Suchergebnisse

Der Verlust von Biodiversität ist eines der drängendsten Umweltprobleme. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat in den vergangenen 30 Jahren zahlreiche Versuche unternommen, ihn zu stoppen, sie war jedoch nicht erfolgreich. Deshalb bedarf es dringend eines neuen Anlaufs. (APuZ)

Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen (payments for ecosystem services , PES) sind Zahlungen an Grundbesitzer, deren Landbewirtschaftungspraktiken helfen, Ökosystemdienstleistungen ( ecosystem services , ES) zu erbringen. Im Kontext von Wassereinzugsgebieten sind die wichtigsten Leistungen die Bereitstellung, Reinigung und Regulierung von Wasser. PES wurde als Instrument konzipiert, das den Übergang zu einer ökologischen Wirtschaft erleichtern soll. Aus dieser Perspektive ist es eine Win-Win -Lösung für Umweltzerstörung und Armut. Heute ist PES ein weit verbreitetes Instrument für den Naturschutz. Als vereinzelte, privat finanzierte Projekte begonnen, hat PES seinen Weg in viele nationale und internationale Naturschutzpolitiken überall auf der Welt gefunden. Der PES-Wert für Vorgänge in Wassereinzugsgebieten betrug für das Jahr 2011 8-10 Mrd. US$ und er steigt weiterhin schnell an. Dieses Themenpapier wendet sich gegen die Vorstellung von PES als Allheilmittel gegen Umweltzerstörung und Armut. PES ist ein sich schnell verbreitender Mechanismus für die Bewirtschaftung natürlicher Ressourcen und Naturschutz; bei der Umsetzung von PES mangelt es jedoch mitunter am Verständnis ihrer sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Wirkungen. Wir benennen deshalb eine Reihe kritischer Punkte, die im entwicklungspolitischen Kontext wenig politische Aufmerksamkeit erhalten haben, jedoch von großer sozialer Relevanz und Wirkung sind. Das Verständnis der kritischen Punkte rund um PES kann helfen, die folgenden Mängel zu überwinden oder zu verringern: Machtasymmetrien in PES-Verhandlungen. Bei PES verhandeln häufig Regierungen und Privatunternehmen mit marginalisierten Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die unterschiedlichen Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten dieser Akteure sind geeignet, sowohl die Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen als auch Umsetzung von PES zu beeinflussen. Die Interessen der marginalisierten Bevölkerungsgruppen zu schützen ist nicht nur eine gesellschaftliche Notwendigkeit, es trägt auch zur Nachhaltigkeit bei. Die Teilnahme an PES ist nicht immer freiwillig. Umweltgesetze, strenge Vertragsklauseln, unklare Partizipationsmechanismen und Druck von Intermediären tragen dazu bei, Dienstleister zu PES zu zwingen. Den implementierenden Organisationen sollte eine freiwillige Teilnahme garantiert werden. Darüber hinaus sollten PES-Politiken die Perspektive der Bauern berücksichtigen (d.h. was meinen Dienstleister zu benötigen?), sodass PES ein Werkzeug statt ein Hindernis für ländliche Entwicklung ist. PES-Systeme werden in Kontexten eingeführt, in denen eine ungleiche Verteilung der natürlichen Ressourcen auftritt. PES kann diese ungleiche Verteilung verschärfen und sogar die Verfügungsgewalt der weniger mächtigen Gruppen über ihre natürlichen Ressourcen schwächen. In vielen Situationen kann PES dazu führen, dass Dienstleister überhaupt keinen Zugang mehr zu den Leistungen haben, die sie zu schützen helfen, oder dass sie die Kontrolle über ihre Ressourcen verlieren. PES sollte an eine faire Verteilung der Rechte an natürlichen Ressourcen gebunden werden. PES kann im Wettbewerb mit kommunalen Organisationen stehen und die kulturellen und Naturschutzpraktiken untergraben, die nicht auf Geldzahlungen basieren

Payments for environmental services (PES) are payments to land owners whose land management practices help to provide environmental services (ES). In the context of watershed environmental services, the most important services are the supply, purification and regulation of water. PES was conceived as an instrument for facilitating the transition to a green economy. From this perspective, PES is a win-win solution to environmental degradation and poverty. Today, PES is a widely used policy tool for conservation. Having begun life as scattered, privately funded projects, PES has made its way into many national and internation¬al conservation policies around the world. The value of PES watershed transactions in 2011 was USD 8-10 billion; and the figure is still growing fast. This briefing paper challenges the notion of PES as a panacea for environmental degradation and poverty. While PES is a rapidly proliferating mechanism for natural resource management and conservation, its use is sometimes coupled with a lack of understanding of its social and econo¬mic impacts. To this end, we identify a number of critical issues that have received marginal policy attention in the context of the developing world, but which have a great deal of social relevance and impact. Understanding the critical issues surrounding PES can help to overcome and reduce the following drawbacks: • Power asymmetries in PES negotiations. PES often involves governments and private enterprises negotiating with marginalised communities. These actors' differing resources and capabilities are likely to influence both the outcomes of negotiations and the operation of PES. Ensuring that the interests of marginalised communities are protected in PES negotiations is not just a social imperative, but also contributes to sustainability. • PES participation is not always voluntary. Environ¬mental laws, strict contract clauses, unclear partici¬pation mechanisms and intermediary agency pressure tend to force PES on service-providers. Voluntary participation should be guaranteed by implementing organisations. In addition, PES policies should inte-grate peasants' perspectives (i. e. what do providers think they need?), so that PES is a tool for rather than a hurdle to rural development. • PES schemes are introduced in contexts where natural resource distribution is skewed. PES could exacerbate this skewed distribution or even reduce the degree of control that the less powerful have over natural resources. In many situations, PES may result in service-providers not actually having access to the services they are helping to conserve, or losing control over their resources. PES should be tied to the fair redistribution of natural resource rights. • PES may compete with communal organisations, and erode cultural and conservation practices that are not based on monetary payments.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a global human health crisis that is deeply intertwined with the global biodiversity crisis. It originated when a zoonotic virus spilled over from wild animals to humans. Viruses can spread easily in disturbed ecosystems, and with increasing contact between humans and wildlife the risk of contagion grows. Conservation is crucial to reduce the risks of future pandemics, but the current pandemic also impacts on conservation in many ways. In this Briefing Paper we suggest strategies to alleviate the pandemic's adverse effects on conservation in the Global South. Many zoonoses originate there, and livelihoods are strongly dependent on natural resources. The paper considers the pandemic's overarching economic implica-tions for protected and other conserved areas, and specific ramifications for the tourism and wildlife trade sectors, which are closely related to these areas. As economies shrink, natural resources come under pressure from various sides. Financial resources are reallocated from the conservation to the health sector, countries decrease environmental protection standards to boost economic recovery, and poor people in rural regions resort to protected wild resources as a subsistence strategy. Together, these trends speed up the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services and create supportive conditions for the emergence of zoonotic disease and the undermining of livelihoods. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, nature-based tourism was a multi-billion dollar industry, and the temporary breakdown in tourism is having both positive and negative impacts on sustainable development. On the negative side, many people employed in tourism have lost their jobs and livelihoods, and a key source of funding for management of protected areas has been depleted. On the positive side, a temporary decline in tourism has given nature time to recover, and a drop in international flights has lowered global carbon emissions from air travel. The need for the industry to plan its post-COVID outlook offers a chance to promote more community-driven tourism to support inclusion of local people. Wildlife trade - a major spreader of zoonotic viruses - has been banned in response to the pandemic in some countries. Yet social safeguards for local communities dependent on protein from wild animals are still largely missing. Our recommendations to address these challenges are that conservation must remain high on the international agenda, especially in the midst of a global health crisis that could quickly repeat itself if ecosystem destruction continues at the current pace. Environmental legislation must be upheld and funding made available for sustainable livelihoods. The resurgence of nature-based tourism should be supported because of its potential to generate conservation funding and income for local communities. In the meantime, the tourism industry should work on further reducing its environmental footprint and improving community self-determination. Bans on wildlife trade need to be designed in ways that do not undermine communities' need for sources of protein.

As competition for water resources grows, a holistic management approach is required. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) provides a coordinated, participative management framework to maximise economic and social welfare equitably, without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. IWRM requires coordination at the national level for effective decision-making. Often IWRM is based on River Basin Management (RBM), which takes the river basin as the working unit for water management. Implementing RBM is not an easy task and levels of success differ between countries. This policy brief analyses the challenges that Mongolia faces as it continues down the IWRM/RBM path. Mongolia is an interesting case because of its rapid legal adoption of IWRM, its transition towards political decentralisation in its post-socialist era, and the tensions caused by a push for economic growth through mining activities. In particular, we analyse how to move from de jure to de facto RBM implementation. We structure our analysis and recommendations based on the political, legal, and financial dimensions that characterise water management decentralisation under the principles of IWRM. First, we find that regarding the legal dimension, Mongolia has made considerable progress in advancing the legal framework for IWRM/RBM and defining institutional responsibilities, both horizontally across sectors, as well as vertically across government levels. However, vertical coordination between the national and the river basin levels still needs improvement. The Ministry of Environment (MEGDT) and the National Water Committee (NWC) can further harmonise vertical coordination through different levels of government. Regulations for the implementation of water pollution fees need to be developed. Second, regarding the financial dimension, there is still ambiguity in some respects: In practice, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) remain underfunded and their financial resources are barely enough to cover their fixed costs. River Basin Councils (RBCs), as important as they appear to be in legal terms – allowing stakeholder participation in watershed management and decision-making – remain "paper tigers", as they are not financially supported. Thus, stakeholder participation is marginal and in practice often only includes the participation of province (Aimag) and district (Soum) representatives, if any. Financing strategies related to the River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) are needed. Third, on the political dimension, the development of the legal framework is an expression of the political will to implement RBM. This political will, however, remains half-hearted when it comes to enforcing environmental law, sparking participation, prioritising funding for respective water organisations and providing those organisations with the equipment required to fulfil their tasks. Aware of the current payment crisis, this paper argues for securing proper environmental conditions that sustain economic and social development in the long run.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a mitigation instrument that creates a financial value for the carbon stored in standing forests. The purpose of REDD+ is to provide incentives for developing countries to mitigate forest-related emissions and to foster conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. This instrument is still not fully operational under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) but, despite the large criticism it raises, its political traction is what is keeping it on the table. In this Briefing Paper, we discuss the prospects for REDD+. We structure these on the basis of options included in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) Negotiating Text of February 2015: (1) forests in a market-based mechanism, (2) result-based approaches for REDD+, and (3) non-result-based approaches. In addition, we discuss for each of these the likeliness of substantial international finance that they may raise, their mitigation potential, their contribution to forest conservation, and their social co-benefits. We conclude that large sums for REDD+ can only be expected when REDD+ credits can be used to offset fossil-fuel based emissions, provided the carbon credit price is high enough. Although funds could be large, and may contribute to forest protection, there is an important counterargument: only the emissions reductions that are realised through non-offsetting approaches are net emission reductions. Integrated non-results-based approaches may offer more opportunities for local social and ecological co-benefits but it is difficult to raise funds for them. With the high stakes of protecting the global climate and important ecosystems, biodiversity and local cultures, a non-results-based mechanism seems too non-committal. But, without funds, non-offsetting approaches may not be realised at all, which may prove to be a missed opportunity for forest protection. Leakage (deforestation elsewhere) and non permanence (deforestation at a later point in time) may be an issue for all options, but form a climate risk particularly when forest credits are used to offset emissions. We suggest a middle road that focuses on regulatory measures and results-based approaches, which ensure social co-benefits, and are financed through public funds specifically generated for the purpose of developed nations assisting developing nations in adaptation and mitigation projects. Under this type of solution the results-based approach should be separated from mechanisms to reduce emissions from fossil fuel use.

The concept of river basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often this goes along with the introduction of river basin organisations (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, particularly in developing countries, RBOs often suffer from insufficient funds. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Decentralisation could thus provide a source of funding for RBOs, depending on how tasks and funds are allocated among RBOs and general-purpose jurisdictions. This briefing paper examines administrative and fiscal aspects of river basin management and analyses whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management. We present the example of Mongolia, where in recent years the processes of RBO institutionalisation and fiscal decentralisation have occurred in parallel. More specifically, we analyse i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated, ii) which de jure and de facto funding arrangements are in place, and iii) what this implies for the coordination and sustainability of water resource use.We find that despite a broad division of labour among administrative units, a high level of overlap exists, for instance in the areas of data management, water law enforcement and implementation of water protection measures.In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and aimag (province-level) environmental authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, funds available to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects nor do they earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to initial collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and we recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. In particular, we recommend thatresponsibilities be distributed more clearly to reduce overlap and uncertainty;legal inconsistencies regarding water-use fees be clarified;funding be arranged according to tasks; andfunding for RBAs be increased and minimum state-funding be provided to river basin councils (RBCs), so they can fulfil their mandates.

The concept of river basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often this goes along with the introduction of river basin organisations (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, particularly in developing countries, RBOs often suffer from insufficient funds. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Decentralisation could thus provide a source of funding for RBOs, depending on how tasks and funds are allocated among RBOs and general-purpose jurisdictions. This briefing paper examines administrative and fiscal aspects of river basin management and analyses whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management. We present the example of Mongolia, where in recent years the processes of RBO institutionalisation and fiscal decentralisation have occurred in parallel. More specifically, we analyse i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated, ii) which de jure and de facto funding arrangements are in place, and iii) what this implies for the coordination and sustainability of water resource use. We find that despite a broad division of labour among administrative units, a high level of overlap exists, for instance in the areas of data management, water law enforcement and implementation of water protection measures. In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and aimag (province-level) environmental authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, funds available to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects nor do they earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to initial collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and we recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. In particular, we recommend that responsibilities be distributed more clearly to reduce overlap and uncertainty; legal inconsistencies regarding water-use fees be clarified; funding be arranged according to tasks; and funding for RBAs be increased and minimum state-funding be provided to river basin councils (RBCs), so they can fulfil their mandates.