Suchergebnisse

part PART I THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH -- chapter 1 Michael Ashley Stein (2007), 'Disability Human Rights', California Law Review, 95, pp. 75–121. -- chapter 2 Ravi Malhotra (2009), 'Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach and Equality Rights for People with Disabilities: Rethinking the Granovsky Decision', Supreme Court Law Review, 45, pp. 61–90. -- chapter 3 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz (2013), 'Personal Delegations', Brooklyn Law Review, 78, pp. 1231–78. -- chapter 4 Ani B. Satz (2009), 'Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property', Animal Law, 16, pp. 65–122. -- chapter 5 Robin West (2015), 'Capabilities and Constitutions', Nussbaum and Law, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 187–202. -- part PART II LAW AND EMOTIONS -- chapter 6 Katharine K. Baker (2005), 'Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law', Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 28, pp. 447–66. -- chapter 7 Susan Bandes (1996), 'Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements', University of Chicago Law Review, 63, pp. 361–412. -- chapter 8 David Gray (2015), 'Justice and Mercy in the Face of Excessive Suffering: Some Preliminary Thoughts', Nussbaum and Law, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 277–98. -- part PART III SEXUALITY, GENDER, FEMINISM AND LAW -- chapter 9 Noa Ben-Asher (2014), 'Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual', Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, 37, pp. 243–84. -- chapter 10 Tracey E. Higgins (2010), 'Feminism as Liberalism: A Tribute to the Work of Martha Nussbaum', Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 19, pp. 65–87. -- chapter 11 Robin West (2003), 'Human Capabilities and Human Authorities: A Comment on Martha Nussbaum's Women and Human Development', St Thomas Law Review, 15, pp. 757–90. -- part PART IV LAW AND LITERATURE -- chapter 12 Elizabeth F. Emens (2011), 'Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage', California Law Review, 99, pp. 235–72. -- chapter 13 Kenji Yoshino (2005), 'The City and the Poet', Yale Law Journal, 114, pp. 1835–96.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction: Towards Humanistic Jurisprudence -- PART I THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH -- 1 Michael Ashley Stein (2007), 'Disability Human Rights', California Law Review, 95, pp. 75-121. -- 2 Ravi Malhotra (2009), 'Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach and Equality Rights for People with Disabilities: Rethinking the Granovsky Decision', Supreme Court Law Review, 45, pp. 61-90. -- 3 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz (2013), 'Personal Delegations', Brooklyn Law Review, 78, pp. 1231-78. -- 4 Ani B. Satz (2009), 'Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property', Animal Law, 16, pp. 65-122. -- 5 Robin West (2015), 'Capabilities and Constitutions', Nussbaum and Law, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 187-202. -- PART II LAW AND EMOTIONS -- 6 Katharine K. Baker (2005), 'Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law', Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, 28, pp. 447-66. -- 7 Susan Bandes (1996), 'Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements', University of Chicago Law Review, 63, pp. 361-412. -- 8 David Gray (2015), 'Justice and Mercy in the Face of Excessive Suffering: Some Preliminary Thoughts', Nussbaum and Law, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 277-98. -- PART III SEXUALITY, GENDER, FEMINISM AND LAW -- 9 Noa Ben-Asher (2014), 'Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual', Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, 37, pp. 243-84. -- 10 Tracey E. Higgins (2010), 'Feminism as Liberalism: A Tribute to the Work of Martha Nussbaum', Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 19, pp. 65-87. -- 11 Robin West (2003), 'Human Capabilities and Human Authorities: A Comment on Martha Nussbaum's Women and Human Development', St Thomas Law Review, 15, pp. 757-90. -- PART IV LAW AND LITERATURE

Teaching Law re-imagines law school teaching and scholarship by going beyond crises now besetting the legal academy and examining deeper and longer-lasting challenges. The book argues that the legal academy has long neglected the need to focus teaching and scholarship on the ideals of justice that law fitfully serves, the political origins of law, and the development of a respectful but critical relationship with the legal profession. It suggests reforms to improve the quality of legal education and responds to concerns that law schools eschew the study of justice, rendering students amoralist; that law schools slight the political sources of law, particularly in legislative action; and that law schools have ignored the profession entirely. These areas of neglect have impoverished legal teaching and scholarship as the academy is refashioned in response to current financial exigencies, and addressing them is long overdue

"Normative Jurisprudence aims to reinvigorate normative legal scholarship that both criticizes positive law and suggests reforms for it, on the basis of stated moral values and legalistic ideals. It looks sequentially and in detail at the three major traditions in jurisprudence - natural law, legal positivism, and critical legal studies - that have in the past provided philosophical foundations for just such normative scholarship. Over the last fifty years or so, all of these traditions, although for different reasons, have taken a number of different turns - toward empirical analysis, conceptual analysis, or Foucaultian critique - and away from straightforward normative criticism. As a result, normative legal scholarship - scholarship that is aimed at criticism and reform - is now lacking a foundation in jurisprudential thought. The book criticizes those developments and suggests a return, albeit with different and in many ways larger challenges, to this traditional understanding of the purpose of legal scholarship"--

Normative Jurisprudence aims to reinvigorate normative legal scholarship that both criticizes positive law and suggests reforms for it, on the basis of stated moral values and legalistic ideals. It looks sequentially and in detail at the three major traditions in jurisprudence – natural law, legal positivism and critical legal studies – that have in the past provided philosophical foundations for just such normative scholarship. Over the last fifty years or so, all of these traditions, although for different reasons, have taken a number of different turns – toward empirical analysis, conceptual analysis or Foucaultian critique – and away from straightforward normative criticism. As a result, normative legal scholarship – scholarship that is aimed at criticism and reform – is now lacking a foundation in jurisprudential thought. The book criticizes those developments and suggests a return, albeit with different and in many ways larger challenges, to this traditional understanding of the purpose of legal scholarship