Search results

En octobre 2019, d'immenses manifestations populaires ont contesté le pouvoir libanais alors qu'éclatait au grand jour une crise économique et financière sans précédent due à l'incurie des dirigeants. La chaîne de Ponzi organisée à l'échelle nationale par les autorités monétaires elles-mêmes s'est rompue. La monnaie s'est effondrée et avec elle toute une société confrontée à un appauvrissement aussi fort que brutal. Plus d'un an plus tard, les mouvements contestataires qui se sont auto-baptisés révolutionnaires « thawra », sont très peu visibles. Même le traumatisme de l'explosion du 4 août dans le port de Beyrouth, dû à la même incurie des pouvoirs publics, n'a pas suscité la remobilisation de dynamiques collectives alors qu'à l'échelle individuelle le niveau de colère est très élevé, et le rythme de l'émigration sans volonté de retour s'est très fortement accéléré malgré les contraintes liées à la Covid. Au point que le paysage politique libanais semble extraordinairement figé, alors que la société est en plein bouleversements. En cause, la résilience à toute épreuve d'un système de pouvoir qui s'est paré d'atours démocratiques mais qui fonctionne en réalité comme une oligarchie aux composantes communautaires, confessionnelles, miliciennes, politiques et financières.

After long thought safe from Al Qaeda networks because of its multi-religious structure, Lebanon discovered a new form of violence: the jihadists. A series of deadly attacks revealed the existence of a real operational infrastructure and, above all, a locally recruited pool of Lebanese suicide bombers. In the collective imagination of the Lebanese, this modus operandi remained the preserve of the Shiite militants of Hezbollah during the 1975-1990 war. Some thirty years later, jihadism has changed sides: it is no longer the work of Islamist radicals Shiites, but Sunni Salafist groups. Even now they hold entire regions in Iraq and Syria. Adapted from the source document.

Samy Gemayel, 32, is one of Lebanon's youngest political leaders. First elected to the Lebanese Parliament in 2009, he personifies the new order of the Kataeb or 'Phalangist' Party founded by his grandfather Pierre Gemayel in 1936 - a party whose history, like that of his family, is wrapped up in the history of Lebanon. Interviewed here by Sibylle Rizk, Samy Gemayel condemns the weakness of his country's institutions and drives home the need to amend the Constitution in the interests of greater decentralization, or perhaps even federalism. He particularly warns of the dangers of a new flare-up: the war raging in neighboring Syria threatens to spill over into Lebanon at any given moment, and the mutual sectarian hatred in the country between Sunni and Shia still burns strong. Samy Gemayel is a firm believer in strict neutrality. He appeals to his countrymen to stay out of conflicts that do not concern them. Adapted from the source document.

Michel Aoun is in a category all his own. A Christian general who came late to the political scene, he was first commander of the armed forces, then prime minister of Lebanon. He opposed the Taif agreement of 1989, maintaining that it legitimized Syrian control over his country. Choosing exile over submission, he returned triumphant to his native land as soon as Syrian troops withdrew in 2005-then executed a spectacular about-face in 2006. The uncontested winner of legislative elections in regions with a Christian majority, Michel Aoun was unable to agree on the make-up of a government with the new sovereignist movement led by Rafic Hariri's son Saad. This led him to join the opposition and on February 6, 2006 he signed a political agreement with Hezbollah, the Islamic resistance party and the primary ally of Syria and Iran. In a compelling interview with Sibylle Rizk, General Aoun explains this turnaround and its consequences for the future of Lebanon and the region. Adapted from the source document.