Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This research delves into Lithuania's response to the perceived threat from Russia and the practical implementation of its total defence approach. Key political figures, including the President, Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, and Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee, are scrutinized using securitization theory. The study explores how these actors frame total defence as an urgent response to an existential threat and analyses both their discourse and tangible actions from 2020 onwards. Distinct approaches among political figures emerge, with the President prioritizing communication, the Minister of Defence emphasizing tangible improvements, and the Chairman of the NSDC acting as a driving force. Despite increased military spending, the involvement of society in national defence—integral to the total defence strategy—remains limited. Factors contributing to this limitation include unclear leadership, insincere rhetoric, bureaucratic obstacles, and the initial unpreparedness of the Armed Forces to integrate civilians. The study underscores the critical need for genuine commitment and leadership to achieve meaningful breakthroughs in Lithuania's total defence approach. While politicians employ securitization and public discourse to align with public sentiment and present themselves as problem solvers, the actual progress in engaging the public and the private sector remains limited. The discrepancy between discourse and material implementation suggests that a more substantial commitment is essential for effective societal involvement in national defence, making it clear that symbolic gestures fall short of achieving impactful results in Lithuania's total defence approach.

The article delves into the willingness of citizens in the Baltic States, particularly Estonia, to fight for their countries in the face of rising threats, notably the Russian threat following the Crimean annexation. With historically weaker NATO defenses and relatively small armed forces, Baltic States like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia rely on allied support and their residents' determination to defend their homeland. The study explores variables that influence this willingness, focusing on Estonia's leadership in this aspect. The article consists of three main sections: a literature review, a comparative case analysis, and conclusions. The literature review examines past data from global, regional, and national perspectives, touching upon the theories of renowned researchers like Ronald F. Inglehart. The comparative case analysis delves into new variables—civic engagement, government functionality, and corruption levels—exploring their correlation with citizens' readiness to fight for their country. The analysis uncovers distinct patterns in Estonia, which consistently outpaces Latvia and Lithuania in civic engagement, efficient governance, and lower corruption levels. Ultimately, the research emphasizes that civic engagement positively associates with willingness to defend one's country, exemplified by Estonia's higher voter turnout and volunteering rates. Effective government functioning also contributes to citizens' willingness to fight, with Estonia's robust governance over the past decades potentially boosting resilience. Furthermore, low corruption levels appear to enhance citizens' confidence in their state, potentially encouraging them to defend it. The study concludes that understanding these multifaceted factors can guide policymakers and community leaders in bolstering citizens' determination to protect their countries, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania.

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This article argues that the closer small state is situated near a direct threat, the more it seeks to develop a comprehensive defense strategy. The small state cannot fully trust and hope a fast support from international organizations, allied countries, or other big states due to their bureaucratic procedures, internal democratic debates, and uncertain international positions among big players. A well-developed whole of society approach works not only as a first deterrence, but also expands the potential national resistance to an unacceptable level to an adversary. The small state that faces a direct threat from a foe must (1) develop a military conscription and volunteer forces programs that boost its reserves, (2) support and fund nongovernmental organizations, especially those ones that directly contribute to the state security and civil defense, (3) decentralize strategic assets necessary to resist and prolong a conflict, (4) strengthen nonconventional warfare and guerrilla fighting skills.

In a period of 2015-2020, Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) military spending increased twice, thus it enabled to initiate and to arrange significant critical projects that eventually allowed armed forces to upgrade military equipment and tactics. New artillery units, armoured personnel vehicles, air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, radars, anti-drone systems boosted military power of LAF. Tactics switched from anti green men to conventional tactics, where fire and manoeuvre dominates again. Meanwhile, in the same period of time in Kaliningrad the Russian armed forces boosted the number of military personnel, upgraded equipment (most of it to offensive one) and increased military exercises. In order to be prepared, LAF must look for the most efficient ways of defence towards a potential foe. In a near future LAF must decentralize a central military storage thus critical assets could be secured and used by battalions at any time. Moreover, LAF capabilities could be improved by cyber conscripts and non-conventional tactics which could bring extra dividends when a small state fights against technologically advanced adversary. Eventually, with an additional military spending LAF could obtain MLRS artillery, the coastal defence systems and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could deal with enemy from a safer distance.

Summary. In a period of 2015-2020, Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) military spending increased twice, thus it enabled to initiate and to arrange significant critical projects that eventually allowed armed forces to upgrade military equipment and tactics. New artillery units, armoured personnel vehicles, air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, radars, anti-drone systems boosted military power of LAF. Tactics switched from anti green men to conventional tactics, where fire and manoeuvre dominates again. Meanwhile, in the same period of time in Kaliningrad the Russian armed forces boosted the number of military personnel, upgraded equipment (most of it to offensive one) and increased military exercises. In order to be prepared, LAF must look for the most efficient ways of defence towards a potential foe. In a near future LAF must decentralize a central military storage thus critical assets could be secured and used by battalions at any time. Moreover, LAF capabilities could be improved by cyber conscripts and non-conventional tactics which could bring extra dividends when a small state fights against technologically advanced adversary. Eventually, with an additional military spending LAF could obtain MLRS artillery, the coastal defence systems and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could deal with enemy from a safer distance.

In a period of 2015-2020, Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) military spending increased twice, thus it enabled to initiate and to arrange significant critical projects that eventually allowed armed forces to upgrade military equipment and tactics. New artillery units, armoured personnel vehicles, air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, radars, anti-drone systems boosted military power of LAF. Tactics switched from anti green men to conventional tactics, where fire and manoeuvre dominates again. Meanwhile, in the same period of time in Kaliningrad the Russian armed forces boosted the number of military personnel, upgraded equipment (most of it to offensive one) and increased military exercises. In order to be prepared, LAF must look for the most efficient ways of defence towards a potential foe. In a near future LAF must decentralize a central military storage thus critical assets could be secured and used by battalions at any time. Moreover, LAF capabilities could be improved by cyber conscripts and non-conventional tactics which could bring extra dividends when a small state fights against technologically advanced adversary. Eventually, with an additional military spending LAF could obtain MLRS artillery, the coastal defence systems and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could deal with enemy from a safer distance. ; 2015‒2020 metais Lietuvos ginkluotosioms pajėgoms skirtos išlaidos padidėjo dvigubai, ir tai padėjo inicijuoti svarbių kritinių projektų, leidusių Lietuvos kariuomenei modernizuoti ginkluotę ir patobulinti taktiką, įgyvendinimą. Naujos savaeigės haubicos, pėstininkų kovos mašinos, oro gynybos sistemos, prieštankiniai ginklai, radarai, priešdroninės sistemos sustiprino Lietuvos kariuomenės pajėgumus. Naudojamos taktikos prieš "žaliuosius žmogeliukus" pasikeitė į konvencines taktikas, kur ugnis ir manevras tapo esminiu faktoriumi. Tuo pat metu Kaliningrado srityje Rusijos armija padidino savo karių personalą, modernizavo įvairią ginkluotę į puolamąją bei padidino vykdomų karinių pratybų skaičių. Lietuvos ginkluotosios pajėgos, siekdamos pasiruošti galimoms konvencinėms grėsmėms, privalo decentralizuoti ginkluotės ir amunicijos centrinį arsenalą, kad visi batalionai bet kuriuo metu galėtų panaudoti turimus resursus. Be to, Lietuvos kariuomenės pajėgumai padidėtų, jeigu dalis privalomąją karo tarnybą atlikti kviečiamų jaunuolių tarnautų kibernetiniais šauktiniais ir jeigu būtų naudojamos nekonvencinės taktikos. Tai suteiktų papildomų galimybių Lietuvai, kaip mažai valstybei, kovoti prieš technologiškai pažangų priešininką. Galiausiai, iš papildomo finansavimo Lietuvos kariuomenė privalo siekti įsigyti raketinių salvinės ugnies sistemų ir mobilių priešlaivinių raketų sistemų, kurios galėtų naikinti priešininką iš saugesnio atstumo.

Abstract
Abstract This thesis seeks to find out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected relations with Russia. In order to achieve the aim and hypothesis of the study, the critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a theoretical framework. A schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization of Gearóid Ó. Tuathail is used as the method of research. This thesis mostly pays attention to three essential parts of the critical geopolitics: "formal geopolitics" (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), "practical geopolitics" (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, strategies and speeches) and "popular geopolitics" (the discourse of the media and surveys). The combination of these three elements allows determining the certain NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. With regard to evidences of crises, NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses are assessed from very positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very negative. It provides an opportunity to see how both sides have acknowledged these crises and how in long terms NATO's military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have influenced relations with Russia in international order. Moreover, descriptive method, discourse analysis and a comparative approach are used to scrutinize Russian and NATO's geopolitical discourses towards crises. The analyses of NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses show that the hypothesis different NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected reciprocal relations is correct. The crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian flexible policy towards NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical discourse against NATO in Europe. NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes towards crises in Libya and Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO-Russian relations in the European continent. Consequently, Russia concentrates most of its attention to the geopolitical tradition towards Europe.

This thesis seeks to find out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected relations with Russia. In order to achieve the aim and hypothesis of the study, the critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a theoretical framework. A schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization of Gearóid Ó. Tuathail is used as the method of research. This thesis mostly pays attention to three essential parts of the critical geopolitics: "formal geopolitics" (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), "practical geopolitics" (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, strategies and speeches) and "popular geopolitics" (the discourse of the media and surveys). The combination of these three elements allows determining the certain NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. With regard to evidences of crises, NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses are assessed from very positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very negative. It provides an opportunity to see how both sides have acknowledged these crises and how in long terms NATO's military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have influenced relations with Russia in international order. Moreover, descriptive method, discourse analysis and a comparative approach are used to scrutinize Russian and NATO's geopolitical discourses towards crises. The analyses of NATO's and Russian geopolitical discourses show that the hypothesis different NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected reciprocal relations is correct. The crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian flexible policy towards NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical discourse against NATO in Europe. NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes towards crises in Libya and Afghanistan are ...