Suchergebnisse

Introduction : bread, dignity, social justice and economic reforms -- A Gramscian approach to the study of the political economy of reforms -- The Egyptian way to neoliberalism? : IMF, World Bank and reforms in Egypt -- Of success and greed : the new business class turns into capitalist oligarchy -- Ideology resurgent? : neoliberalism as economic-corporate project for the few -- From hubris to debris : global crisis and the end of the Mubarak regime -- Conclusion : Gramsci, failed hegemony and the fall of Mubarak -- Postscript : back to square one? : considerations on Egypt's uncertain future

While the 2011 Egyptian revolution has already become the subject of much debate, the roots of the socio-economic context which made the revolution possible have seldom been explored. Roberto Roccu addresses this gap and in doing this provides the first detailed study of the deeper causes of the Egyptian revolution. Relying on an innovative understanding of Antonio Gramsci's thought, He argues that economic reforms implemented since the late 1980s provided the conditions for both the emergence of a capitalist oligarchy within the regime and an unprecedented rise in socio-economic inequality in society at large. These two processes substantially eroded any remnants of hegemony, leaving the Mubarak regime ill-equipped to face the global economic crisis. By alienating sections of the ruling bloc while impoverishing vast strata of the population, neoliberal reforms provided a necessary, although by no means sufficient, condition for the Egyptian revolution to occur.

Trapped in the premises of the transition 'paradogma,' democratization and authoritarian persistence literature are limited by a linear and continuous understanding of time, a gradualist view of transition, and a procedural definition of democracy. These analytical and normative strictures are compounded by a methodological nationalism that prevents an appreciation of how global factors shape the parameters for political transformation in the contemporary Middle East. Inspired by Gramsci's theory of history, this article seeks to move beyond these limitations and explore the prospect of transition as rupture, away from democratization as strategy for ensuring duration of capitalist time, and toward democratic transition as epochal change beyond capitalism. By counterposing the effects of the two globalizations and the decolonization in between on the prospects of political transformation in the Middle East, this article argues that the Arab uprisings provide an opportunity for thinking globally and rupturally about political time, transition and democracy in the region.

AbstractWhile the EU has long been promoting economic reforms in neighbouring countries, scant attention has hitherto been paid to its regulatory efforts. This paper addresses this empirical gap with reference to the EU's promotion of regulatory reforms in three economic sectors in Egypt: agriculture, banking and telecoms. It finds that these reforms are significantly, if selectively, informed by ordoliberal principles and practices. Two theoretical implications of this finding are explored. On the one hand, while this substantiates the institutional isomorphism hypothesis, for which the EU tends to export its own models elsewhere, the selectivity with which this occurs demonstrates greater instrumentality than usually maintained in this literature. On the other hand, understanding ordoliberalism as a variation within the neoliberal template shaping restructuring in Egypt, this paper moves beyond binary views of regulatory co‐operation and competition and thus also enriches debates on the EU as a global regulator.

SUMMARY
Roberto Roccu's intervention provides a detailed reading of the concepts of subalternity, common sense and passive revolution as employed in Gramsci on Tahrir. Roccu calls for a more sustained and careful reading of how 'subaltern agency' is invoked and performed in revolutionary upheavals.

Building on the recent fertile season of studies on passive revolution, this article argues for the (re-)increasing relevance of the concept in these times of capitalist crisis. However, it is also argued that this renewed relevance should be predicated on a narrower definition of passive revolution than the one generally used in recent debates in critical International Political Economy. Returning to the Prison Notebooks, four elements are identified here as the conceptual core of passive revolution, to which Gramsci's admittedly varying uses of the phrase are implicitly anchored: an international precondition determining the necessity of restructuring on the national scale, a domestic precondition determining the specific form of this restructuring, a specific method through which passive revolution is effected and a specific outcome which entails achieving the passivity of subaltern classes through the partial fulfilment and simultaneous displacement of their demands. Thus redefined, passive revolution becomes a valuable instrument for grasping the challenges facing the emergence of a subaltern bloc in the current organic crisis of capitalism.

Building on the recent fertile season of studies on passive revolution, this paper argues for the (re-)increasing relevance of the concept in these times of capitalist crisis. However, it is also argued that this renewed relevance should be predicated on a narrower definition of passive revolution than the one generally used in recent debates in critical International Political Economy. Returning to the Prison Notebooks, four elements are identified here as the conceptual core of passive revolution, to which Gramsci's admittedly varying uses of the phrase are implicitly anchored: an international precondition determining the necessity of restructuring on the national scale; a domestic precondition determining the specific form of this restructuring; a specific method through which passive revolution is effected; and a specific outcome which entails achieving the passivity of subaltern classes through the partial fulfilment and simultaneous displacement of their demands. Thus redefined, passive revolution becomes a valuable instrument for grasping the challenges facing the emergence of a subaltern bloc in the current organic crisis of capitalism.

There is little doubt that the EU has played a key role within the wider constellation of forces pushing several Arab Mediterranean countries on the path of economic reform since the late 1980s. This is particularly clear in the case of Egypt, where the EU has been able to differentiate itself from international financial institutions and main donors in two crucial respects. On the one hand, it has proposed integration through a gradualist approach to economic reforms. On the other hand, within the wider process of multiscalar restructuring, the EU has tried to entrench its own model of integration through re-regulation in its periphery, promoting EU standards in several key areas ranging from agriculture to banking to telecoms. Following from these processes, Egypt has been asymmetrically integrated in the EU's economic 'sphere of influence', a process which in turn has contributed to three fundamental forms of differential integration within Egypt. One is most obvious and has a sectorial nature, with some parts of the Egyptian economy highly integrated with, and others effectively prevented access to, the EU market. The second form of differential integration is socioeconomic, and has seen outward-oriented sections of the Egyptian elite capturing most benefits of integration, with the wider population shouldering most of its costs. Lastly, differential integration has also had a political dimension, as increased access to the Egyptian economy has heightened the stability bias in Brussels, as well as the reliance on Mubarak's ruling elite before the revolution, thereby strengthening the marginalisation of opposition groups, both secular and Islamist, and in turn their resentment towards the EU. While the sectorial dimension of differential integration was clearly part and parcel of the EU's project, the socioeconomic and political dimensions, though arguably unintended, have made the Egyptian public and its elites in the post-Mubarak era much less receptive to the incentives offered from Brussels. This is suggested both by the preference Morsi demonstrated for doing business with Turkey and Qatar, and by Sisi's decision to deepen economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait rather than the EU. ; Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto.