The principle of mutual trust has become a structural principle of EU law that underpins many rules of primary law as well as secondary legislation both in the field of internal market and in that of the area, of freedom, security and justice. Several questions in relation to this principle have had to be settled by the Court of Justice, particularly, with regard to the risks that it can pose for the protection of, fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. In this regard, the Court of Justice adopted a 'stone-by-stone approach', by progressively specifying the limits framing the principle of mutual trust on the basis of the specific cases it had to handle. Building on recent the case law, this paper offers a critical, examination of the balance struck by the Court of Justice between the, principle of mutual trust and the protection of fundamental rights.
According to mainstream discourse, the EU is facing a 'refugee crisis' due to a mass influx of asylum seekers, which is putting the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) under pressure. Although this article acknowledges that the CEAS is currently under pressure, it aims to take a different view from the assumption that the - admittedly significant - arrival of asylum seekers constitutes in itself a problem for the EU. It suggests that the problems encountered by the CEAS are rather symptomatic of a deeper gridlock resulting from this system's lack of compliance with two main EU's fundamental values, the respect of which constitutes the 'fundamental premise' of EU integration, namely solidarity and human rights. From both an historical and a legal perspective, the EU is indeed founded on a set of values comprising the respect of human rights and solidarity. The treaties further require their respect internally (i.e. Articles 2 and 6 TEU), but also vis-à-vis the rest of the world (i.e. Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU). However, the current responses to the arrival of asylum-seekers are, in several respects, in contradiction with these founding values. On the one hand, the internal management of the influx of refugees reveals a lack of solidarity and results in breaches of asylum-seekers' fundamental rights. On the other, the EU's asylum policy does not meet the requirement according to which the Union shall, in its relations with the wider world, uphold and promote these values. These observations lead us to believe that facing the refugee challenge constitutes, from a normative perspective at least, a litmus test for the EU at large. Indeed, the EU's difficulties in dealing with the arrival of the asylum seekers - which have already been the subject of extensive research - appear to be the evidence of an identity crisis. The way the EU, hand in hand with its Member States, responds to this challenge thus amounts to a 'decisively indicative test' for its normative foundations that are a prerequisite for the viability of ...
According to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the legal structure of the European Union: 'is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU.' Fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy occupy a central place among these common values. The Court holds that this premiss 'implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States.' However, for several years, the European Union has been suffering from a crisis of values. This crisis stems from the undermining of the values on which the European Union is supposedly based. Yet, references to mutual trust between Member States has never been more prevalent in the official discourse. Like the adage 'there is never so much talk about water as in the desert,' is the rise in popularity of mutual trust symptomatic of the climate of mistrust between the Member States? This book centres around this question, raised by the success of the principle of mutual trust at a time when the context betrays fundamental divisions between the Member States regarding the meaning of European integration and the values on which it is based. To answer this question, the first part of the book seeks to clear the ground and to offer a cross-cutting definition of the principle of mutual trust in EU law, which applies both to internal market law and to the law of the area of freedom, security and justice. In this respect, the presumptive mechanism seems to offer the best description of the principle studied. The second part of the book analyses the apparently consubstantial link between this principle and the founding values of the EU. In that regard, it appears that the common set of values has an ambivalent relationship with the principle of mutual trust, being both its normative basis and its imperfect limit. The book closes with a third part analysing the essential role played by the principle of mutual trust in EU law at the intersection of the imperatives of unity, diversity and equality which drive European integration. Given the threats currently faced by the founding values of the EU, it argues in favour of moving mutual trust from the rank of postulate to that of method
Le principe de confiance mutuelle connaît un véritable avènement en droit de l'Union européenne. Initialement mobilisé à l'aube des années 70' en droit du marché intérieur, il a par la suite été sollicité de façon explicite dans les domaines de la coopération européenne judiciaire civile et pénale, ainsi que dans le domaine de la politique commune d'asile. Désormais qualifiée de principe d'importance fondamentale par la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, la confiance mutuelle est devenue un véritable leitmotiv de l'intégration européenne. En dépit de son succès, ce principe demeurait en manque criant de conceptualisation. Cette thèse de doctorat avait pour principal objectif de remédier à cette nébuleuse en offrant une définition transversale du principe de confiance mutuelle. Il a pu être démontré qu'il se définit par l'obligation qu'il impose aux États membres de présumer la compatibilité de leurs solutions juridiques nationales respectives. Cette présomption est ambivalente, en ce qu'elle porte, dans certains cas, sur la conformité d'une solution juridique nationale par rapport au droit de l'Union et, dans d'autres, sur l'admissibilité de solutions juridiques nationales différentes. Dans ce cadre, les États membres sont tenus de considérer, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, que tous les autres États membres respectent les droits fondamentaux. Avec l'appui des travaux relatifs à la notion de confiance en sociologie, l'archétype de la confiance mutuelle en droit de l'Union a également pu être esquissé. Cette dernière agit comme un « réducteur de la complexité » et rend possible la gouvernance dans l'espace sans frontières intérieures. Le principe de confiance mutuelle se situe en effet à la croisée de trois impératifs essentiels de la construction européenne : l'unité, la diversité ainsi que l'égalité entre les États membres. Le gain en fluidité a néanmoins un prix : le risque qu'il génère en raison de l'absence de contrôle mutuel des solutions juridiques pré
