By the dawn of the 21st century, more than half of the world's population was living in urban areas. This volume explores the implications of this unprecedented expansion in the world's most urbanized region, Latin America, exploring the new urban reality, and the consequences for both Latin America and the rest of the developing world
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AbstractThis article explores the longitudinal dynamics of youth gang transformation in urban Nicaragua. On the basis of an overview of successive gang iterations that have emerged over the past 30 years in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighborhood in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, the article identifies key elements for the articulation of a political economy of both change and stability. In particular, drawing on Bourdieusian theory, it conceives of a gang as a "social field" rather than as a discrete organizational form. It traces how different processes of individual and collective capital accumulation underpinning the social order promulgated by distinct gang iterations emerge and interact with each other, and the consequences that this has for their evolution over time. In doing so, the article offers a better understanding of the logic of what might be termed "gang rule(s)".
AbstractGangs are widely considered major contributors to the high levels of violence afflicting Latin America, including in particular Central America. At the same time, however, the vast majority of individuals who join a gang will also leave it and, it is assumed, become less violent. Having said this, the mechanisms underlying this 'desistance' process are not well understood, and nor are the determinants of individuals' post-gang trajectories, partly because gang desistance tends to be seen as an event rather than a process. Drawing on long-term ethnographic research carried out in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighbourhood in Nicaragua's capital city Managua, and more specifically a set of 'archetypal' gang member life histories that illustrate the occupational options open to former gang members, this article offers a longitudinal perspective on desistance and its consequences, with specific reference to the determinants of individuals' continued engagement with violence (or not).
ABSTRACTDrawing on longitudinal ethnographic research carried out over two-and-a-half decades in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighborhood in Managua, Nicaragua, this article explores how legal and illegal economic activities are socially legitimized, and more specifically, how certain illegal economic activities can end up being seen as legitimate, and certain legal ones perceived as illegitimate. The first part of the article explores the variable morality surrounding different types of criminal activities that local gang members engaged in during the 1990s and 2000s. The second part considers my experiences running a local market stall, describing the contrasting reactions I faced when I resorted to first legal, and then illegal, strategies to boost my revenue levels. Taken together, these examples showcase how the social legitimization of an economic activity has less to do with whether it is legal or illegal, but rather the future aspirations it embodies.
The ethnographic representation of violence is a controversial issue, involving debates about (avoiding) sensationalism or (acknowledging) emotionality, for example. Less considered is how the subjective nature of ethnography and the fact that ethnographic narratives are always situated can have ramifications for both interpreting and representing violence, particularly in the context of longitudinal ethnographic research. Drawing on my investigations into Nicaraguan gang dynamics begun in 1996, this article explores the subjectivity of the longitudinal ethnographic experience of violence both in and out of "the field" through three specific examples. These highlight in different ways how ethnographic understanding is highly situational and time-bound, meaning that longitudinal research is particularly prone to episodes of discomfiting conceptual disjuncture. At the same time, it is precisely this that arguably imbues it with exceptional power and insight.
Como lo resaltan Steven Levitt y Stephen Dubner (2005, p. 103) en su famoso libro Freakonomics, existen numerosos mitos e ideas equivocadas sobre los beneficios del tráfico de drogas. En su capítulo jocosamente intitulado "¿Por qué los expendedores de drogas viven todavía con sus mamás?", por ejemplo, describen cómo, contrariamente a lo que suele pensarse, la gran mayoría de los involucrados en el tráfico de drogas en Estados Unidos ganan "menos del salario mínimo", y únicamente los jefes de las bandas obtienen ganancias significativas. Si bien este no es necesariamente el caso en todo el mundo —ver Rodgers (2017a)—, no hay duda de que los beneficios del tráfico de drogas se distribuyen de manera muy desigual, y que son altamente contingentes y volátiles, lo cual puede generar economías políticas muy particulares.
Como lo resaltan Steven Levitt y Stephen Dubner (2005, p. 103) en su famoso libro Freakonomics, existen numerosos mitos e ideas equivocadas sobre los beneficios del tráfico de drogas. En su capítulo jocosamente intitulado '¿Por qué los expendedores de drogas viven todavía con sus mamás?', por ejemplo, describen cómo, contrariamente a lo que suele pensarse, la gran mayoría de los involucrados en el tráfico de drogas en Estados Unidos ganan 'menos del salario mínimo', y únicamente los jefes de las bandas obtienen ganancias significativas. Si bien este no es necesariamente el caso en todo el mundo -ver Rodgers (2017a)-, no hay duda de que los beneficios del tráfico de drogas se distribuyen de manera muy desigual, y que son altamente contingentes y volátiles, lo cual puede generar economías políticas muy particulares. ; As Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner (2005, p. 103) highlight in their famous book Freakonomics, there are numerous myths and misconceptions about the benefits of drug trafficking. In their jokingly titled chapter 'Why do drug dealers still live with their mothers?', For example, they describe how, contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of those involved in drug trafficking in the United States win ' less than the minimum wage, 'and only gang bosses make significant gains. While this is not necessarily the case worldwide - see Rodgers (2017a) -, there is no doubt that the benefits of drug trafficking are very unevenly distributed, highly contingent and volatile, which can generate very particular political economies.
Drawing on longitudinal ethnographic research that has been ongoing since 1996, this article explores the way that gangs socialize individuals into violent norms and practices in Nicaragua. It shows how different types of gang violence can be related to distinct socialization processes and mechanisms, tracing how these dynamically articulate individual agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances, albeit in ways that change over time. As such, the article highlights how gang socialization is not only a variable multilayered process, but also a very volatile one, which suggests that the socialization of violence and its consequences are not necessarily enduring.