Search results

The choice facing British government about maintaining the status quo for sterling or joining the euro is a choice between long-term policy regimes. Short-term considerations such as the relative position of business cycles or the current level of the sterling-euro exchange rate have a bearing on the adjustment costs and the timing of entry. The article therefore examines the EMU framework versus the British framework for monetary policy; the performance of economic policy in Britain and in Euroland, and especially Germany as Euroland's main precursor; the relevance to the adjustment costs of membership to the Maastricht criteria and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's five economic tests for joining the euro; and whether or not Britain can qualify for joining EMU. The analysis is broadened to include supporting policies for monetary policy, especially fiscal, labour market and other structural policies where relevant.

Compares European Monetary Union (EMU) and British frameworks for monetary policy, their economic performances, and determines if Britain can qualify for membership based on the Maastricht criteria and the five economic tests set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Politicians on all sides failed to engage in serious debate about trade policy in the referendum. The ensuing debates on the implementation of Brexit lacked clarity on trade policy, processes, and the implications of these for business, consumers and the ability to negotiate new deals. The UK Government has only been consistent in its ability to frequently change its trade policy demands. The meaning of Single Market, Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union etc were widely misunderstood. Mrs May tried to preserve 'Frictionless trade' . More recently the ability to 'strike new trade deals' has become the most advertised 'gain' from Brexit. But the argument has focussed entirely on the ability to exercise sovereignty. Economic costs, including the impact of Coronavirus Disease (COVID) and its implications for trade rules, are hardly discussed on the UK side but the EU has also taken a fairly principled stand. We are not in a position to predict the final outcome but would argue that if there were to be no deal it would not be an accident but rather a logical consequence of the British view emphasizing sovereignty above all else.
Trade- Trade policy-Regulation, Sovereignty, Brexit- European Union , Negotiations

This paper considers the agenda for UK trade negotiations over the post-Brexit period. There are several groups of countries that will need to be dealt with and we consider the priorities among them. Negotiations with the WTO and the EU are the most important and the most pressing in time, and should be pursued simultaneously. On the former, the UK must try quickly to establish its independent WTO status, which will be greatly facilitated by minimising the changes it proposes to its tariffs schedules. On the EU the UK needs to consider the choices between remaining in the customs union, creating an FTA with the EU and maintaining the 'regulatory union' that is the European Economic Area (EEA). Only when relations with the EU and WTO are clear will it be feasible to negotiate trade deals of various sorts with other countries, ranging from those with which we already have deals via the EU to those that currently trade with us on 'WTO rules'. All of this takes time and we argue that it may be worth pursuing transitional arrangements to extend certain current trading arrangements a few years beyond Brexit in order to make time for serious negotiations.