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AbstractI propose in this article a new interpretation of the evolution of post‐communist systems by comparing the evolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and in China. Transition is reinterpreted as the result of a collapse of communist state structures in Central and Eastern Europe and, in China, in contrast, as the result of the will to prevent such an outcome. This reconceptualization helps us to better understand the emergence of bad institutions and corruption in Eastern Europe under the market economy as well as the absence of political liberalization in China and the strengthening of the power of the Communist Party in recent years.

Privatization of large state-owned enterprises has been one of the most radical new policies of the last quarter century. While many countries had engaged in large nationalization programs during the decades following World War II, Margaret Thatcher initiated a policy swing in the other direction in the 1980s by pushing for aggressive privatization of many of the large state-owned British firms. In the following two decades, privatization policies were implemented throughout the planet, as both left and right leaning governments alike undertook a policy of privatization. Right wing governments engaged in privatization in an effort to keep down the size of government, while Left wing governments implemented privatization policies in order to generate revenues, and also because they were persuaded of the virtues of markets and competition after being disappointed with the inefficiencies of large state-owned firms. In this way, privatization spread from Europe to Latin America, Asia and Africa, reaching a high point with the transition from socialism to capitalism following the fall of the Berlin wall. Transition economies were then faced with the task of privatizing their whole economies. In theses cases, quite diverse policies were put in place, ranging from a gradual sale of state property to foreign and domestic investors (as was the case in Hungary and Poland) to more radical programs called "mass privatization programs" which resulted in the rapid giveaway of state owned assets.

This article proposes a classification of "slow-moving" & "fast-moving" institutions, & discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving institution is culture, including values, beliefs, & social norms, which tend to change gradually. Political institutions are typically fast-moving institutions; exemplifying the nature of this category, political institutions do not necessarily change often but can change very quickly -- sometimes nearly overnight. The interaction between slow-moving & fast-moving institutions can shed light on institutional change (why, how, & when it occurs) & evinces both the difficulty of transplanting institutions into different cultural contexts & the advantages of diverse institutional "blueprints" for efficient growth & development. 55 References. Adapted from the source document.

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and average polity scores and durations of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist cultures also are more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.

We review the literature on the rise of identity politics and populism in Europe. Populist parties have gained large vote shares since the Great Recession of 2008. We observe in many countries, and even in the European Parliament, a transformation of the main dimension of politics from the left–right cleavage to a new cleavage opposing the mainstream parties to populist parties. We examine how this transformation relates to changes in voter attitudes and the adjustment of political parties to these changes. Two main types of causes for the rise of populism have emerged: economic and cultural. In reviewing the evidence, we find a complex interaction between economic and cultural factors. Economic anxiety among large groups of voters related to the Great Recession and austerity policies triggers a heightened receptivity to the messages of cultural backlash from populist parties.

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and average polity scores and durations of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist cultures also are more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.

We present empirical evidence that, among a variety of cultural dimensions, the individualism-collectivism dimension, based on Hofstede's (2001) data, is the most important and robustly significant effect of culture on long run growth. Other dimensions that have a significant effect, albeit less robust, are generally strongly correlated with individualism and convey similar information. We found no significant or robust effect on growth from cultural dimensions that are independent from the individualism-collectivism cleavage.

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agriculture. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.