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This work explores the phenomenon of informal international organizations. These bodies are involved in governing many of the most important issues the world currently faces, and differ significantly from the highly legalized, formal organizations the world has traditionally relied on. But despite their evident importance, they remain poorly understood. This text develops a new approach to thinking about these puzzling institutions, presents new data revealing their extraordinary growth over time, and develops a novel theory about why states are creating them.

This ground-breaking book explores the phenomenon of informal international organizations--weakly-legalized bodies that differ significantly from the formal institutions traditionally relied upon by the global community. It advances a new way of thinking about these organizations, presents new data revealing their extraordinary growth over time and across regions, and offers a novel account explaining why states have embraced them. Roger locates the origins of informality in major shifts occurring within the domestic political arenas of powerful states, explaining how these have projected outwards and reshaped the legal foundations of global governance. The book systematically tests this theory, presents detailed accounts of the forces behind some of the most important institutions governing the global economy, and draws out the policy implications of this account. While informality has allowed the number of multilateral institutions to grow, Roger argues, it has coincided with a decline in their quality, leaving us less prepared for the next global crisis.

AbstractStates have increasingly relied on informal international organizations (IOs) to govern cross‐border problems. Frequently, however, their accountability has been questioned because they have been created to evade political control and strengthen the hands of executives and bureaucrats vis‐à‐vis legislative actors. This has led some to propose solutions that might address their accountability gaps. In this article, I discuss the role that institutional inter‐linkages may play. Many informal IOs lack capabilities and accountability mechanisms that raise questions about their desirability as standalone institutions. Yet, in practice, by creating links with states and formal IOs, their capabilities and accountability have been augmented. With respect to their accountability, specifically, I argue such linkages can promote reflexivity, policy filtering, and the institutionalization of new procedural norms. While these dynamics cannot fully reduce accountability gaps, recognition of them provides a more balanced picture of the issues at stake and an added rationale for expanding such linkages in the future.

We present a new dataset of membership in informal international organizations—IOs founded with non-binding instruments—which constitute one-third of operating IOs. We introduce state-IO-year–level membership data for 195 countries that complements the dataset on formal IOs from the Correlates of War Project. We explain our conceptualization of an informal IO, contrast it with other approaches, and detail the data collection process. We illustrate similarities and differences across formal and informal IOs, and across states and regions. We explain how our data validate or challenge conjectures about informal cooperation that have been inaccessible for lack of data. We demonstrate that while formal and informal IOs are similar in size, the composition of informal memberships in informal IOs is more fragmented. While informal IOs are a growing part of the governance portfolios of most states, some countries and regions participate more. We conclude by outlining elements of the research program our dataset unlocks.

Since 2009, a diverse group of developing states that includes China, Brazil, Ethiopia and Costa Rica has been advancing unprecedented pledges to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, offering new, unexpected signs of climate leadership. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that these targets are now even more ambitious than those put forward by their wealthier counterparts. But what really lies behind these new pledges? What actions are being taken to meet them? And what stumbling blocks lie in the way of their realization? In this book, an international group of scholars seeks.

Many scholars and policymakers see transnational governance as a substitute for lackluster national and international policies, particularly in the context of intergovernmental gridlock or limited state capacity. The bulk of the literature explains sub- and non-state actors' participation in transnational initiatives as a product of, on the one hand, micro-level incentives and, on the other, diffusion processes that create and spread normative and market-based pressures. We argue that such theoretical perspectives overlook the dynamic relationship between national policies and transnational governance. First, we argue that ambitious national policies positively affect sub- and non-state actors' participation in transnational governance. Second, we posit that domestic institutions condition the effects of micro-level incentives and transnational pressures on participation in transnational governance. We test these claims in the climate regime, using an original dataset that, for the first time, measures cross-national participation in transnational climate initiatives across jurisdictions. The results support our expectations. They therefore suggest that we should understand national policies and transnational governance as complements, rather than competitors, to one another. Finally, by showing how and when national policies affect participation in transnational initiatives, we identify important scope conditions for their significance in addressing climate change.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub- and non-state involvement in post-2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub- and non-state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low-carbon and climate-resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal-type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event-driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub- and non-state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub- and non-state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

After a decade-long search, countries finally agreed on a new climate treaty in 2015. The Paris Agreement has attracted attention both for overcoming years of gridlock and for its novel features. Here, we build on accounts explaining why states reached agreement, arguing that a deeper understanding requires a focus on institutional design. Ultimately, it was this agreement, with its specific provisions, that proved acceptable to states rather than other possible outcomes. Our account is multi-causal and draws methodological inspiration from the public policy and causes of war literatures. Specifically, we distinguish between background, intermediate, and proximate conditions and identify how they relate to one another, jointly producing the ultimate outcome we observe. Our analysis focuses especially on the role of scientific knowledge, non-state actor mobilization, institutional legacies, bargaining, and coalition-building in the final push for agreement. This case-based approach helps to understand the origins of Paris, but also offers a unique, historically grounded way to examine questions of institutional design.