Suchergebnisse

Examines the three-pronged strategy that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez used in response to the 2002 crisis in governability. The first component is his search for external enemies, eg, Colombia, to mobilize popular support. His social policy reforms as manifest in programs called missiones are identified as the second component. Particular attention is given to his literacy campaign, which was part of Mision Robinson, which, despite government claims to the contrary, is labeled here as a "stunning failure." How the Chavez government was able to present the program as a success without any independently verifiable evidence is considered. A third component of this campaign against the opposition is identified as an elaborate state-backed method of reward & punishment that worked to raise the cost of opposing the Chavez regime. Attention is given to the revocation of elected officials' mandates via petition & the so-called Tascon & Maisanta Lists, databases of names of those who sided with the opposition on various petitions. In this light, analysis of income data of those on the lists indicate that they suffered setbacks either in the form of decreased income or, if they were a private sector corporation, increased taxes, while pro-government corporations were beneficiaries of government largesse. Asserting that Chavez now faces a crisis similar to that of 2002, his options to counter eroding popular support & a faltering political coalition are pondered. D. Edelman

Even critics of Hugo Chavez tend to concede that he has made helping the poor his top priority. But in fact, Chavez's government has not done anymore to fight poverty than past Venezuelan governments, and his much-heralded social programs have had little effect. A close look at the evidence reveals just how much Chavez's "revolution" has hurt Venezuela's economy-and that the poor are hurting most of all. Adapted from the source document.

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups & politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality & growth & provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 72 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author seeks to define, elucidate & differentiate the concepts of Literature & Power, & to enhance their most visible relationships. He tries to emphasize the role of Ideology as a search of power continuity amidst the discontinuity of social events. Literature is a defying act opposed to Ideology as a preservation act, or in Milan Kunderas' words: the eternal struggle between memory & oblivion. Adapted from the source document.