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Seventy five years ago today – April 4, 1949 — foreign ministers of the United States, Canada, and 10 West European countries concluded the Treaty of Washington, creating what became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The treaty committed U.S. (and Canadian) power and purpose to Western Europe to contain the Soviet Union. In the subsequent four decades, NATO was critical in ending the Cold War and Soviet suzerainty over Central and European Europe, and playing a role in the collapse of the Soviet Union.Today the alliance is faced with a new challenge, that of Vladimir Putin's Russia and its encroachment from the East. Many observers and even some Western governments say Putin's aggression in the 21st Century was inevitable: that he had always contrived to put the old Russian (Soviet) empire back together and to push Moscow's influence Westward, perhaps even beyond Ukraine.Not everyone would agree with that assessment, but the current challenge to the West is nevertheless palpable, beginning with the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014. In February 2022, Putin rolled tanks as far as the outskirts of Kyiv and today is determined to keep the Russian-speaking Oblasts, including Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, as well as Crimea. Leaders of many NATO countries are convinced that, if not stopped, Putin threatens the Baltic states, Poland, and NATO's newest allies, Finland and Sweden.Historians will contend it is useless to revisit events and pretend that what happened in 2014 and 2022 could have been deterred. But in this case, there were leaders just after the Cold War who did try to shape European security in a way that might have avoided the current confrontation with Russia. Perhaps Putin always had ambitions to swallow Ukraine and advance Russian influence farther West. But an equally plausible (I would argue more compelling) argument can be made that the West — and later Russia — ultimately forfeited the chance to develop "history" differently.Even before the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the H. W. Bush and later the Clinton administrations had a critical insight: A defeated Russia should not be treated with the harshness meted out to Germany in 1919, with the Versailles Treaty's so-called War Guilt Clause that required Germany to accept total responsibility for causing the First World War. In Hitler's rise to power, the treaty proved to be highly useful propaganda for targeting the demoralized and resentful German people.Bush thus proclaimed the ambition of a "Europe whole and free" and at peace. As much as anything, that meant not stigmatizing Russia and, to the extent possible, enabling it to play a serious role in the new security architecture the West was putting into place instead of simply disbanding NATO and tempting fate. NATO thus gained Russia's membership in its flagship Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It also welcomed Russian troops in the post-Bosnia War Implementation Force (IFOR) – the first such military cooperation since U.S. and Soviet forces met on the Elbe River in 1945. Because some Central European countries remained wary of a potentially revanchist Russia, NATO invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to be full members in 1997. The Russians were not pleased, but they turned a blind eye to NATO membership for the first two of these new allies because of Moscow's concern that at some point Germany might again pose a threat. It was thus useful to Russia to have Poland and the Czech Republic "surround" Germany with NATO and U.S. power, just as Moscow had agreed that united Germany could be a full NATO ally. Along with that first enlargement of NATO, the alliance negotiated a NATO-Russia Founding Act, with a remarkable set of common principles, self-proclaimed limits on NATO military activities in Central Europe, and a long list of cooperative projects. At the same time, lest there be any concern that Ukraine, sited between NATO and Russia, would fall under Russia's sway, NATO concluded a Charter with Ukraine, which complemented a 1994 three-power non-aggression pledge to Ukraine (U.S., UK, and Russia) — which Russia broke in 2014 and 2022 — in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its Soviet nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War.Then, new officials came to power in Washington who lacked historical perspective: they decided that Russia was of no account. Notably, the U.S. abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty — a symbol more than substance of Moscow's desire still to be seen as a great power. Then the U.S. deployed anti-ballistic missiles in Central Europe, in violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. For its part, Russia also took negative steps, quitting the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,. which led the U.S. to leave it.Most damaging to the chances for building shared security and avoiding a new confrontation, in 2008 President George W. Bush pressured NATO to declare that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO." This was clearly beyond what any major country could accept (for the U.S.: think Cuba) and violated the 1997 tacit understandings on Ukraine's position between East and West. Both NATO and the United States have repeated that pledge regularly ever since — ironically so, since it is virtually inconceivable that the alliance could get the required consensus of its 33 members in order for Ukraine to join. This geopolitical folly does not justify any of Putin's actions. But, along with further NATO enlargements and a 2014 U.S.-led government coup in Kyiv, it has helped Putin make the case at home that NATO is seeking to surround Russia.Today, NATO has made it clear that it must help Ukraine counter Russian aggression, while, following President Joe Biden's lead, not putting member troops on the ground that could lead to miscalculations or escalation. Yes, the U.S. Congress must finally appropriate a new tranche of vitally-needed arms for Ukraine to defend itself, though it now appears that, even with more aid, Ukraine will not be able to make significant advances against Russian forces. Beyond the critical importance of aiding Ukraine and showing Putin that there are limits to his military ambitions, at stake is the precious commodity of U.S. credibility, focusing on the security of all NATO allies and especially those that could become further targets of Russian aggression. This is today's most fundamental charge on U.S. foreign and security policy: it must not be funked.At the same time, it has become too easy and popular to proclaim a new cold war with Russia. That would mean high risks and costs, political and psychological rigidities, and constant fears of miscalculation and possible escalation from one war (Ukraine) to broader conflict on the Continent. One has to remember that from the time when the U.S.-Soviet confrontation stabilized strategically — about 1963 — it would be more than a quarter century before the Cold War ended.Moreover, it has become too easy to ignore an incontrovertible geopolitical reality: that Russia cannot be wished away. At some point, it will again become a great power, though unlikely to be a superpower as was the Soviet Union. The West, beginning with the United States, will have to deal with this fact, in our own self-interest. That argues for caution, especially at this summer's NATO summit, to keep from crossing the Rubicon to permanent confrontation with Russia. NATO must not close off all avenues of non-military engagement, including navigating a pathway to a negotiated settlement to end the Russia-Ukraine war. It cannot abandon its strategic stabilization and arms control efforts, and should not promote a new division of Europe between friends and permanent foe. Support for Ukraine in its valiant defense, yes; thwarting alternatives to a new cold war, no.

Of all the foreign policy challenges President Joe Biden faces, most difficult is the war in Gaza. That is not because of the apparent geopolitical stakes; as Biden often says, China poses the most important long-term challenge and Russia is next. But while important, what happens between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East, has not been in the same league.Yet because of the war in Gaza, with its linkage to overall Israeli-Palestinian relations and risks of escalation to other parts of the region, there may soon be an explosion dwarfing all other concerns facing Biden and his team. There is also another important reason that the war in Gaza now occupies center stage for the Biden administration: America's attitudes towards and relations with Israel. Since Israel's creation in the wake of World War II, most Americans have considered U.S. ties with the Jewish state as special, both because of its founding as a democracy committed to values similar to America's and a shared perspective of "never again" stemming from the Holocaust. Even when Israel has fallen short, as for many years in its treatment of Palestinians, most Americans have given Israel the benefit of the doubt. Except on a handful of occasions, Washington consistently "has had Israel's back" in Middle East crises and conflicts. For both interests and values reasons, therefore, it was natural that immediately following the horrendous October 7 Hamas assault on southern Israel, in which some 1,200 people were killed and 240 more taken hostage, Biden declared total support for Israel's military retaliation. His position was initially supported by most Americans, largely on a bipartisan basis. But then the toll of destruction in Gaza mounted — as of this past week, more than 16,000 Palestinians have been killed, at least 40,000 more wounded, and more than 85 percent of the Strip's population of more than two million has been rendered homeless with no safe place to go. All of this has been vividly displayed on U.S. television and cable media. Thus, the Biden administration began to rethink its hands-off support for Israel's military campaign — but only with respect to its tactics, not its overall policy of destroying Hamas.Washington worked through intermediaries, principally Qatar, to obtain a "pause" in the Gaza fighting in order to get Hamas to release some hostages and increase the flow of humanitarian assistance from Egypt into Gaza. Following the end of the pause, however, U.S. appeals to Israel have been limited to try to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza, or, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken put it, "taking more effective steps to protect the lives of civilians." But so long as Israel continues to pursue the extirpation of Hamas, significantly limiting civilian casualties is impossible, as the Biden team must recognize. Notably, the world sees that Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has essentially rebuffed Biden, which impacts on U.S. credibility elsewhere, especially since the United States is universally seen as Israel's sole patron. Certainly, America's reputation for promoting humanitarian concerns has been severely damaged. Both factors argue for the president to press Israel immediately to declare a cease-fire, not just a temporary "pause," but one designed to end the war. Indeed, if we are to believe Israel's own estimates, Hamas's military capacities have already been heavily degraded, and the possibility of it again being able to mount a serious attack on Israel is low.The gravity of risks in the Levant and potentially throughout the region means that the United States (and others) cannot once again return to indifference when this war ends. Biden has shown he is aware of this, and has recommitted himself to pursuing the so-called "two-state solution." For years, however, it has been largely a mantra; and while it is the best outcome, its prospects are now even more remote given renewed Israeli fears provoked by the October 7 attack and its attendant atrocities, as well as increased Palestinian bitterness over the massive destruction and loss of life in Gaza. Yet time is not on the side of "orderly diplomacy" that for a half-century has been the usual course. There is already a major risk of a new intifada on the West Bank, as most Palestinians have lost any hope of Israel's willingness to recognize their basic human rights, much less permit a Palestinian state. They also see that Israel will not stop West Bank settlers from displacing and even murdering Palestinian civilians. The Palestinians also cannot count on support from Arab states. No Arab leader really cares for the Palestinians and none has even called into question their existing treaties with Israel or the so-called Abraham Accords. Nor is it conceivable that, to do the necessary diplomatic work, the U.N. or countries other than the U.S. can lead or have any chance of success. Nothing will be possible unless Washington takes charge and makes clear to Israel that, as the occupying power, it must change its policies and practices toward the Palestinians. On December 6 , U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres reiterated his "appeal for a humanitarian ceasefire to be declared." In the U.N. Security Council Friday, the United States vetoed the resolution and was joined only by Britain's abstention. The Biden administration thus tied itself even more to Israel's slaughter in Gaza, carried out in major part with U.S.-supplied bombs. The veto further cheapened U.S. political and moral standing and made it harder for Biden to be seen as credible as a diplomatic leader once the war ends.Until October 7, President Biden and his team gave Israel-Palestinian relations short shrift. So far, everyone has been lucky that the crisis has not spread across the region, with the possibility of wider war. Even so, Israel and Hezbollah have come to blows; Yemen has taken some pot-shots; and while Iran has been careful not to get directly involved, its proxies in Iraq and Syria have been engaged in some incidents.But luck is not a policy. The president must know that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis can't again be pushed aside when this war ends. He needs to rebuild trust in the United States for strategic competence and then as an honest broker. He needs to show that the United States will place its own interests first, not anyone else's. He needs to augment his foreign policy inner circle with outside experts in strategy and regional dynamics, but free from biases. And he needs to be prepared to run risks in American domestic politics.It's a difficult agenda, but nothing less will enable President Biden to protect and promote U.S. strategic, political, and moral interests.

The United States must determine how best to promote long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf region while seeking to reduce the risks and costs imposed by its role as a permanent regional power. The author analyzes Iraq's future, the role of Iran, asymmetric threats, regional reassurance, regional tensions, and the roles of other external actors. He then sets out criteria and requirements for a new regional security structure.

Border arrangements -- International force -- Palestinian military forces -- Israeli settlements -- Intelligence, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute -- Resolution provisions -- Special security issues regarding Jerusalem -- External security environment -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- A. security issues and the Arab-Israeli peace process, 1967/2003 -- B. "Clinton parameters" (presented by President Bill Clinton to the Israeli and -- Palestinian negotiators on December 23, 2000)

In keeping Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the United States currently faces five possibilities. Three are unlikely to succeed: Iran either cannot produce the bomb or decides for its own reasons not to do so; economic sanctions work; or a new regime comes to power and adopts radically different foreign policies. Two other possibilities are more plausible: either the West accepts an Iranian nuclear weapon and deters/contains Iran; or the United States or Israel attacks its nuclear facilities. War would be catastrophic; but containment also has penalties. Washington should thus reassess core Western and Iranian strategic interests; offer security guarantees if Iran credibly abandons any pursuit of nuclear weapons and stops other unacceptable behaviour (for example support for Hizbullah and Hamas); explore possible cooperation with Iran in Iraq and (particularly) Afghanistan; and pursue confidence-building measures, such as agreements on incidents at sea, freedom of navigation, and counter-piracy cooperation. The United States has nothing to lose by trying this approach. (Survival / SWP)