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Throughout American history, the government has used U.S. citizenship and immigration law to protect privileged groups from less privileged ones, using citizenship as a "legitimate" proxy for otherwise invidious, and often unconstitutional, discrimination on the basis of race. While racial discrimination is rarely legally acceptable today, profiling on the basis of citizenship is still largely unchecked, and has in fact arguably increased in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks on the United States. In this thoughtful examination of the intersection between American immigration and constitutional law, Victor C. Romero draws our attention to a "constitutional immigration law paradox" that reserves certain rights for U.S. citizens only, while simultaneously purporting to treat all people fairly under constitutional law regardless of citizenship.As a naturalized Filipino American, Romero brings an outsider's perspective to Alienated, forcing us to look at constitutional immigration law from the vantage point of people whose citizenship status is murky (either legally or from the viewpoint of other citizens and lawmakers), including foreign-born adoptees, undocumented immigrants, tourists, foreign students, and same-gender bi-national partners. Romero endorses an equality-based reading of the Constitution and advocates a new theoretical and practical approach that protects the individual rights of non-citizens without sacrificing their personhood

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed the long-standing equal protection doctrine that government actors can only be held liable for discriminatory conduct when they purposefully rely on a forbidden characteristic, such as race or gender, in promulgating policy; to simply know that minorities and women will be adversely affected by the law does not deny these groups equal protection under the law. This Essay interrogates this doctrine by taking a closer look at Iqbal and Feeney, the thirty-year-old precedent the majority cited as the source of its antidiscrimination standard. Because Feeney was cited in neither of the lower court opinions, its reappearance in Iqbal signals the Court's reluctance to intervene in matters (even tangentially) related to national security even if the government's allocation of burdens and benefits perpetuates societal racial and gender privileges. In Feeney, the Court upheld a Massachusetts law granting benefits to war veterans, even though the state legislature was aware that less than two percent of the veterans at the time were women, owing in part to women's exclusion from military service; thirty years later, the Iqbal Court dismissed constitutional claims against two high ranking federal officials responsible for orchestrating modern-day round-ups of noncitizens from so-called terrorist-breeding states, even though these officials knew their policies would disproportionately burden individuals of a certain racial, religious, and citizenship background. Both cases illustrate the inertia that has befallen the Court as it appears unwilling to engage in the traditional balancing of government interests against individual rights on the theory that the disaffected minorities must essentially prove that lawmakers bore them the equivalent of ill will or animus-in Feeney's words, reiterated verbatim in Iqbal: that the decisionmakers chose a course of action "because of not merely in spite of [the action's] adverse effects upon an identifiable group. By taking a closer look at the ...