Suchergebnisse

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents' preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proo frule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We study the evolution of political power and show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield political power to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible. We also show that high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes. We call this political unemployment. ; Thanks to the MOMA network under the Project ECO2014-57673-REDT for financial support. The first author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. Luis Corchon and Antonio Romero-Medina acknowledge financial support from MEC under Project ECO2014_57442_P, and financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants MYGRANT and MDM 2014-0431.

We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whomto hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in threeclasses, high, medium and low productivity.We study the evolution of political powerand show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield politicalpower to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible.We also showthat high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes.We call this political unemployment ; Thanks to the MOMA network under the Project ECO2014-57673-REDT for financial support. The first author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. Luis Corchon and Antonio Romero-Medina acknowledge financial support from MEC under Project ECO2014_57442_P, and financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants MYGRANT and MDM 2014-0431.

We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution. This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a twosided matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if research centers decided by majority to play either the old or the new mechanism. Our results prove that in a repeated game and assuming that research personnel is scarce, even endogamic centers will prefer the new mechanism after a finite number of calls. We also analyze application data for the first five calls, finding empirical support to our assumptions and theoretical findings.

We study the e§ect of a Program, aimed at Önancing high qual- ity researchers to integrate them into the Spanish scientiÖc system, on the relative ex post performance of the researchers awarded. We assess the e§ect of the contract status on the scientiÖc productivity of applicants, in the four-year period after application. Both the con- ditional regression and the matching results show that the contract status has no e§ect on the average number of published contributions, but it exhibits, for several areas, a positive e§ect on the scientiÖc qual- ity of contributions (as measured by its impact). This result points out the success of the Program in increasing the scientiÖc impact of the Spanish system.

We analyse a competitive research-oriented public programme established in Spain, the Ramon y Cajal Programme, intended to offer contracts in public research centres to high-quality researchers. We study the effects of the programme on the ex post scientific productivity of its recipients, relative to non-granted applicants with comparable curricula at the time of application. The full sample results demonstrate that the programme has a positive and significant effect on the scientific productivity of the recipients, as measured both by the amount of published contribution and by the impact of their publications. Consequently, receiving a contract affects the quantity, but also increases the quality, of the contract recipients' publications. ; Research funding from the Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness, Grant Nos. ECO2015-65204-P (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2014- 57442P (Romero-Medina), ECO2015-70331-C2-1- R (Sánchez- Mangas), MDM20140431 (Alonso-Borrego and Romero- Medina) and Comunidad de Madrid, Grant No. MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 (all authors) is acknowledged

We analyze a competitive research-oriented public program established in Spain, the Ramon yCajal Program, intended to offer contracts in public research centers to high-quality researchers.We study the effects of the Program on the ex-post scientific productivity of its recipients, relativeto unsuccessful applicants with comparable curricula at the time of application. The full sampleresults demonstrate that the Program has a positive and significant effect on the scientific impactof the recipients, as measured by the average and the maximum impact factors, but the effect onthe number of published papers is not significant. Consequently, receiving a contract does notsignificantly affect the quantity, but increases the quality, of the contract recipients' publications.This result is primarily driven by the particular relevance of experimental sciences in the Program. ; Research funding from the Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness, Grant Nos. ECO2012-31358 (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2011-25330 (Romero-Medina) and ECO2012-32854 (Sánchez-Mangas) is acknowledged

We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded with a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates without attachment to the system were equalized.