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SUMMARYIn trade negotiations under fixed exchange rates governments insist on reciprocity mainly to ensure that the adverse impact of import barrier reductions on the balance‐of‐payments and on employment is offset through concurrent trade liberalization abroad. In negotiations under floating currencies reciprocity is not necessary for these purposes because governments can then liberalize unilaterally and let the resulting depreciation equilibrate payments and stimulate a reallocation of resources. In such negotiations reciprocity serves to reduce the political costs of trade liberalization. Applying Downss' economic theory of democracy, the paper shows that governments can win majority support for freer trade only if they subsidize the acquisition or use of information enabling producers and consumers benefitting from the reduction of import barriers to decide to favour the measures. Governments prefer to liberalize trade on a reciprocal basis because this creates easily demonstrable benefits for narrow interest groups and therefore reduces the need for such subsidization.

In view of recent proposals to grant the International Monetary Fund new instruments to press countries to adjust balance of payments disequilibria, the question arises of the efficacy of such means of pressure. An analysis of the Fund's power shows, inter alia, that conditions attached to currency purchases by deficit countries can only influence the techniques of adjustment but not the length of the adjustment period, that it is normally not possible for the Fund to expose individual surplus countries to inflationary or expansionary pressures, that the scarce currency clause is unworkable in present monetary conditions, and that the Fund's system of charges and remunerations cannot be used to exert financial pressure on countries in imbalance. The general avoidance of sanctions by the Fund's Executive Directors suggests that it would only be useful to make additional pressures available to the Fund, as contemplated by the Committee of Twenty, if the authority to take decisions on sanctions were transferred to a separate judicial or quasi-judicial body.