Suchergebnisse

From 1990 to the early 2000s, in order to solve the sudden crisis caused by the collapse of the USSR, the Cuban government prioritized the reconstruction of the international tourism sector and the development of telecommunications services and nickel mining (Pérez-Villanueva, 2004). To this end, it enforced policies aimed at attracting direct foreign investments, mainly from Canada and Europe. At the same time, the Cuban government legalized new forms of self-employment1 in order to boost productivity and incorporate a part of the growing informal economy into the formal economy (Henken, 2005). As a result of crisis and reforms, Cuban socio-economic structures have changed. New economic sectors, the so-called emergent sectors, appeared and, more generally the services and primary sectors grew, while the secondary sector decayed (Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012). Moreover, inequality started to grow and a process of social re-stratification occurred (Ranis and Kosak, 2004; Mesa-Lago, 2004; Espina-Prieto, 2004; Romanò, 2012). Studies on inequality carried out in Cuba show that in the Cuban labor market, the emergent sectors provide the most economically-profitable occupations (Espina-Prieto, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010; Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012; Zabala, 2010; Henken, 2000, 2002, 2008; Corrales, 2004). In effect, a recent study by the Center for Psychological and Sociological Studies (CIPS, hereafter), a research center affiliated with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, notes that Cubans associate the attainment of economically advantageous position in emergent sectors to paths of upward mobility (Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012). Therefore, in the paper I will use the terms profitable and desirable interchangeably. In the evolving socio-economic structures briefly described above, control of specific resources (e.g., education, expertise, information, influence) has enabled some individuals to move to new employment or new occupational positions, while others who lacked such control remained stuck in their traditional positions. In the Cuban labor market the more economically profitable positions do not necessarily coincide with the more prestigious ones; therefore, restrictions were established to avoid skilled technicians or professionals from traditional sectors (i.e., doctors and other health workers, professors and teachers) migrating towards more gainful jobs in order to cope better with the effects of the crisis. To this end, the government has strengthened the restrictions limiting job changes between ministries. In order to be hired by an enterprise or institution a job seeker must show his or her work-record. Applicants to emergent sector jobs or those seeking self-employment licenses must also have a clean criminal record, especially if they are expected to work in front-offices, interacting with foreigners. Taking the above-mentioned basic factors into account, this paper will try to answer the following question: how do individuals reach the economically profitable state-jobs in emergent sectors? To answer this question I will focus on the role of party affiliation and personal networks in the labor market. Before formulating the hypotheses, I will first review what is already known about inequality in mixed socialist economies and in Cuban society as well.

In the 1990s, the Cuban government implemented a set of market-oriented reforms in order to cope with the economic crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. These reforms were followed by a sharp increase in inequality. This rise in inequality can be best understood by looking at what profitable economic exchanges are made possible to which actors by the reforms. Using survey data specifically collected in Havana, we show that new opportunities to accumulate wealth accrue to actors who occupy positions whereby they can legitimately access exchanges that take place in hard currency. This advantage holds for both entrepreneurs and state employees, who work for state-owned enterprises operating in emergent sectors (intrapreneurs), suggesting that the distinction between market and plan is not paramount to explain inequality. Furthermore, actors that do not have legitimate access to exchanges in hard currency benefit from their personal ties to those actors that do

Le statistiche sociali ed economiche di Cuba mostrano che la isla grande ha raggiunto notevoli risultati sociali nonostante performance economiche relativamente modeste, per giunta funestate negli ultimi venticinque anni da due profonde crisi economiche. Il principale intento di questo libro è descrivere il modello sociale ed economico cubano nei suoi tratti essenziali ed analizzare le sue zigzaganti evoluzioni nel corso degli ultimi venticinque anni, dalla dissoluzione dell'URSS all'implementazione delle "Linee guida di politica sociale ed economica" (approvate dal VI e ultimo Congresso del Partito Comunista di Cuba del 2011), passando per gli anni 2000 della cosiddetta "manna venezuelana" in cui il governo cubano godette di privilegiati accordi di cooperazione economica con il Venezuela di Hugo Chávez. A tal fine, il volume presenta e compara alcune statistiche sociali ed economiche di Cuba con quelle di altri paesi caraibici e del Centro America ed analizza le riforme sociali ed economiche dagli anni '90 ad oggi.

AbstractIn the 1990s, the Cuban government implemented a set of market-oriented reforms in order to cope with the economic crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. These reforms were followed by a sharp increase in inequality. This rise in inequality can be best understood by looking at what profitable economic exchanges are made possible to which actors by the reforms. Using survey data specifically collected in Havana, we show that new opportunities to accumulate wealth accrue to actors who occupy positions whereby they can legitimately access exchanges that take place in hard currency. This advantage holds for both entrepreneurs and state employees, who work for state-owned enterprises operating in emergent sectors (intrapreneurs), suggesting that the distinction between market and plan is not paramount to explain inequality. Furthermore, actors that do not have legitimate access to exchanges in hard currency benefit from their personal ties to those actors that do.

In Italia si stima che la sovra-istruzione interessi tra il 23% e il 36% dei giovani lau-reati. Anche al fine di contrastare questo fenomeno, le azioni intraprese nel corso degli ultimi anni sono state diverse. Tra queste ci sono anche la promozione delle esperienze di tirocinio sia curricolare sia extra-curricolare. L'idea è che attraverso le esperienze di tirocinio i giovani acquisiscono competenze professionalizzanti che sono particolarmente apprezzate e richieste nel mercato del lavoro. Questo studio analizza se le esperienze di tirocinio curricolare ed extracurricolare contribuiscano a prevenire la sovra-istruzione. A tal fine sono stati elaborati dei modelli di regres-sione longitudinale utilizzando i dati AlmaLaurea sui laureati magistrali del 2014 e intervistati al momento della laurea, e a uno, tre e cinque anni dal conseguimento del titolo. I risultati suggeriscono che le esperienze di tirocinio curricolare non influi-scono sulla sovra-istruzione, mentre quelle di tirocinio extra-curricolare tendono ad associarsi a situazioni di sovra-istruzione.

Nuestro estudio es el primer análisis que muestra la tendencia de la distribución del bienestar en Cuba, en el periodo de las reformas económicas y sociales impulsadas por el presidente Raúl Castro. Los análisis revelan que el bienestar, premisa del desarrollo humano y medido como acceso a bienes y servicios fundamentales y no monetarios, ha aumentado, a pesar de la crisis económica; en tanto que las desigualdades en el acceso al bienestar han aumentado poco en el periodo 2006-2011 y han disminuido en el periodo siguiente, para llegar en 2014 a un nivel ligeramente inferior al de 2006.