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Human beings are full of moral inconsistencies. We wear multiple moral hats on one head, and juggle double standards. But how do we manage being the moral acrobats that we are? 'Moral Acrobatics' addresses this question by trying to shed honesty on who we are as moral agents and the limits of what we consider 'moral'. Philippe Rochat reveals our deep inclination to hold double standards and manage contradictory values, and our universal tendency to cluster our existence depending on context and situations, whether we deal with close kin, colleagues, strangers, lovers, or enemies. Ultimately, this text explains our inclination to see the world in black and white.

Human possession psychology originates from deeply rooted experiential capacities shared with other animals. However, unlike other animals, we are a uniquely self-conscious species concerned with reputation, and possessions affect our perception of how we exist in the eyes of others. This book discusses the psychology surrounding the ways in which humans experience possession, claim ownership, and share from both a developmental and cross-cultural perspective. Philippe Rochat explores the origins of human possession and its symbolic development across cultures. He proposes that human possession psychology is particularly revealing of human nature, and also the source of our elusive moral sense

Résumé Dans cet article, je reprends l'idée centrale qui a servi de fil rouge à la pensée et l'approche pratique d'André « Bubu » Büllinger. Cette idée est celle d'un engagement global du corps dès le début de la vie. Elle s'inspire entre autres des écrits de Wallon, grande influence de Büllinger qui lui a servi de marquage identitaire face à l'imposant Piaget, le patron qui l'a formé. L'idée de l'organisation globale du corps dès les débuts de la vie comme entité fonctionnelle structurée plutôt que l'habitacle d'un sujet essentiellement épistémique initialement désorganisé, a permis à Büllinger d'offrir une perspective nouvelle dans le cadre de l'école genevoise. Sa perspective est davantage en résonance avec les nouvelles découvertes dans le domaine de la première enfance qui explosent dans les années 1970 et qui sont celles de sa formation. Après un bref préambule sur la personne de Büllinger tel que je l'ai connue et à qui je dois beaucoup, je discute la pertinence, la validité, et essaye de situer la nouveauté des idées-souches de sa théorie. Je termine en mentionnant ce qui pourrait être rajouté à ces idées, du point de vue de la recherche non clinique sur le nourrisson au XXI e siècle : le développement co-extensif d'un bébé psychologique sur lequel « bubu » s'est essentiellement focalisé, et d'un bébé épistémique né équipé pour concevoir la pertinence des choses dont il dépend pour sa survie.

Lorsqu'on se réfère à la réputation, on parle de ce qui a trait à l'identité, car le calcul constitutif de la réputation est un calcul sur la valeur de l'identité d'un individu ou d'un groupe. En analysant le développement de l'identité chez l'enfant, cet article tente de mieux comprendre ce qui peut motiver l'enfant à développer un sens de la réputation, c'est-à-dire cette propension unique et exacerbée de notre espèce à se préoccuper du regard évaluateur d'autrui.

Cet article propose que bien avant que le jeune enfant puisse se reconnaître dans le miroir et identifier l'image spéculaire du corps propre, le bébé manifeste dès les tout débuts de la vie une connaissance implicite de son corps. Cette connaissance correspond au sens du corps comme entité différenciée, située, et agent parmi d'autres objets de l'environnement. C'est aussi le sens d'un corps qui est organisé spatio- temporellement, capable de ressentir des émotions et de moduler son affectivité dans les échanges réciproques avec autrui. Ces aspects d'une connaissance implicite précoce du corps seraient précurseurs du développement ultérieur d'une connaissance « réfléchissante » explicite et conceptuelle de soi.

Two‐month‐olds and newborns were tested in a situation where they had the opportunity to experience different auditory consequences of their own oral activity on a dummy pacifier. Modulation of oral activity was scored and analyzed relative to two types of contingent auditory feedback, either analog or non‐analog to the effort exerted by the infant on the pacifier. The dummy pacifier was connected to an air pressure transducer for recording of oral action. In two different experimental conditions, each time the infant sucked above a certain pressure threshold they heard a perfectly contingent sound of varying pitch. In one condition, the pitch variation was analog to the pressure applied by the infant on the pacifier (analog condition). In another, the pitch variation was random (non‐analog condition). As rationale, a differential modulation of oral activity in these two conditions was construed as indexing some voluntary control and the sense of a causal link between sucking and its auditory consequences, beyond mere temporal contingency detection and response–stimulus association. Results indicated that 2‐month‐olds showed clear signs of modulation of their oral activity on the pacifier as a function of analog versus non‐analog condition. In contrast, newborns did not show any signs of such modulation either between experimental conditions (analog versus non‐analog contingent sounds) or between baseline (no contingent sounds condition) and experimental conditions. These observations are interpreted as evidence of self‐exploration and the emergence of a sense of self‐agency by 2 months of age.

AbstractChildren start to engage in self‐serving deception from approximately 2½ years of age. This emerging self‐centered propensity toward the deliberate covering of truth is predicted by the child's degree of executive function and level of theory of mind. In contrast, existing studies on the emergence of other‐oriented lies point to a significant developmental lag—children begin to produce prosocial lies not prior to 3–4 years of age. What may account for such a lag? In this article, we review the recent literature and conclude that the existing cognitive account does not fully explain the developmental lag between self‐ and other‐serving deception. As an alternative, we propose that reputational concerns may drive the ontogeny of prosocial lies and account for their later emergence.

This article focuses on policies seeking to address social inequalities in metropolitan areas, where the allocation of resources to places with needs often clashes with the politics of redistribution in fragmented local government systems. Scholarship on metropolitan governance has yet to overcome the opposition between proponents of consolidation and defenders of polycentrism. The crucial open question is whether and how intergovernmental cooperation and revenue-sharing can redress spatial equity in institutionally fragmented metropolitan areas. This article addresses this question by exploring the determinants of social expenditures in the 630 municipalities of seven major metropolitan areas in Switzerland, where revenue-sharing systems are common. The analysis shows that intergovernmental grants make a significant but limited contribution to reducing the mismatch between needs and resources in fragmented and decentralized metropolitan areas, depending on the redistributive efforts made by higher state levels.