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This book explores how groups of interacting minds relate to singular minds. Roelofs argue that we are too used to seeing the mind as an indivisible unity, and that properly understanding our place in nature requires more willingness to see minds as composite systems, both one and many.

Abstract
We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon – implicit coordination – is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by "explicit" intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions driven by "implicit" intentions (those not thus available). More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly implicit individual intentions, and constituted by the partly implicit intentions of participants. We discuss the significance of this category for action theory, social ontology, and social criticism.