How to Make Impossible Decisions: jacques derrida and ruth chang on the ethics of rational choice
In: Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities, Band 29, Heft 1-2, S. 181-191
ISSN: 1469-2899
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In: Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities, Band 29, Heft 1-2, S. 181-191
ISSN: 1469-2899
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 9, S. 8085-8102
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractTalents often play a significant role in our personal and social lives. For example, our talents may shape the choices we make and the goods that we value, making them central to the creation of a meaningful life. Differences in the level of talents also affect how social institutions are structured, and how social goods and resources are distributed. Despite their normative importance, it is surprising that talents have not yet received substantial philosophical analysis in their own right. As a result, the current literature is rife with conceptual ambiguity: a talent is referred to as all of a skill, potential, ability, capacity, endowment, and a natural gift. In response to this confusion, in this paper I develop an account of what a talent is, based on the debate concerning the metaphysics of ability and dispositions. I argue for a position that I call 'talent dispositionalism':Shas a talent for skillAin circumstancesCiffShas the general disposition to excellently develop and maintainAwhen, in circumstancesC, she tries to excellently develop and maintainA. On this account, a talent is not the skill itself, but a general iterated ability for the excellent development and up-keep of a particular skill, constituted by an agent's dispositional properties. I defend the account against four objections usually levelled against traditional dispositionalist theories of ability, and highlight some ways the account may influence debates in other areas of philosophical inquiry.
In: Celebrity studies, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 128-142
ISSN: 1939-2400