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"Capitalists in most authoritarian regimes have been described as "cronies" of political elites, but why do some crony relationships produce growth, while others produce stagnation or even destructive economic crisis? And if business actors are "co-opted" by authoritarian regimes, like China's entrepreneurs have been said to be, what explains why business and the state turn on one another? Precarious Ties offers a novel account of relationships between business and political elites in three authoritarian regimes in developing Asia: Indonesia under Suharto's New Order, Malaysia under the Barisan Nasional, and China under the Chinese Communist Party. All three regimes enjoyed periods of high growth and supposed alliances between autocrats and capitalists, but state-business relations in Indonesia and China became destructive and dangerous when those countries undertook efforts at financial liberalization. Rithmire characterizes this destructive form of state-business relations as mutual endangerment, in which vulnerable business elites are entwined with political elites in ways that imperil both sides, manifest in asset expatriation, weaponized information, and rampant economic looting. Indonesia and China experienced mutual endangerment because of fundamental distrust between business elites and the state combined with financial opening. In contrast, Malaysia's business elites expected cooperation from the regime, and state-business relations have cycled through mutual alignment and competitive clientelism, but never became destructive. Precarious Ties examines how conflict during regime formation affects political trust and dynamics of financial development in authoritarian regimes. The experiences of these three dynamic countries in authoritarian Asia ultimately reveal the inherent instability of state-business ties."

Despite common national institutions and incentives to remake urban landscapes to anchor growth, generate land-lease revenues and display a capacious administration, Chinese urban governments exhibit varying levels of control over land. This article uses a paired comparison of Dalian and Harbin in China's north-east to link differences in local political economies to land politics. Dalian, benefiting from early access to foreign capital, consolidated its control over urban territory through the designation of a development zone, which realigned local economic interests and introduced dual pressures for enterprises to restructure and relocate. Harbin, facing capital shortages, distributed urban territory to assuage the losers of reform and promote economic growth. The findings suggest that 1) growth strategies, and the territorial politics they produce, are products of the post-Mao urban hierarchy rather than of socialist legacies, and 2), perhaps surprisingly, local governments exercise the greatest control over urban land in cities that adopted market reforms earliest. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractDespite common national institutions and incentives to remake urban landscapes to anchor growth, generate land-lease revenues and display a capacious administration, Chinese urban governments exhibit varying levels of control over land. This article uses a paired comparison of Dalian and Harbin in China's north-east to link differences in local political economies to land politics. Dalian, benefiting from early access to foreign capital, consolidated its control over urban territory through the designation of a development zone, which realigned local economic interests and introduced dual pressures for enterprises to restructure and relocate. Harbin, facing capital shortages, distributed urban territory to assuage the losers of reform and promote economic growth. The findings suggest that 1) growth strategies, and the territorial politics they produce, are products of the post-Mao urban hierarchy rather than of socialist legacies, and 2), perhaps surprisingly, local governments exercise the greatest control over urban land in cities that adopted market reforms earliest.

This article critically examines the origins and evolution of China's unique land institutions and situates land policy in the larger context of China's reforms and pursuit of economic growth. It argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has strengthened the institutions that permit land expropriation—namely, urban/rural dualism, decentralized land ownership, and hierarchical land management—in order to use land as a key instrument of macroeconomic regulation, helping the CCP respond to domestic and international economic trends and manage expansion and contraction. Key episodes of macroeconomic policymaking are analyzed, with the use of local and central documents, to show how the CCP relied on the manipulation and distribution of the national land supply either to stimulate economic growth or to rein in an overheating economy. China's land institutions, therefore, share "complementarities" with fiscal and financial institutions and benefit powerful political actors while imposing costs on marginal ones.

A review essay covering books by: 1) Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree, Run of the Red Queen: Government, Innovation, Globalization, and Economic Growth in China (2011); 2) John Donaldson, Small Works: Poverty and Economic Development in Southwest China (2011); 3) William Hurst, The Chinese Worker after Socialism (2009); 4) Adam Segal, Digital Dragon: High Technology Enterprises in China (2003); 5) Eric Thun, Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments, and Auto Sector Development (2006); 6) Susan Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change (2002).