Suchergebnisse

Examines religious freedom in the US & identifies potential risk factors. These risks include the faith-based initiative proposed by George W. Bush & alignment of religious communities with political parties. Suggestions for enhanced religious tolerance & understanding in the US are presented. L. Collins Leigh

Political institutions strongly influence incentives to tax. In this article, I examine differences across national regimes in provincial taxation in Argentina from 1959–2001 and compare them to subnational regimes under national democracy. I argue that elections fundamentally shape taxation by guiding career incentives of provincial leaders. Under autocratic regimes, sub-national leaders have strong motivation to tax because they answer to national leaders who reward extraction. I find that national autocrats tax at higher levels, using more difficult taxes. In democratic systems, governors judged by local constituents use political resources to avoid taxation. Governors in closed electoral regimes generally collect less tax revenue than governors in competitive provinces, but this effect is largely driven by national coalition-building and privileged access to national resources. An important difference across sub-national regime type is incidence – closed provinces extract disproportionately from the dependent business sector.

Political institutions strongly influence incentives to tax. In this article, I examine differences across national regimes in provincial taxation in Argentina from 1959-2001 and compare them to sub-national regimes under national democracy. I argue that elections fundamentally shape taxation by guiding career incentives of provincial leaders. Under autocratic regimes, sub-national leaders have strong motivation to tax because they answer to national leaders who reward extraction. I find that national autocrats tax at higher levels, using more difficult taxes. In democratic systems, governors judged by local constituents use political resources to avoid taxation. Governors in closed electoral regimes generally collect less tax revenue than governors in competitive provinces, but this effect is largely driven by national coalition-building and privileged access to national resources. An important difference across sub-national regime type is incidence - closed provinces extract disproportionately from the dependent business sector. Adapted from the source document.

Political institutions strongly influence incentives to tax. In this article, the author examines differences across national regimes in provincial taxation in Argentina from 1959-2001 and compares them to sub-national regimes under national democracy. She argues that elections fundamentally shape taxation by guiding career incentives of provincial leaders. Under autocratic regimes, sub-national leaders have strong motivation to tax because they answer to national leaders who reward extraction. She finds that national autocrats tax at higher levels, using more difficult taxes. In democratic systems, governors judged by local constituents use political resources to avoid taxation. Governors in closed electoral regimes generally collect less tax revenue than governors in competitive provinces, but this effect is largely driven by national coalition-building and privileged access to national resources. An important difference across sub-national regime type is incidence - closed provinces extract disproportionately from the dependent business sector. (GIGA)

Weak bureaucratic capacity fundamentally challenges the stability of new democracies. Decentralization has placed greater importance on low capacity sub-national bureaucracies. When, why and from who do we see successful reform initiatives of these bureaucracies? I argue that sub-national politicians in new democracies do not have political will or resources to reform. Rather, impetus for reform comes from threats to their resources, especially federal transfers, from the national level. Accordingly, the success of reforms depends on the national government's commitment and often derailed by short-time horizons and political expediency. These constraints on national leverage are shown in Argentina's Fiscal Pact of 1993. Partisanship and sub-national capacity are shown to interact to both fuel and temper reform initiatives.