Suchergebnisse

Global governance and postconflict peacebuilding -- Postconflict peacebuilding -- Crisis of institutionalism -- Crises of state and institutional memory -- Crises of legitimacy and dispossession -- From third to fourth generation peacebuilding -- Fourth generation peacebuilding -- Legitimacy, popular peace, and global governance.

This book examines the limits to cosmopolitan liberal peacebuilding caused by its preoccupation with the values and assumptions of neoliberal global governance.

Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional investors are "rationally reticent," meaning that they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries and, ultimately, spur the effective monitoring of corporate boards. Activist shareholders, such as hedge funds, often achieve their business strategy and governance objectives by obtaining toehold positions in a corporation and soliciting support from institutional investors for their governance proposals. However, this solution is in jeopardy. Recently proposed regulatory changes in the United States track adopted legislation in the United Kingdom and Europe, and pose a threat to domestic activist shareholder success. This Note argues that incorporation of the UK Stewardship Code's Principle 5 into the U.S. regulatory scheme may help alleviate the potentially chilling effects of the proposed rule-making on shareholder activists.

This work discusses conflict resolution in the Western paradigm and Cambodia's recent experience of that. Lizee makes a notable contribution to our understanding of the management of transitions from conflict to peace in this sophisticated piece of analysis. The work revolves around the general hypothesis that the failure of the Cambodian peace process is attributable almost entirely to the inappropriate character of the Western-determined peace process. The book starts by comparing the evolution of conflict management processes in the West and in Cambodia; Lizee makes the differences quite clear, and this part of his work is very strong as an indicator of the evolution of socioinstitutional mores in Cambodia (especially pp. 39–43). He argues that a critical tension accounts for the failure of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA). This is to be found in the Khmer approaches to social harmony through balance-of-power equations and Buddhist values.

This book takes the reader through the complexities of the search for peace in the first chapters and through the provision of the UNTAC operation up to 1993. It concludes with an overview of the 1998 elections, and in between there is a section dedicated to the period between the two polls. The first section is reasonable, but the text is repetitive and it repeats what several others have already written (Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, 1995, and various works by David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Michael Vickery). The analysis reflects that by several of the recognized Khmer scholars, and is useful to read, but while the analysis is insightful regarding Western peacemaking processes and the Khmer resistance at various points, it does not question assumptions regarding the overwriting of Western peace paradigms onto Khmer political culture. This has a distinctly different historical evolution and an equally dissimilar set of contemporary values regarding the notions of opposition, power sharing, and social harmony. The limits of this type of analysis are present throughout the work and are probably best illustrated by the statement that the violence of July 1997 "transformed UNTAC's enterprise from what may have been termed a [limited success' to a failed rescue of a failed state" (p. 265).

Introduction -- Thinking about security and violence -- Global human insecurity -- Institutions, infanticide and mortality -- Institutions and intimate murder -- Human and realist security -- International institutions -- Andrarchy and neoliberalism -- The social construction of global structures -- Conclusion