Suchergebnisse

AbstractI test a market consensus hypothesis about earnings management in the banking industry. This hypothesis states that when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings forecasts, managers have an incentive to manage earnings through discretionary accruals to achieve market expectations. A sample of banks is partitioned based on the degree of forecaster consensus, and the behavior of one discretionary accrual, the loan loss provision, is predicted for each partition. The results suggest bank managers make greater use of the loan loss provision to manipulate earnings in a discretionary manner when analysts have reached a consensus in their earnings predictions.

The concept of framing is used to describe how a "Quality of Earnings" theme was constructed and implemented in Intermediate-level Financial Accounting. Specific curriculum tactics, including student-generated definitions of quality of earnings and a variety of cases are described as part of a framing strategy at the start of the course and subsequent reinforcement of such a strategy throughout. The complexity and central importance in accounting and accounting education of quality of earnings make this construct especially valuable in conceptualizing, designing, and implementing accounting curriculum.

ABSTRACT: We examine whether the market assesses a lower level of information asymmetry to firms that are perceived to be monitored more intensely by members of the board of directors. We use changes in bid-ask spreads as proxies for changes in information asymmetry between the firm and the market around the time earnings are announced. Our study is innovative in its association of director monitoring with levels of information asymmetry as reflected in quoted spreads.Our sample includes 145 firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index (TSX-300). The TSX's hybrid market structure provides a unique international setting in which to examine the effects of governance on information asymmetry. Results indicate that the market attributes a lower level of information asymmetry to firms with a larger proportion of outside directors on the board. Contrary to our predictions, we find the larger the proportion of voting rights held by directors, the higher the level of information asymmetry attributed to the firm. We provide some evidence that a separate CEO/Chair leadership structure is associated with reduced information asymmetry. From a practice perspective, we are able to provide some preliminary insight into the potential value attributed by market participants to the imposition of regulation surrounding certain director monitoring activities.