Studying more to vote less. Education and voter turnout in Italy
In: European journal of political economy, Band 72, S. 102115
ISSN: 1873-5703
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In: European journal of political economy, Band 72, S. 102115
ISSN: 1873-5703
We use Italian municipality data on education and voter participation in national elections to estimate the effect of schooling on voter turnout. By adopting a fixed effect instrumental variable identification strategy, we find that education reduces voter turnout, more so in municipalities with higher income, lower social capital, which experienced political misconduct in the past and have low institutional quality. Analysis with individual data confirms these results. We discuss several mechanisms to rationalize our findings ranging from the opportunity cost of time to disaffection and civic protest.
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 51, S. 27-43
In: Journal of human capital: JHC, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 106-166
ISSN: 1932-8664
In: Eastern economic journal: EEJ, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 202-225
ISSN: 1939-4632
In: Economics of education review, Band 32, S. 234-246
ISSN: 0272-7757
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 5479
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 118, Heft 533, S. 1866-1887
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Public choice, Band 134, Heft 3-4, S. 347-366
ISSN: 1573-7101
Nondemocratic governments under the rule of weak institutions use repression against the opposition to remain in power. Repression both muffles the opposition's voice and strengthens the government's supporters. Nevertheless, when repression becomes strong enough, it becomes intolerable to its victims who revolt and initiate a civil war. The government is aware of the mechanism and determines the level of repression accordingly. This paper studies the circumstances in which the ruler's best alternative is to intensify repression to the point of provoking civil war. Although the model is abstract, its implications are discussed using the recent civil war in the Ivory Coast as a case study. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 134, Heft 3, S. 347-366
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 134, Heft 3-4, S. 347-366
ISSN: 1573-7101
We show that, when school quality is measured by the educational standard and attaining the standard requires costly effort, secondary education needs not be a hierarchy with private schools offering better quality than public schools, as in Epple and Romano, 1998. An alternative configuration, with public schools offering a higher educational standard than private schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied by private schools is strictly positive. In our model, private schools can offer a lower educational standard at a positive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of effort, who would find the high standards of the public school excessively demanding. With the key parameters calibrated on the available micro-econometric evidence from the US, our model predicts that majority voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. This system, however, is not the one that would be selected by the social planner, who prefers high quality public schools combined with low quality private schools.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9275
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12829
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12816
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