economic exchanges, and cultural contacts between the opponents. Such attempts to foster peace are likely to waste resources until such time as formal peace treaties are concluded between longtime adversaries.

Domestic opinion and democratic foreign security policy -- The domestic decision-making environments of Great Britain, France, and the United States after two World Wars -- The post-World War I settlement, 1919 -- The post-World War II settlement, 1945-1954 -- Structural autonomy and democratic foreign security policy

Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.

This article summarizes the findings of my current research on successful peace agreements between regional rivals and offers policy recommendations that third-party states and institutions can follow to promote regional peacemaking. Based on detailed primary and secondary source analysis of three successful peace agreements between regional antagonists -- France and Germany after World War II, Egypt and Israel in 1978-79, and Israel and Jordan in 1994 -- I concluded that peacemaking is a two-staged process. The first stage, the transition process, is driven by a statist logic. Adapted from the source document.

"Neoclassical Realism" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article criticises the traditional realist distinction between "high politics" (sovereignty and security matters) and "low politics" (economics and other "less important" state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of "political economy" issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security.

La décennie Mulroney présente des conditions qui ont amené le gouvernement conservateur à modifier considérablement ses orientations de politiques et, à cet égard, le secteur de la défense a probablement été plus affecté que tout autre. Le gouvernement a d'abord présenté une politique ambitieuse énoncée dans un Livre blanc et qui avait pour but de combler le fossé grandissant entre les engagements et les ressources affectées en matière de défense. Ce programme d'action a été conçu comme étant une réponse aux impératifs dictés par la guerre froide et par la relation inhérente du Canada avec les États-Unis. L'approche agressive du gouvernement dans sa politique de défense a toutefois vite été minée autant par la fin de la guerre froide que par les impératifs économiques et politiques intérieurs telle la réduction du déficit. En conséquence, les Conservateurs ont dû réduire considérablement leurs projets en matière de défense. Cet épisode suggère qu'à l'encontre de ce que l'on constate dans plusieurs autres secteurs, la redéfinition de l'espace en matière de défense est caractérisée par un resserrement important au cours des années Mulroney.