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In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941–1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of "deep battle" have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.

In the lead-up to WWII, both Germany & the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941-1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German & Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg & the Soviet conception of "deep battle" have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German & Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years. Adapted from the source document.

Die katastrophale Niederlage der Roten Armee in den ersten Monaten der deutschen Invasion 1941 ist nicht allein auf Stalins Fehlinterpretation der deutschen Absichten oder die Dezimierung des sowjetischen Offizierskorps durch die stalinistischen Säuberungen zurückzuführen. Sie basiert vielmehr vor allem auf dem starren Festhalten an einer militärischen Dogmatik, die das erfolgversprechende Konzept einer strategischen Verteidigung ausschloß und auf eine rasche Gegenoffensive der Roten Armee setzte. Ungeachtet der Erfolge des deutschen Blitzkriegs im Westen ging die militärische Führung davon aus, daß zwischen den ersten Feindseligkeiten und dem Aufeinandertreffen der Hauptkräfte der kriegführenden Parteien eine bedeutende Zeitspanne liegen würde. Ein nach der Niederlage Polens in militärischen Kreisen entwickeltes alternatives Paradigma vermochte sich nicht durchzusetzen. Die militärische Führung überschätzte unverändert die eigene Offensivfähigkeit und unterschätzte gleichzeitig die Schlagkraft der deutschen Blitzkriegstrategie. (BIOst-Wpt)