Suchergebnisse

States can do much to tap community-level energies & resources for development if they seek to interact more synergistically with local communities. The broader spin-off is the creation of a developmental society & polity. Using case studies from Asia & Latin America, we illustrate how (1) state efforts to bring about land reform, tenancy reform, & expand noncrop sources of income can broaden the distribution of power in rural communities, laying the basis for more effective community-driven collective action; & (2) higher levels of government can form alliances with communities, putting pressure on local authorities from above & below to improve development outcomes at the local level. These alliances can also be very effective in catalyzing collective action at community level, & reducing "local capture" by vested interests. There are several encouraging points that emerge from these case studies. First, powerful institutional changes do not necessarily take long to generate. Second, they can be achieved in a diversity of settings: tightly knit or open communities; war-ravaged or relatively stable; democratic or authoritarian; with land reform or (if carefully managed) even without. Third, there are strong political payoffs in terms of legitimacy & popular support for those who support such developmental action. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 101 References. Adapted from the source document.

States can do much to tap community-level energies and resources for development if they seek to interact more synergistically with local communities. The broader spin-off is the creation of a developmental society and polity. Using case studies from Asia and Latin America, we illustrate how: (1) state efforts to bring about land reform, tenancy reform, and expanding non-crop sources of income can broaden the distribution of power in rural communities, laying the basis for more effective community-driven collective action; and (2) higher levels of government can form alliances with communities, putting pressure on local authorities from above and below to improve development outcomes at the local level. These alliances can also be very effective in catalysing collective action at community level, and reducing "local capture" by vested interests. There are several encouraging points that emerge from these case studies. First, powerful institutional changes do not necessarily take long to generate. Second, they can be achieved in a diversity of settings: tightly knit or open communities; war-ravaged or relatively stable; democratic or authoritarian; with land reform or (if carefully managed) even without. Third, there are strong political pay-offs in terms of legitimacy and popular support for those who support such developmental action. (Original abstract)

The authors argue that complementary hostile and benevolent components of sexism exist across cultures. Male dominance creates hostile sexism IHS), but men's dependence on women fosters benevolent sexism (BS)-subjectively positive attitudes that put women on a pedestal but reinforce their subordination. Research with 15,000 men and women in 19 nations showed that (a) HS and BS are coherent constructs that correlate positively across nations, but (b) HS predicts the ascription of negative and BS the ascription of positive traits to women, (c) relative to men, women are more likely to reject HS than BS, especially when overall levels of sexism in a culture are high, and (d) national averages on BS and HS predict gender inequality across nations. These results challenge prevailing notions of prejudice as an antipathy in that BS tan affectionate, patronizing ideology) reflects inequality and is a cross-culturally pervasive complement to HS.