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The relevance of the study consists in the fact that the changes in the 1860-70s in the Empire determine the beginning of positive developments within the judicial system. Consequently, the objective of the article was to study the historical stages of the transformations in the judicial system and procedure in the Russian Empire in 1864. The main research method was deductive that allowed to study the nature and the key historical stages of the transformations in the judicial system and legal procedure in the Russian Empire in 1864. The solution to the problem posed was based on studying the legal foundations of the significance (place and function) of the judicial reform of 1864 within the general historical development of Russia. It is concluded that the key judicial principles include democratic foundations such as publicity in the oral process, frankness, and the right to a lawyer. Furthermore, it highlights that the authors of the Judicial Regulations of 1864 studied not only English and French law, but also examined the codes of procedure of Geneva and the Kingdom of Sardinia. Thus, the Russian jury trial became a new step in the development of European legal culture.

The objective of the article is to find optimal ways to develop the judicial interpretation of legal norms as a form of application (explanation) by courts of norms of current legislation. Justice is one of the most important security functions of the judicial power system in Russia and, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is exercised in civil, administrative, criminal, and constitutional court proceedings. The inevitability of the existence of the judicial lawmaking institution implies the necessity to adjust the understanding of the principle of the separation of powers so that the lawmaking function is distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power. The leading method of studying the problem is deductive, which allows studying the legal nature of the judicial interpretation of legal norms. The article concludes that the existence of discretion in the legal system is conditioned by several objective factors. These factors include the objective impossibility of regulation by the general norm of all individual legal relations; the existence of evaluative concepts, dispositive, and peremptory legal norms containing relatively certain or alternative sanctions; the existence of open legal lists, gaps in the law, and collisions of legislation. The thesis is argued that it is impossible to level out by subjective preferences one of such objective phenomena of legal regulation as legitimacy and law enforcement discretion. At the same time, legitimacy is a phenomenon of a higher order. In a sustainable democratic legal system, law enforcement discretion can function only in terms of legitimacy.