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The BRICS in the Era of Renewed Great Power Competition
In: Strategic analysis: a monthly journal of the IDSA, Band 43, Heft 6, S. 469-486
ISSN: 1754-0054
Russia's BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider
In: Polity, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 38-73
ISSN: 1744-1684
Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security by Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 122, Heft 4, S. 706-708
ISSN: 1538-165X
Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 122, Heft 4, S. 706-707
ISSN: 0032-3195
German and Soviet Military Doctrinal Innovation before World War II
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 140-144
ISSN: 1531-3298
In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941–1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of "deep battle" have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.
German and Soviet Military Doctrinal Innovation before World War II
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 140-144
ISSN: 1520-3972
In the lead-up to WWII, both Germany & the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941-1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German & Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg & the Soviet conception of "deep battle" have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German & Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years. Adapted from the source document.
Planning for war: The red army and the catastrophe of 1941
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 47, Heft 8, S. 1293-1326
ISSN: 1465-3427
Planning for war: The Red Army and the catastrophe of 1941
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 47, Heft 8, S. 1293-1326
ISSN: 0966-8136
Die katastrophale Niederlage der Roten Armee in den ersten Monaten der deutschen Invasion 1941 ist nicht allein auf Stalins Fehlinterpretation der deutschen Absichten oder die Dezimierung des sowjetischen Offizierskorps durch die stalinistischen Säuberungen zurückzuführen. Sie basiert vielmehr vor allem auf dem starren Festhalten an einer militärischen Dogmatik, die das erfolgversprechende Konzept einer strategischen Verteidigung ausschloß und auf eine rasche Gegenoffensive der Roten Armee setzte. Ungeachtet der Erfolge des deutschen Blitzkriegs im Westen ging die militärische Führung davon aus, daß zwischen den ersten Feindseligkeiten und dem Aufeinandertreffen der Hauptkräfte der kriegführenden Parteien eine bedeutende Zeitspanne liegen würde. Ein nach der Niederlage Polens in militärischen Kreisen entwickeltes alternatives Paradigma vermochte sich nicht durchzusetzen. Die militärische Führung überschätzte unverändert die eigene Offensivfähigkeit und unterschätzte gleichzeitig die Schlagkraft der deutschen Blitzkriegstrategie. (BIOst-Wpt)
World Affairs Online
The New Realism and the Old Rigidities: Gorbachev's Strategy in Perspective
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 213-226
ISSN: 1530-9177
The new realism and the old rigidities: Gorbachev's strategy in perspective
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 213-226
ISSN: 0163-660X, 0147-1465
World Affairs Online
Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe, by Joshua M. Epstein
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 100, Heft 2, S. 319-320
ISSN: 1538-165X
Soviet Military Policy in Transition
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 83, Heft 495, S. 331-334
ISSN: 1944-785X
Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question, by Leon V. Sigal and John D. Steinbruner, Eds
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 99, Heft 3, S. 539-540
ISSN: 1538-165X
Soviet military policy in transition
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 83, Heft 495, S. 331-334,345-346
ISSN: 0011-3530
World Affairs Online