Suchergebnisse

1. The EU : history, institutions and sources of law -- 2. Enforcement actions against member states and preliminary rulings -- 3. European law supremacy and direct effect -- 4. Indirect effect and state liability -- 5. Free movement of goods 1 : articles 28-30 and 110 TFEU -- 6. Free movement of goods 2 : articles 34-36 TFEU -- 7. Personal mobility : citizenship and free movement of persons -- 8. Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services -- 9. Competition law 1 : article 101 TFEU -- 10. Competition law 2 : article 102 TFEU.

"The Optimize series is designed to show you how to apply your knowledge in assessment. These concise revision guides cover the most commonly taught topics, and provide you with the tools to: Understand the law and remember the details using diagrams and tables throughout to demonstrate how the law fits together Contextualise your knowledge identifying and explaining how to apply legal principles for important cases providing cross-references and further reading to help you aim higher in essays and exams Avoid common misunderstandings and errors identifying common pitfalls students encounter in class and in assessment Reflect critically on the law identifying contentious areas that are up for debate and on which you will need to form an opinion Apply what you have learned in assessment presenting learning objectives that reflect typical assessment criteria providing sample essay and exam questions, supported by end-of chapter feedback The series is also supported by comprehensive online resources that allow you to test your progress during the run-up to exams"--

This article appeared in Strategic Insights (May 2002), v.1 no.3 ; Israel's assault on West Bank Palestinian towns throughout April 2002 and its even longer siege and then occupation of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat's presidential compound in Ramallah, have raised legitimate questions about how long Arafat will remain in power in Palestine. After all, Arafat is already older than King Husayn of Jordan and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria were at the time of their deaths in recent years, and Arafat has suffered from a number of physical ailments, particularly since his near-fatal plane crash in Libya. In addition to the ravages of time, Arafat must also worry about assassination attempts, either from Palestinian dissidents or Israeli commandos. Even as the siege of Arafat is coming to an end, the questions of his physical longevity and of political succession in Palestine only intensify. The intent of this essay is not to predict which personality will eventually succeed Arafat, but rather to outline some of the major issues that will define the succession process when it occurs.

Klappentext: Most violent jihadi movements in the twentieth century focused on removing corrupt, repressive secular regimes throughout the Muslim world. But following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a new form of jihadism emerged - global jihad - turning to the international arena as the primary locus of ideology and action. With this book, Glenn E. Robinson develops a compelling and provocative argument about this violent political movement's evolution. Global Jihad tells the story of four distinct jihadi waves, each with its own program for achieving a global end: whether a Jihadi International to liberate Muslim lands from foreign occupation; al-Qa'ida's call to drive the United States out of the Muslim world; ISIS using "jihadi cool" to recruit followers; or leaderless efforts of stochastic terror to "keep the dream alive." Robinson connects the rise of global jihad to other "movements of rage" such as the Nazi Brownshirts, White supremacists, Khmer Rouge, and Boko Haram. Ultimately, he shows that while global jihad has posed a low strategic threat, it has instigated an outsized reaction from the United States and other Western nations.

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.55540/ 0031-1723.2973 ; This article analyzes Hamas' strategic and political calculations during the 2014 conflict with Israel in Gaza. I argue Hamas did not plan the conflict, which came mostly in response to Israel's crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank (Operation Brothers Keeper). However, Hamas sought to use the conflict to reverse its increasingly weak strategic position, and had some success in doing so. However, given Gaza's continued physical and regional isolation, Hamas' enhanced position coming out of the conflict is not likely to be long-lived.

Without an acknowledgment of possible defeat, neither the regime nor the opposition will accept a grand bargain in which compromise is central.