Suchergebnisse

Kriger vinnes i det kognitive domenet. Denne hypotesen er utgangspunkt for denne analysen av krigen mot terrorisme og dens tilhørende strategiske narrativer. Artikkelen gir støtte til hypotesen og understreker sammenhengen mellom krigens faktiske utvikling, og dens narrativer. Artikkelen analyserer selve narrativet om en krig mot terrorisme. Hvordan oppstod dette master-narrativet? Hvordan utviklet det seg over tid? Hva ble det erstattet av, og hvilke aktører var sentrale i å utfase frasen «krig mot terrorisme»? To nøkkelaktører i å avslutte både krigen mot terrorisme og narrativet om den er ISIL og president Barack Obama. ISIL overtok rollen som verdens mest fryktede og mektige terrorgruppe, og stilte dermed Al Qaida i skyggen. Mens Obama helt systematisk valgte å ikke benytte frasen «krig mot terror». En krig som aldri nevnes av USAs commander-in-chief er ikke lenger et operasjonelt militært konsept. Med likvideringen av bin Laden i 2011 gav Obama USA en slags «closure» for 9/11-traumet. For krigen mot terror var alltid president George W. Bush sin krig. Han etterlot seg to bakkekriger som man vanskelig kan påstå at USA kunne vinne. Men Bush sin strategi-omlegging i Irak i 2007, «The Surge», skaffet USA nok pusterom til å trekke seg ut. Men med ISILs hurtige fremvekst ble gleden kortvarig, ettersom de opprettet en pseudo-stat i Levanten.
Abstract in English:Narratives from the War on TerrorWars are decided in the cognitive domain. This hypothesis is supported by this article on the war on terrorism and its strategic narrative. The analysis emphasizes how the physical warfighting is inextricably linked to the strategic narratives of the war. Special consideration is given here to the master narrative establishing the war on terror. How was this narrative constructed? How did it develop over time? What replaced it, and what actors were crucial in retiring the phrase 'war on terror'? Two key actors in this respect were ISIL and President Barack Obama. ISIL eclipsed Al Qaida as the world's most feared and infamous terror group. Whereas Obama systematically avoided using the phrase 'war on terror' altogether. A war that is never mentioned by the USA's Commander-in-Chief is no longer an operational military concept. Equipped with the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Obama brought closure to the national trauma of 9/11. Because the war on terrorism was always George W. Bush's war. He left behind two large scale ground wars with little prospect of success in either of them. He did provide a temporary change of fortune in Iraq with 'the Surge' of fresh troops in 2007. But these gains were soon enough erased as ISIL grew and developed into a pseudo-state in northern Iraq and Syria.

- ; Political communication comes in various forms. The first part of this paper presents some variants of political communication, and provides a set of definitions of such communication. A centre of gravity is along the borderline and overlap between rhetoric and propaganda. It is argued here that rhetoric unlike propaganda has a potential for deliberation. Propaganda is inherently hostile towards debate and discussion. This reluctance towards debate and discussion has at times been evident as regards the Bush administration's war on terrorism. The second part of the article deals with propaganda from the Bush administration aimed at quelling debate. All the principals from the first George W. Bush administration (2001-2005) took part in this strategy. Most of the material presented here is explained in more detail in Anders G. Romarheim (2005). "Crossfire of Fear: Propaganda in the US War on Terrorism" Hovedoppgave i Statsvitenskap, ISV, UIO.

In the 1990s, American public diplomacy was built down & neglected following its merits during the Cold War. After September 11, (2001), this field has, however, had a renaissance. But at present, the Cold War situation is inverted. In the struggle against communism, the US typically faced hostile regimes with populations yearning for Western ideology & values. Today a heavy reliance on mechanisms of marketing seems to have deteriorated US public diplomacy, whereas the Arab world is far from fertile soil for US public diplomacy. America's current enemies tend to be sub-national actors with hostile perceptions of the US, & larger populations show strong anti-American sentiments. Most activities that are labeled public diplomacy also belong in the realm of propaganda, but so-called white propaganda -- ie, the sender is known. But can public diplomacy work unless the state it originates from combines it with a policy that is saleable to the target audience? 1 Figure, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.