Suchergebnisse

Many scholars have examined the durability of parliamentary versus presidential regimes in democracies, but the process by which authoritarian leaders are (nominally) elected is generally assumed to be irrelevant. However, even if the electoral outcome is not in doubt, the executive selection process may affect outcomes such as regime durability. I argue that, when opposition parties are allowed to participate in the executive selection process, a Parliament-based election system increases authoritarian regime durability by creating incentives for ruling party elites to work cooperatively for mutual gain. In this article, I identify dictatorships by executive selection system and find that regimes with a multiparty Parliament-based system are more durable than those with a multiparty Presidential system or an Unelected (or single party) system if the party, relative to the ruler and the military, is an important power center.

On April 25, 2015, over two million Togolese participated in the third presidential election since the death of long-standing dictator Gnassingbe Eyadema in 2005. Incumbent president - and Eyadema's son - Faure Gnassingbe won the election with 59 percent of the vote, extending his tenure in office until at least 2020. Official reports put turnout at 61 percent of registered voters (Commission Electorale Nationale Independent [Togo], 2015). [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]